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3General CharaCterIstICs and  
OrIGIn Of thIs BOOk
wenceslao J. gonzalez
1. General CharaCterIstICs Of thIs VOlume
New Methodological Perspectives on Observation and Experimentation in Science is a 
book that deals with a classic topic that is seen from new angles. thus, its nine chapters 
seek “non-traditional” aspects, trying to extend the boundaries of this philosophical-
methodological theme. they are presented in five sections: 1) A Philosophical-Methodological 
Context; 2) Experience and Scientific Observations; 3) Empirical Support and Experiments in 
Science; 4) Changes in the Framework on Observation and Experimentation; and 5) Enlarging 
the Philosophical Scope: law and Ecology.
in addition to the novelty in the contents, this book has another relevant feature: New 
Methodological Perspectives on Observation and Experimentation in Science belongs to the 
new series regarding philosophy and methodology of science published by Netbiblo. On the one 
hand, from the point of view of the search for academic rigor, it is clearly inspired by the 
prestigious collections of studies already available; and, on the other hand, this new series is 
published by a more recent publishing house that has a particular interest in the internet and 
the new possibilities opened up by the World Wide Web. 
Since 2003 this house has been publishing a set of books on philosophy and methodology 
of science. From the beginning, it was considered a presence in the paper format as well as in 
the electronic presentation, which is nowadays the case. these books deal with contemporary 
approaches to the philosophical-methodological realm. Commonly, they look for an enlarged 
vision of the field and, therefore, they are oriented towards originality. these volumes are 
now listed under the label of Serie de Filosofía y Metodología de la Ciencia/Philosophy and 
Methodology of Science Series. 
the first book of this series of Netbiblo was in Spanish: Racionalidad, historicidad y 
predicción en Herbert A. Simon, 2003. but the volumes were published in English very soon: 
Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, 2005; Contemporary Perspectives 
in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, 2006; and Evolutionism: Present Approaches, 2008. 
the list, which is available at the end of this volume, is opened to the future according to a plan 
of offering to the reader new contributions to this academic sphere.
From the beginning there were two “ideal models” of this new series in philosophy and 
methodology of science. One of them is the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, a 
collection published for many years by Kluwer Academic Press and with a prestigious record; 
and the other is the Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, which 
belong to Rodopi and whose catalog includes very relevant publications. the new series is also 
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rooted in a University —A Coruña— and shares the interest in an international presence, but it 
has its own character within the framework of academic standards. 
2. OrIGIn Of the BOOk
Originally, these papers were delivered at the Jornadas sobre Observación y experimentación 
en la Ciencia: Nuevas perspectivas metodológicas (Conference on Observation and 
Experimentation in Science: New Philosophical Perspectives), organized by the University 
of A Coruña with the support of the Society of logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
in Spain. the meeting was held at the Campus of Ferrol on 8th and 9th of March 2007. the 
discussions were oriented towards the main goal: new approaches on scientific observation 
and recent contributions on experimentation in science. As in the case of the previous 
Jornadas sobre Filosofía y Metodología actual de la Ciencia (Conferences on Contemporary 
Philosophy and Methodology of Science), the twelfth edition of these meetings has its central 
interest in the reflections developed nowadays.
the conference had a keynote speaker: Mary S. Morgan, Professor at the London School 
of Economics, where she has lectured since 1988, and the University of Amsterdam, where 
she has taught since 1992. She is a Fellow of the British Academy (2002) and a correspondent 
member of the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Netherlands (2002). She has been 
president of the History of Economics Society (2004-2005). before her academic career, she 
worked for the Citibank (london, 1973-1975) and the bank of England (1978-1979). After 
her PhD at the London School of Economics (1984), she worked at several universities: york 
(1984-1987), Duke (1987), … She have worked in editorial committees such as History of 
Political Economy (1988), Journal of Economic Methodology (1996), Journal for the History 
of Economic Thought (1997), …
Morgan is the author of influential books, such as The History of Econometric Ideas (1990), 
The Foundations of Econometric Analysis (1995, written with D. F. hendry), and Methodology 
and Tacit Knowledge: Two Experiments in Econometrics (1999, prepared with J. R. Magnus). 
She is also the editor of several books, such as Higgling: Transactors and Their Markets in 
the History of Economics (1994, with N. de Marchi), From Interwar Pluralism to Post-War 
Neoclassicism (1998, with M. Rutherford), Models as Mediators (1999, with M. Morrison), …
Among her papers related to the topics of this conference are “Finding a Satisfactory Empirical 
Model” (1988), “Design of the Experiment” (1997), “What Makes the Empirical Models-Policy 
interaction Successful?” (1998), “is Data Mining a Methodological Problem?” (2000), “Ceteris 
paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic theories” (2001, with Marcel 
boumans), “Model Experiments and Models in Experiments” (2002), “Experiments without 
Material intervention: Model Experiments, Virtual Experiments and Virtually Experiments” 
(2003), “Simulation: the birth of a technology to Create ‘Evidence’ in Economics” (2004), 
“Experiments versus Models: New Phenomena, inference, and Surprise” (2005), …
Another international speaker was Maria Carla Galavotti. She is Professor of Philosophy 
of Science at the University of bologna. She has been a Visiting fellow in a large number of 
institutions, such as the Department of Philosophy at the University of Princeton, the Center for 
the Study of Language and Information at the University of Stanford, the Center of Philosophy 
of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. She is a member of Clare hall College, Cambridge 
University, and she works in editorial committees such as Erkenntnis; Vienna Circle Institute 
Yearbook and Sciences et techniques en perspective. 
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Galavotti’s main lines of research are focused on the foundations of probability and statistics, 
scientific explanation, probabilistic causation, the role and structure of the models in natural 
sciences and social sciences. Among her contributions are several books as editor: Stochastic 
Causality (2001, co-edited with P. Suppes and D. Costantini), Observation and Experiment 
in the Natural and Social Sciences (2003), Cambridge and Vienna. Frank P. Ramsey and the 
Vienna Circle (2006), and Reasoning, Rationality and Probability (2008, with R. Scazzieri, 
and P. Suppes). She is the author of “harold Jeffreys’ Epistemology between logicism and 
Subjectivism” (2003), “Kinds of Probabilism” (2003), and Philosophical Introduction to 
Probability (2005).
Other invited speakers were several Professors of logic and Philosophy of Science: 
Amparo Gómez (University of la laguna), José Antonio lópez Cerezo (University of 
Oviedo), and José Ferreirós (University of Seville). the authors of the contributed papers 
come from other institutions: Obdulia torres (University of Salamanca); María G. bonome 
(University of A Coruña); and luis Marone (CONiCEt, Argentina) and Rafael González del 
Solar (Autonomous University of barcelona). 
Each one of these participants has developed new angles of the views on observation and 
experimentation in science, seeing it from a philosophical-methodological perspective. in 
addition to the papers presented in this conference, the book includes a new chapter prepared 
by the editor of the volume. On the one hand, the content was written in order to offer the 
philosophical-methodological context of the topic as well as to contribute in some extent to 
the discussion on this issue. On the other hand, the initial paper has a practical aim: to be 
particularly helpful for the reading of other chapters of the book, especially for those that like 
to move from the general scope to the particular details.
3. PuBlICatIOns frOm the COnferenCes On COntemPOrary PhIlOsOPhy and 
methOdOlOGy Of sCIenCe 
Annually, from 1996 up to now, we have had the Conferences on Contemporary Philosophy 
and Methodology of Science at the University of A Coruña, Ferrol Campus. the keynote 
speakers have been so far: larry laudan, ilkka Niiniluoto, Evandro Agazzi, Daniel hausman, 
John Worrall, Wesley Salmon, Peter Machamer, Donald Gillies, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 
James lennox, Philip Kitcher, Mary Morgan, Peter Clark, Paul thagard and thomas Nickles. 
All of them have presented two papers in these Jornadas sobre Filosofía y Metodología actual 
de la Ciencia. in addition, other well-known professors have presented papers: Merrilee h. 
Salmon, James E. McGuire, Jarret leplin, Jean Gayon, Maria Carla Galavotti, Matti Sintonen, 
Subrata Dasgupta, … these fifteen years had a previous stage in the course given by Nicholas 
Rescher in 1995. his lectures —in addition with other papers— have been published in his 
book Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, Paidós, barcelona, 1999.
Following the policy of publishing the main papers presented each year plus a chapter of 
contextualization of the topic, there is a set of publications under the label of Colección Gallaecia. 
Estudios de Filosofía y Metodología actual de la Ciencia (Gallaecia Collection. Studies 
in Contemporary Philosophy and Methodology of Science). During the initial years the 
volumes published were Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Progreso científico e innovación tecnológica, 
monographic issue of Arbor, v. 157, n. 620, (1997); Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), El Pensamiento de 
L. Laudan. Relaciones entre Historia de la Ciencia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Publicaciones 
Universidad de A Coruña, A Coruña, 1998; Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Ciencia y valores éticos, 
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monographic issue of Arbor, v. 162, n. 638, (1999); Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Problemas filosóficos 
y metodológicos de la Economía en la Sociedad tecnológica actual, monographic issue of 
Argumentos de Razón técnica, v. 3, (2000); and Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), La Filosofía de Imre 
Lakatos: Evaluación de sus propuestas, UNED, Madrid, 2001.
After these volumes, the conferences of the following years were published: Gonzalez, 
W. J. (ed.), Diversidad de la explicación científica, Ariel, barcelona, 2002; Gonzalez, W. J. 
(ed.), Análisis de Thomas Kuhn: Las revoluciones científicas, trotta, Madrid, 2004; Gonzalez, 
W. J. (ed.), Karl Popper: Revisión de su legado, Unión Editorial, Madrid, 2004; Gonzalez, W. J. 
(ed.), Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2005; 
and Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Evolutionism: Present Approaches, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2008. 
Although the tradition has been to publish in English since 2005, there is an exception due to 
the support of the Spanish Ministry of Culture to the topic on evolutionism: Gonzalez, W. J. 
(ed), Evolucionismo: Darwin y enfoques actuales, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2009. in a few months’ 
time, besides the present book, the publication is expected of Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Scientific 
Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Sciences and the humanities, Rodopi, Amsterdam.
4. aCknOwledGments
When a project becomes real, there are commonly some institutions and persons that have 
been particularly relevant to the activity. in this regard, my first acknowledgement goes to the 
City hall of Ferrol, especially to the councilman for culture, who is well aware of the relevance of this 
nexus between university and society. My gratitude is also to the Spanish Ministry of Science 
and Education for the support given to this conference through the Secretary of State for 
Scientific and technological Policy (hUM2006-28005-E). My recognition to the Santander 
bank, the economic entity that facilitates the cultural activities promoted by University of 
A Coruña.
Regarding persons, i want to mention the Rector of the University of A Coruña, because 
of his manifest consideration of these Jornadas, and the Vice-rector of Ferrol Campus, who 
has given support to this congress. My appreciation goes expressly to Mary S. Morgan for 
accepting my invitation, which has allowed us to go more deeply into the issues on observation 
and experimentation. My recognition also goes to Maria Carla Galavotti, who is a very well 
known figure in the European philosophy of science. i am grateful for the presence of my 
colleagues Amparo Gómez, José Antonio lópez Cerezo and José Ferreirós. in addition, i am 
happy with the authors of the contributed papers.
Within the closer sphere of collaborators, i thank the work done by the people of the 
support team. they have been especially helpful for material and organizational matters. in 
this regard, my gratitude is greater in the case of those persons that have been collaborating in 
all the editions of these Jornadas. Furthermore i am thankful to those who have assisted me 
in administrative matters. in addition, i am grateful to the media that have informed of this 
activity. Obviously, i have a warm recognition to those who have cooperated in editorial tasks: 
José Fco. Martínez Solano and Jéssica Rey.
Ferrol, 2 March 2010
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variations in the reflection on 
observation and experimentation
1. recent approaches on observation and experimentation: 
a Philosophical-Methodological viewpoint

9reCent aPPrOaChes On OBserVatIOn and exPerImentatIOn: 
a PhIlOsOPhICal-methOdOlOGICal VIewPOInt *
wenceslao J. gonzalez 
Observation and experimentation are among the central topics of philosophy and 
methodology of science. 1 From the beginning of these studies, the empirical sciences have 
been commonly associated to observational and experimental processes, because they have 
been considered crucial for testing their contents. thus, observation and experimentation 
have received attention from different angles, and they have been historically relevant in the 
advancement of science. the general context for their philosophical-methodological analysis 
should include some key aspects, which are those related to axiological, epistemological and 
methodological issues. 
Axiologically, the scientific values associated with observation and experimentation are 
those connected to the degree in the control of reality independent of the human mind. thus, 
the main aims of observation and experimentation in science are to guarantee the reliability 
and validity of empirical evidence used in those empirical sciences. Epistemologically, 
observation and experimentation are valuable for basic science as well as for applied 
science. 2 thus, on the one hand, observation and experimentation can be used to enlarge 
our knowledge of the world (natural, social or artificial); and, on the other hand, they can 
be utilized to solve specific problems within a well-defined realm. Methodologically, 
observation and experimentation are used for testing scientific theories. but the methods 
based on them can do more that: they might have a large number of different purposes, 3 
including, obviously, the practical ones.
Underlying this general philosophical-methodological context of analysis in empirical 
sciences, there are many features on observation and experimentation to be considered. 
Among them are the following epistemological and methodological aspects. (i) Frequently, 
empirical sciences are divided in two large groups: the natural sciences and the social sciences. 
Nevertheless, there is a third important group: the sciences of the artificial, in general, 4 and 
the sciences of design, in particular. these disciplines have developed strongly development in 
*  this research is supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and innovation (FFi2008-05948).
1  the bibliography included in this chapter illustrates the interest in this topic, which has drawn the attention from 
quite different angles. Among the large list of publications in this regard in recent times, see Galavotti, M. C. (ed.), 
Observation and Experiment in the Natural and the Social Sciences, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, and Franklin, A., 
Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008.
2  On the notion of “applied science” see niiniluoto, i., “the Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” Erkenntnis, 
v. 38, (1993), pp. 1-21.
3  Cf. BoGen, J., “Experiment and Observation,” in MachaMer, P. and SilBerStein, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to 
the Philosophy of Science, blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp. 128 and 144.
4  Cf. SiMon, h., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996 (1st ed., 1969; 2nd ed., 1981).
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recent times, and they present special difficulties regarding this methodological framework. 5 
(ii) Although observation is widely assumed in the natural sciences and the social sciences, 
the role of experimentation in the social sciences is still controversial, including sciences such 
as economics. 6 (iii) if “observation” is understood in a very active way (i.e., as an effective 
cognitive control of an empirical event, different from a passive perception of a phenomenon), 
then its conceptual dissimilarity with “experiment” might be more complicated. (iv) there are 
a large number of conceptions on “experiment.” Some of them, such as “thought experiment” 
or simulations made by computer, do not follow the usual connection between experiment and 
“intervention” (according to a previous design and with a material contact).
here the main focus of attention is on recent approaches, taking into account the general 
context on observation and experimentation pointed out as well as the epistemological and 
methodological aspects mentioned. in addition, some elements of historical background are 
needed as a starting point for the present situation. thus, the analysis on the characterization of 
observation in science will follow five steps: a) some historical traits of this concept, elements 
that are presented in order to see its philosophical-methodological roots; b) the existence of a 
relevant shift in the natural sciences regarding observation and theory-ladenness; c) the change 
from the use of observation in the social sciences to the explicit acceptance of experiments 
in them, which raises the problem of experimentation in these sciences (i.e., possibility and 
limits); d) the variation from the study of “traditional” sciences to the elucidation of the sciences 
of the artificial; and e) the difference between actual “observations” and “simulations,” which 
has consequences for “computer simulations.”
later on, the analysis in this chapter shifts towards experiments. the emphasis will be in 
the existence of relevant differences about “experiments,” which might be seen as concepts of 
experiment rather than as a unifying and simple notion of it. in this regard, there will first be an 
analysis of the traditional approach of the laboratory experiments. Secondly, the enlarged vision 
of the diversity of experiments will be considered, insofar as it has broadened the perspective 
on what an experiment is. thirdly, the issue of the “external validity” will be pointed out, 
followed by the external view developed by bruno latour and Steven Woolgar on the social 
construction scientific facts, which leads to “ethnomethodology.” 7 Fourthly, the focus will 
move to the differences between “simulations” and “computer simulations,” which are useful 
in the sciences of the artificial, in general, and in the sciences of design, in particular. 8 Finally, 
the attention will be placed on reconsidering thought experiments and mathematical models, 
which have been especially relevant in some natural sciences, such as biology. 9
5  Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Configuración de las Ciencias de Diseño como Ciencias de lo Artificial: Papel de la inteligencia 
Artificial y de la racionalidad limitada,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño: Racionalidad limitada, 
predicción y prescripción, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2007, pp. 41-69; and Gonzalez, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in 
the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design Science,” in Galavotti, M. C., Scazzieri, R. and SuppeS, P. (eds.), 
Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, CSli Publications, Stanford, 2008, pp. 165-186.
6  Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” in kuiperS, t. (ed.), 
General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 275-301.
7  Cf. latour, b. and WoolGar, S., Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1979 (2nd edition, 1986.), and latour, b., Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
Engineers Through Society, harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
8  Cf. SiMon, h., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., pp. 4, 13-15, 17, 21, 66, 82, 177, and 180.
9  On the first case see lennox, J. G., “the Evolution of Darwinian thought Experiments,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), 
Evolutionism: Present Approaches, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2008, pp. 63-76; and lennox, J. G., “thought Experiments in 
Evolutionary biology today,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Evolutionism: Present Approaches, pp. 109-120.
the mathematical models have been crucial for some branches in biology, such as the mathematical population 
genetics of Ronald A. Fisher, J. b. S. haldane, and Sewall G. Wright.
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1. the CharaCterIzatIOn Of OBserVatIOn In sCIenCe 
Commonly, the features of the distinction between “observation” and “experiment” are 
oriented towards some elements. When the focus is on science as a human activity, they are 
usually related to ends, procedures and outcomes. a) the ends of observation are usually 
connected to the existence of a course of events (natural, social or artificial) whose perception 
is searched in order to be represented, whereas experiment involves in principle a more direct 
intervention on the event, within a deliberately prepared setting. b) the researcher in the 
procedure of observation has a presumptive lower level of control of the phenomena studied 
than in the case of a process of experimentation. c) Prima facie, the outcome of the observation 
might be less reliable than the result of the experiment, especially when the phenomenon 
observed is not repeatable.
Usually, observation is considered as an indispensable element in any empirical science, 
both in the basic sciences and the applied sciences. but the question ‘What is the characteristic 
set of elements of “observation”?’ might be less clear that it initially appears. A key issue is 
the relation between observation and language. in this regard, ian hacking has pointed out 
two possibilities about observation that are connected with some philosophical fashions. “One 
is the vogue for what Quine calls semantic ascent (don’t talk about things, talk about the way 
we talk about things). the other is the domination of experiment by theory. the former says 
not to think about observation, but about observation statements —the words used to report 
observations. the latter says that every observation statement is loaded with theory —there is 
no observing prior to theorizing.” 10
hacking’s perspective on the characterization of “observation” in science has led him to 
accept some “untheoretical” and “unlinguistic” aspects. 1) Observations either provide the data 
that test theory or are the basis upon which theory is built. 2) there are some observations of 
unexpected outcomes of experiments that can lead to new knowledge. 3) the role of observation 
is commonly in initiating the inquiry, because later work is conducted by experimentation. 
4) Observation is a human skill that can be improved by training and practice. 5) the relations 
between observations and theory need to take into account the existence of “pre-theoretical 
observation statements,” whose presence in science is not frequent. 6) Scientific observations 
are generally made through instruments. At least in natural sciences, observations are seldom 
made by unaided human senses. 11
besides these epistemological claims, which are usually thought of sciences such as physics 
and chemistry, there are many methodological aspects of observation, which are relevant. 
traditionally, the focus has been on how they affect basic sciences —natural and social ones—, 
but those aspects are also crucial for applied sciences such as medicine, which are less in the 
front line of the philosophical discussion. in branches of medicine, such as rheumatology, 
“much of the criticism of observational studies concerns the often nonobjective, potentially 
biased methodology involved in subject selection, data collection, analysis, and interpretation, 
although even case reports and case series as descriptive studies might occasionally yield 
important clinical information.” 12
10 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 167.
11 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, pp. 167-168.
12 chakravarty, e. F. and FireS, J. F., “Science as Experiment; Science as Observation,” Natural Clinical Practice, 
v. 2, n. 6, (2006), p. 287.
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Generally, when observation is compared with experimentation in basic science and in 
applied science, the former appears with less methodological weight than the latter. this lower 
level of authority of observational processes is sometimes associated to a minor degree in the 
control of the variables than in the case of experimentation. Another frequent reason for this 
lesser methodological validity lies in the presence of subjective components in observational 
processes. in this regard, it can be stated for any science that “the quality, validity, and reliability 
of observational studies depend on the rigor with which data is collected, outcome measures 
are selected, possible confounders and biases are identified and addressed, and appropriate 
statistical techniques are applied.” 13 
yet, in spite of the traditional link of observation with the search for reliable knowledge and 
adequate procedures for the objects studied, the characterization of “observation” cannot be 
reduced to epistemological and methodological issues. De facto, there are many cases where 
observation has additional problems to those focused on knowledge and method. Medicine 
is a realm that exemplifies this situation quite well. On the one hand, there are axiological 
problems in research designs related to observation. 14 On the other hand, there are increasing 
ethical concerns on controlled observation related to clinical trials. thus, how observations 
are performed in medical research, and how the evidence, in general, is gathered in clinical 
trials have raised special ethical concerns. 15
1.1. Some Historical Traits
historically, the interest in observation can usually be found in any scientist researching 
empirical phenomena. Moreover “observation, as a primary source of data, has always been a 
part of natural science.” 16 it was commonly used from the beginning of “modern science” in the 
seventeenth century. Since then, observation has had a relation to epistemological controversies, 
such as rationalism and empiricism, as well as to methodological discussions around deduction 
and induction (and, to a lesser extent, on abduction too). in addition, observation also has a role 
in the logico-methodological distinction between “explanation” and “prediction,” and it is also 
connected to the issue of the “symmetry” or “asymmetry” between them. 17
Seeking the historical roots, Francis bacon’s Novum Organum appears as a central piece on 
observation and experimentation. 18 According to Urbach, “unlike most of his predecessors, who 
also pressed for a more empirical approach to the acquisition of knowledge, bacon attempted 
to supply details and to set an example.” 19 in his approach, (i) we need precise and varied 
observations, because a collection containing only similar instances would not serve; (ii) not all 
observations are of equal relevance in the inductive process; and (iii) some observations do not 
have a significant probative role but might be heuristically useful.
13 chakravarty, e. F. and FireS, J. F., “Science as Experiment; Science as Observation,” p. 287.
14 Cf. concato, J., Shah, N. and horWitz, R. i., “Randomized, Controlled trials, Observational Studies, and the 
hierarchy of Research Designs,” New England Journal of Medicine, v. 342, n. 25, (2000), pp. 1887-1892. 
15 Cf. Worrall, J., “Why Randomize? Evidence and Ethics in Clinical trials,” in Gonzalez, W. J. and alcolea, J. 
(eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2006, pp. 65-82.
16 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 167.
17 Cf. SalMon, W. C., “On the Alleged temporal Anisotropy of Explantion,” in earMan, J., JaniS, a., MaSSey, G. 
and reScher, N. (eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds, University of Pittsburgh Press, 
Pittsburgh, 1993, pp. 229-248.
18 Cf. Bacon, F., Novum Organum sive iudicia vera de interpretatione naturae et regno hominis, J. billium, london, 1620. 
translated into English and edited by Peter Urbach and John Gibson: Novum Organum, Open Court, la Salle, il, 1994.
19 urBach, P., Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, Open Court, la Salle, il, 1987, pp. 171-172.
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bacon’s views seems to be bi-directional in the relations between theory and experience, 
insofar as “he insisted that the inductive method will go back and forth, using observations to 
generate hypotheses and hypotheses to generate new observations,” 20 which includes correcting 
old ones. he also had special interest in phenomena not observed or not known before. in this 
regard, “the second book of the Novum Organum contains numerous predictions derived from 
theories which bacon advanced, and which he intended should be checked in experiment.” 21
but long before that modern period, observation was a process known by authors such as 
Aristotle. he considered its systematic use in his biological studies on the parts of the animals. 22 
in this regard, it seems wrong to claim that “before positivism, observation is not central.” 23 
Moreover, to some extent, the link between science and empirical knowledge involves, in one 
way or another, the acceptance of a sort of observation in order to grasp the world as well as 
the use of observation to evaluate our theories. Even in the mathematical approaches to nature 
developed by key scientists, such as Galileo, observation has a relevant role in testing theories 
(and later in his career he included the methodological role of experiments as well). 24
At least since modern times, history of science shows a general tendency to consider 
“observation” as conceptually different from “experiment.” Sometimes this distinction is implicit 
rather than explicit. blaise Pascal —according to William Shea— was in favor the experimental 
method, “meaning the active questioning of nature under conditions defined by the experimenter 
rather than the mere observation of the phenomena that spontaneously present themselves.” 25 
later, in the nineteenth century, William herschel —the discoverer of Uranus— establishes 
a clear distinction between both concepts in A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural 
Philosophy. 26 Observation is rather passive: it is a matter of noticing facts as they occur; there is 
no attempt to influence the frequency of their occurrence. Meanwhile, experimentation is active: 
it is a matter of putting in action causes and agents over what they have control, which includes 
varying the possible combination and noting what effects takes place. 27
through the positivism of the 19th century and the different conceptions in the 20th 
century connected with the primacy of empirical knowledge (such as logical positivism, logical 
empiricism, the “received view,” 28 Michael Dummett’s anti-realism, 29 bas Van Fraassen’s 
20 urBach, P., Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, p. 155.
21 Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science, p. 156.
22 Cf. ariStotle, On the Parts of Animals, translated with an introduction and Commentary by James G. lennox, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 123.
23 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 168.
24 Cf. Shea, W. R., Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution: Middle Period, 1610-1632, Science history Publications, New 
york, 1977. On Galileo’s views on experiments, see several papels published in MachaMer, P. (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Galileo, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 38, 45, 67-71, 149, 155, 234, 239, and 402.
25 Shea, W. R., Designing Experiments and Games of Change. The Unconventional Science of Blaise Pascal, Science 
history Publications, Canton, MA, 2003.
26 Cf. herSchel, J. F. W., A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, longman, london, 1830; 
reprinted by the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987.
27 Cf. BoGen, J., “Experiment and Observation,” in MachaMer, P. and SilBerStein, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to 
the Philosophy of Science, p. 129.
28 Cf. ayer, A. J. (ed.), Logical Positivism, Free Press, N. york, 1959, pp. 14, 18, 20-21, 109, 147-153, 155, 160-161, 
215-216, 220, 228, 230-231, 233, 236, …; and Suppe, F., “the Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific 
theories,” in Suppe, F. (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of illinois Press, Urbana, 1974, (2nd ed. 
1977), pp. 1-241. 
29 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “El realismo y sus variedades: El debate actual sobre las bases filosóficas de la Ciencia,” in 
carreraS, A. (ed.), Conocimiento, Ciencia y Realidad, SiUZ-Ediciones Mira, Zaragoza, 1993, pp. 11-58; especially, 
pp. 33-34 and 54; and Gonzalez, W. J., “Semántica anti-realista: intuicionismo matemático y concepto de verdad,” 
Theoria, v. 12-13, (1990), pp. 149-170.
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“constructive empiricism,” 30 etc.), the interest in observation is central. thus, notions such as 
“verification,” “verifiability,” “confirmation,” … are all —in one way or another— related 
to observation of nature (and occasionally to observation of social events). Commonly, these 
approaches associate observation to empirical statements (protocol sentences/Protokollsätze, 
etc.), frequently understood as a sort of foundation for theoretical statements. 
Within the mainstream line on observation between 1920s and 1960s (logical positivism, 
logical empiricism, the received view), observation was commonly an epistemological 
attitude that was more passive than active, even though this kind of relation to phenomena 
might be depicted many times as subjective representation rather than objective knowledge. 
Frequently, the link of observation and linguistic views led to a rather intersubjective 
approach. A sophiscated version on this issue within the then mainstream line is in Carl 
Gustav hempel, who distinguishes between “observable characteristic,” “observation 
predicate,” and “observation sentence.” 31 
For hempel, an observable characteristic is a property or characteristic of physical objects 
that, under suitable circumstances, may be ascertained through direct observation. “thus, 
the terms ‘green,’ ‘soft,’ ‘liquid,’ ‘longer than,’ designate observable characteristics, while 
‘bivalent,’ ‘radioactive,’ ‘better electric conductor,’ and ‘introvert’ do not. terms that 
designate observable characteristics will be called observation predicates. Finally, by an 
observation statement we shall understand any sentence which —correctly or incorrectly— 
asserts of one or more specifically named objects that they have, or that they lack, some 
specific observable characteristic.” 32
Ernst Nagel was aware of some of the problems related to observation. he thought 
of “observation expressions” that refer to things, properties, relations, processes, etc. he 
recognized that “the distinction between observation expressions and other descriptive ones 
is admittedly vague, especially since different degrees of stringency may be used in different 
contexts in deciding what matters are to count as observable ones.” 33 Nevertheless he thought 
that the distinction was unavoidable in scientific inquiry and everyday practice. the problem 
of the characterization of “non-observable” was also an issue of serious concern. 34
Meanwhile, in his alternative view to the epistemological empiricist perspective on 
observation, Karl Popper connects it with “perception” and suggests an interpretation 
of observation in the light of a scientific theory. 35 in The Logic of Scientific Discovery he is 
particularly interested in the problem of the empirical basis. in this context, he maintains that 
30 Cf. van FraaSSen, b. C., “theory Construction and Experiment: An Empiricist View,” Proceedings of the Philosophy 
of Science Association, v. 2, (1980), pp. 663-677; van FraaSen, b. C., The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1980; van FraaSSen, B. c., Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991; and van 
FraaSSen, B. c., Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
31 Cf. heMpel, C. G., “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,” Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie, v. 4 (1950), pp. 41-63; reprinted as heMpel, C. G., “the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,” in ayer, A. J. 
(ed.), Logical Positivism, pp. 108-129.
32 heMpel, C. G., “the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,” in ayer, A. J. (ed.), Logical Positivism, pp. 109-110.
33 NaGel, E., The Structure of Science, harcourt, brace and World, New york, 1961, p. 350.
34 Sir Peter Strawson, a moderate empiricist, recognizes that the sphere of human knowledge can go beyond 
immediate experience: “it would be perverse to deny that we have access, through observation and testimony, to data 
which demand explanation of the kind which we call ‘historical’ or ‘social’,” StraWSon, p. F., “the incoherence of 
Empiricism,” The Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 66, (1992), pp. 142-143.
35 Cf. popper, k. r., Logik der Forschung, Julius Springer Verlag, Vienna, 1935 (reprinted in J. C. b. Mohr 
—P. Siebeck—, tubingen, 1994). English translation: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, hutchinson, london, 1959 
(rev. edic., harper and Row, New york, 1968), pp. 75, 80, 131, 280, and 423.
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“observations and perceptions may be psychological, but observability is not.” 36 he recognizes 
that he has “no intention of defining the term ‘observable’ or ‘observable event’ (…) i think that 
it should be introduced as an undefined term which becomes sufficiently precise in use: as a 
primitive concept whose use the epistemologist has to learn, much as he has to learn the use of 
the term ‘symbol’, or as the physicist has to learn the use of the term ‘mass-point’.” 37
Popper insisted on the critical rationalist idea of observation as an active process. 
thus, in the 1960s he added a vision of an evolutionary approach to knowledge, where 
there is selection in knowing the reality. this starts from the very beginning: he accepted 
inborn dispositions oriented towards discovering regularities and rules. 38 hence, for him, 
observation was an active event in knowing our environment instead of being a passive 
procedure. he dismissed the naive observations, and he gave to theory an important role: for 
him, observation is guided by ideas —in an implicit or explicit search— rather than a human 
being impressed by sense data. therefore, knowing was seen as a “logical” procedure rather 
than as a “psychological” event. 39
1.2. A Relevant Shift in the Natural Sciences: Observation and Theory-Laden
During the second half of the last century —and also in this first decade of the present 
century—, two philosophical tendencies on observation have received special attention. On 
the one hand, there is an approach based on a linguistic vision of observation. thus, instead of 
talking about “observation” as such, we should talk of “observation statements” insofar as the 
key is in the words used to report observation. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on the 
theory when we are doing an observation. in this case, “every observation statement is loaded 
with theory.” 40
According to the first approach, there is an interweaving between semantic aspects and 
epistemological ones: the linguistic items seem to displace epistemological observations. 
thus, in W. v. O. Quine’s point of view, 41 observation sentences should replace “observation.” 
A sentence is then observational when there is an agreement between members of the speech 
community witnessing the same occasion. those witnesses, who are fluent in the language 
used, will agree about what they observe on the spot. Quine is writing against all observations 
being theory-loaded, but what we get in him it is an intersubjective discourse rather than an 
actual observation about the properties of the real world.
Previously, for Nagel, observation statements are “a large class of singular statements 
that either formulate the observations on the subject matter regarded as the province of the 
science or describe the overt procedures instituted in conducting some actual inquiry within 
that discipline.” 42 the emphasis is not then on the “sense data” understood as the exclusive 
objects of the “direct experience.” this allows meaningful statements about the past (‘there 
was a total eclipse of the sun in North brazil on May 29, 1919’) and even about the future (e.g., 
36 popper, k. r., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, rev. edic., p. 103.
37 The Logic of Scientific Discovery, rev. edit., p. 103.
38 Popper, K. R., Unended Quest. An Intellectual Autobiography, Fontana/ Collins, london, 1976 (enlarged version, 
Routledge, london, 1992), p. 49.
39 Cf. popper, k. r., “Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject,” in popper, k. r., Objective Knowledge. An 
Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972 (5th ed. revised, 1979; reprinted in 1989), pp. 106-152.
40 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 167.
41 Cf. Quine, W. v. O., The Roots of Reference, Open Court, la Salle, il, 1974, pp. 36-39.
42 NaGel, E., The Structure of Science, p. 348.
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on climate change). in this regard, “observation statements may on occasion formulate initial 
and boundary conditions for a theory or law; they may also be employed to confirm or refute 
theories and laws.” 43
Following the second approach, we reach the discussions on “theory-laden” conception of 
observation as well as some issues on the problem of the undetermination of theory by data. 
Norwood Russell hanson develops the idea of observation loaded with theory in his book 
Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. 44 he criticizes 
the view —still dominant at that moment— that scientific research relies on bedrock when 
it is based on an observational language. his thesis is that observation and facts include a 
“theory-ladenness.” thus, he dismisses the proposal of “foundational propositions” of science 
that are neutral regarding the theory used. the observation of the phenomenon is then shaped 
by the previous knowledge possessed by the observer. 
hanson utilizes some Gestalt perspectives for understanding scientific believes. this 
perceptual view seems quite interesting to thomas Kuhn, 45 who is in tune with hanson’s idea 
of analyzing the meaning of the scientific terms within a context. Furthermore, he received 
hanson’s influences on how to interpret historical aspects of science, such as isaac Newton’s 
legacy. 46 Nevertheless, in his initial philosophical-methodological conception, Kuhn goes far 
beyond that with his characterization of the paradigms. then, he develops a relativistic view 
on observation: “the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trade in different 
worlds… Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when 
they look from the same point in the same direction.” 47 
imre lakatos criticized the Kuhnian views to the extent that they were relativistic. but 
he was also in favor of a “theory-laden” conception. it appears when he was dealing with the 
problem of scientific prediction, because he defended a theoretical approach on prediction: 
“while theories may be said to be supported by evidence, ‘predictions’ are supported by 
theories.” 48 this view is related to the problem of observation and “theory-ladenness,” which 
received a lot of attention later on. in this regard, John Worrall considers that ultimately there 
must be sentences whose truth value we can decide upon independently of theory. (Otherwise, 
the whole scientific enterprise would be without foundation.) 49
Nicholas Rescher has proposed a more complex framework insofar as he thinks of 
two kinds of limitations on observations and theories. Putting it differently, there is an 
underdetermination of scientific theories and data. On the one hand, observational data 
undetermine theories because those observations are always finite, enumerable and episodic, 
while scientific theories are general and not finite (i.e., the generic feature go beyond a specific 
43 The Structure of Science, p. 348.
44 hanSon, N. R., Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1958. 
45 Cf. kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, international Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Foundations 
of the Unity of Science, vol. 2, n. 2, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962; 2nd ed., 1970, p. 113.
46 Cf. kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., p. 78. Cf. hanSon, N. R., Patterns of Discovery, 
pp. 99-105.
47 kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., p. 150.
48 lakatoS, i., “Changes in the Problem of inductive logic,” in lakatoS, i. (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic, 
North holland, Amsterdam, 1968. Reprinted in lakatoS, i., Mathematics, Science and Epistemology. Philosophical 
Papers. vol. 2, edited by J. Worrall and G. Currie, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 192.
49 Cf. Worrall, J., Personal communication, March 2000.
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place and moment). On the other hand, theories undetermine observable facts, because 
scientific theories might be represented by several forms or different models. in this regard, 
there is a level of ambiguity open to new alternatives to explain or predict those realities that 
the theory intent to grasp. 50
Following this complex framework on observation and theory, Rescher presents de facto a 
bi-directional relation of non-exhaustive content between scientific theory and observational 
data. a) there is an actual complexity in the real world, which is beyond the descriptive 
resources of scientific language. then the observational data available do not exclude the 
possibility of an alternative theory for those phenomena. b) Any scientific theory that tries to 
describe and control empirical phenomena has a limit insofar as the reality itself exceeds the 
resources —explanatory and predictive— of the scientific theorization. thus, he dismisses 
the idea of empirical science as “complete” or “perfect.” 51 
these aspects on observation and theory should not be read in a relativist way. they can 
be seen as a part of a human activity —the scientific enterprise— that is bounded in several 
ways: linguistic, cognitive, procedural, etc. they work on a reality, which is independent 
of our mind, which requires theories to explain and predict (basic science) or to predict and 
prescribe (applied science). 52 thus, an observation statement is related to something real: it 
“is the result of some sensory input interpreted, whether consciously or unconsciously, using 
a set of theories.” 53 
Certainly, theory-ladenness is not groundless: observations do require a conceptual 
framework given by theories, otherwise we cannot identify many elements of what we are 
observing. in addition to the conceptual framework, observations are frequently made through 
instruments (at least in advance natural science, both basic and applied). these instruments 
are supported by a theoretical construction. “in that case, theories of the instrument are part 
of the set of theories used to interpret the sensory input.” 54 these theories are made according 
to our capacities and cognitive structure as human beings.
1.3. The Social Sciences: From the Acceptance of Observation to the Problem  
of Experimentation
Recurrently, the philosophical ref lection on observation —and, above all, on 
experimentation— has been focused on the natural sciences, in general, and on physics, in 
particular. then the methodological scrutiny has paid great attention to case-studies. 55 because 
of this tradition —and due to the relevance of the problems posed by the methods in the social 
50 Cf. reScher, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, Paidós, barcelona, 1999; chapter 1, pp. 51-59; 
especially, pp. 52-54. See also reScher, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic 
Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; reScher, n., Reason and Reality: Realism and Idealism in 
Pragmatic Perspective, Rowman and littlefield, lanham, MD, 2005; and JacQuette, D. (ed.), Reason, Method, and 
Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, 2009.
51 Cf. reScher, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 51-59.
52 On the case of applied social sciences, cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Prediction and Prescription in Economics: A 
Philosophical and Methodological Approach”, Theoria, v. 13, n. 32, (1998), pp. 321-345.
53 GillieS, D. A., Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Four Central Themes, b. blackwell, Oxford, 
1993, p. 146.
54 GillieS, D. A., Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Four Central Themes, p. 146.
55 Among the “classical examples” of the studies of experiments in natural sciences, cf. harré, R., Great Scientific 
Experiments. 20 Experiments that Changed our View of the World, Phaidon, Oxford, 1981. in recent times, a particular 
relevant case can be seen in chanG, h., Inventing Temperature, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
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sciences, especially in recent decades—, 56 the emphasis will be here on the analysis of the 
sciences that research social and human undertakings. in this regard, what seems remarkable 
is the methodological change in the social sciences —mainly in economics— from the 
acceptance of observation to the discussion of the problem of experimentation in them. this 
has involved the consideration of the existence and limits of experiments in the social milieu.
Since the beginning of the social sciences (history, economics, sociology, psychology, 
philology, etc.), observation has been accepted as a methodological tool for research. For several 
centuries, controlled observations have been commonly accepted as a valid procedure to test 
and evaluate scientific statements in the social sciences. Meanwhile the role of experiments 
in the social sciences has received a wary attitude for a long time. 57 Even more, from time to 
time, the existence of experiments as a methodological procedure in social affairs has been 
openly questioned or has even been explicitly neglected. 58 the challenge is in the origin, 
because it comes from the methodological starting point, which is the possibility itself of 
“experiments” in this realm of social phenomena. 
to be sure, questioning the role of experiments in the social sciences has a long tradition. this 
attitude is connected to the insistence on the ontological difference with phenomena studied 
by natural sciences, due to the singularity attributed to human events (such as a historical fact, 
a psychological character, an economic decision, etc.). Consequently, it comes the acceptance 
of a clear methodological gap —a dichotomy— between the natural sciences and the social 
sciences, which is the topic of the Erklären-Verstehen controversy. in this methodological 
controversy, “explanation”-“understanding,” which has changed several times from the 
original version to more recent presentations, the main critics of experimentation in the social 
sciences are the supporters of a strong version of Verstehen. 59 
in recent times, this questioning of the experiments in the social sciences can be seen in the case 
of economics. thus, tony lawson dealt few years ago with the problem of “how social scientific 
research can proceed in the absence of real possibilities of experimental control.” 60 he assumes 
the existence of controlled observations in economics while rejecting the actual possibility of 
experiments in this realm: “despite the lack of opportunities for controlled experimentation in 
the social sciences i remain optimistic about the social scientific prospects.” 61
Currently there is a dominant new stance on this issue, due to the current changes in the 
concepts of “observation” and “experimentation.” in addition, there exists a genuine progress 
in the social sciences. De facto, the wary attitude —sometimes a skeptic view— on the role of 
experiments in the social sciences has changed progressively. the acceptance of the possibility 
56 in some cases, such as economics, the methodological debate on empirical support seems particularly intense, cf. 
reiSS, J., Error in Economics. Towards a More Evidence-based Methodology, Routledge, london, 2008.
57 the analysis in this section works upon Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the 
Case of Economics,” in kuiperS, t. (ed.), General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues, pp. 275-277 and 282-283.
58 in the case of economics, this can be seen in SaMuelSon, P. and nordhauS, W. D., Economics, 12th edition, 
McGraw-hill, N. york, 1983, p. 8. Usually, the critics of experiments in the social sciences are thinking of laboratory 
experimentation.
59 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “From Erklären-Verstehen to Prediction-Understanding: the Methodological Framework in 
Economics,” in Sintonen, M., ylikoSki, P. and Miller, K. (eds.), Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social 
Sciences, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 33-50; especially, pp. 34-37.
60 laWSon, t., Economics and Reality, Routledge, london, 1997, p. 199. See the chapter entitled “Economic Science 
without Experimentation,” pp. 199-226.
61 laWSon, t., Economics and Reality, p. 199.
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of experiments in social sciences is now explicit in economics. this includes a neat attempt to 
explore new aspects of experimentation in human affairs. 
two kinds of approaches have driven the new situation in the social sciences: (i) the idea 
of science as “human activity” —instead of a mere “content”— has led new philosophical-
methodological analyses in science, in general, and in social sciences, in particular; 62 and (ii) the 
existence of an important amount of contributions in different fields within the realm of the 
scientific research on human affairs (economics, psychology, etc.).
An important boost came from the analysis of experiments made on the basis of a new 
consideration of the scientific practice, which is also connected to the development of a social 
concern about science. 63 in this regard, the philosophy and methodology of science has changed 
the previous emphasis on the contents of science (semantic, logical, epistemological, …) in 
favor of science as a human activity developed in a social environment (i.e., the laboratories as 
institutions where scientists intervene). 
this perspective involves a direct reflection on the practice of laboratory experimentation. 64 
Furthermore, the scope of the philosophical and methodological analysis has been enlarged with 
new light shed on applied science and on applications of science, because “it is important to 
distinguish applied science from the applications of science. the former is a part of knowledge 
production, the latter is concerned with the use of scientific knowledge and methods for the 
solving of practical problems of action (e.g., in engineering of business), where a scientist may 
play the role of a consult[ant].” 65
Another important boost came from the scientific research on social events, which has 
widened the original fields in the last decades, mainly in the sciences of psychology and 
economics. Consequently, some new territories have been embraced with these methodological 
procedures. A well-known case is “experimental economics.” 66 in 2002, this branch of 
economics received public recognition in the form of a Nobel Prize awarded to Vernon Smith 67 
and Daniel Kahneman.68 
62 this focus has its roots in the “historical turn” developed in the sixties and seventies. it sheds more light than the 
previous emphasis on science as knowledge and opens up more clearly the nexus with the social setting.
63 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Novelty and Continuity in Philosophy and Methodology of Science,” in Gonzalez, W. J. 
and alcolea, J. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, pp. 1-28; especially, 
pp. 9-11.
64 Cf. GaliSon, P., How Experiments End, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. On the philosophical and 
methodological analysis of experiments (characteristics, kinds, …), cf. GoodinG, d., pinch, t. and SchaFFer, S. (eds.), 
The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; and radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Scientific Experimentation, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2003.
65 niiniluoto, i., “the Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” Erkenntnis, v. 38, (1993), p. 9. to be sure, the 
epistemic and practical aspects can also be seen in the context of the social setting, cf. kitcher, ph., Science, Truth, 
and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, especially, pp. 85-91.
66 See the papers published in roth, a. e. (ed.), Laboratory Experimentation in Economics–Six Points of View, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; hey, J. d. and looMeS, G. (eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental 
Economics, E. Elgar, Aldershot, 1993, vol. i and ii; and kaGel, J. h. and roth, A. E. (eds.), Handbook of 
Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995.
67 it should be pointed out that V. Smith has shown an explicit interest in the philosophy of science, cf. SMith, V. l., 
MccaBe, K. A. and raSSenti, S. J., “lakatos and Experimental Economics,” in Marchi, n. de and BlauG, M. (eds.), 
Appraising Economic Theories, E. Elgar, Aldershot, 1991, pp. 197-227.
68 D. Kahneman’s interests are in connecting psychology and economics, cf. kahneMan, D., knetSch, J. l. and 
thaler, R. h., “Experimental tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, 
v. 98, n. 6, (1990), pp. 1325-1348, reprinted in hey, J. d. and looMeS, G. (eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental 
Economics, vol. i, pp. 206-229.
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it happens that since the mid-1980s experimental economics is a scientific branch that 
has been the focus of increasing attention. it may be considered a recent realm, insofar as 
—according to a key expert— “experimental economics as a field of economic research did 
not emerge before the 1960s.” 69 the connection with mathematical methods is clear insofar 
as several Nobel laureates that have focused on game theory, such as John F. Nash 70 and 
Reinhard Selten, 71 have also developed economic experiments. 
both in the dominant views in philosophy of science and in the recent developments within 
social sciences there is a new situation. the methodological framework is now different from 
the successive versions of the alternatives between Erklären and Verstehen. thus, instead of 
a clear dichotomy between natural sciences and social sciences, the present methodological 
perspectives stress the existence of experiments as a common ground between the natural 
sciences and the social sciences. 
Nevertheless, both kinds of sciences also have differences in their activities, and therefore 
in their aims, processes and results. these new analyses of philosophy and methodology 
of the social sciences work with an enlarged vision of experiment. Moreover, the sciences 
themselves use de facto new views on experiments. the changes indicate that the notion of 
“experiment” is not restricted anymore to a material sort of human intervention based on a 
previous design. there are other possibilities. but sometimes the analysis goes further than 
one might expect, because there are conceptions of experimentation that go beyond that point 
of novelty, and accept the possibility of “natural experiments.” 
Even now “natural experiments” might be considered as an uncommon view, insofar as it 
seems close to the traditional idea of “observation” (i.e., noting the ongoing events) and avoids 
the feature of human intervention, which has been characteristic of the notion of experiment. 
it is a route taken by James Woodward: “the important and philosophically neglected category 
of ‘natural experiments’ typically involves the occurrence of processes in nature that have the 
characteristics of an intervention but do not involve human action or at least are not brought 
about by deliberate human design.” 72
however, this idea is not completely new, because a somewhat similar idea is found in an 
econometrician, and several decades earlier: in 1944. it appears in trygve haavelmo, when he 
writes that “the stream of experiments that Nature is steadily turning out from her own enormous 
laboratory.” 73 to some extent, “natural experiments” is an understandable expression for some 
phenomena in nature, such as hurricanes (e.g., the case of ‘Katrina,’ which hit New Orleans 
69 Selten, r., “in Search of a better Understanding of Economic behavior,” in heertJe, a. (ed.), Makers of Modern 
Economics, harverster Wheatsheaf, london, 1993, p. 118.
70 J. F. Nash was involved in experimentation in the social sciences at least since 1952, when a conference on 
“the Design of Experiments in Decision Processes” was held in Santa Monica, CA, cf. roth, A., “introduction to 
Experimental Economics,” in kaGel, J. h. and roth, A. (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, pp. 10-11. 
thereafter Nash wrote an important paper: kaliSch, G. K., Milnor, J. W., naSh, J. F. and nerinG, E. D., “Some 
Experimental n-Person Games,” in thrall, R. M., cooMBS, C. h., and daviS, R. l. (eds.), Decision Processes, J. Wiley, 
N. york, 1954, pp. 301-327.
71 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Rationality in Experimental Economics: An Analysis of R. Selten’s Approach,” in Galavotti, 
M. C. (ed.), Observation and Experiment in the Natural and the Social Sciences, pp. 71-83.
72 WoodWard, J., “Experimentation, Causal inference, and intrumental Realism,” in radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Scientific Experimentation, p. 94.
73 Cf. haavelMo, t., “the Probability Approach in Econometrics,” supplement to Econometrica, v. 12, (1944), 
pp. 14-15.
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in August 2005. it was accurately predicted in the previous days, and those predictions were 
tested during the hurricane.) Even so, some features commonly associated with the concept of 
experiment, such as “repeatability” or “reproducibility,” can hardly be found in a singular case.
Still, when the presence of experimentation in the social sciences is discussed, one of the 
debates is the possibility of accepting a “passive experimentation,” a facet that accompanies 
the idea of “natural experiments.” this has been proposed in econometrics, because “unlike 
the lab experiment, the ‘experiments’ of econometrics are not actual ones but statistical ones, 
conducted on ‘passive data’: data thrown up by the uncontrolled experiments of Nature (the 
Economy), incorporating all the multiple variation of the interacting factors with which the 
econometrician must deal as best he/she can ex post.” 74 
haavelmo’s methodological position seems to be assumed in this proposal, insofar as 
econometrics cannot control circumstances directly, and this position accepts that we are 
passive observers of a stream of experiments that Nature (here, the economic world) is 
turning out from within, like an enormous laboratory. 75 Accordingly, the case of econometric 
experimentations relies on the possibility of having “natural experiments” and their statistical 
control: “the econometric model is first built and estimated as a passive experiment and then 
is used as if it were a mathematical model.” 76
Subsequent to the acceptance of a “passive experimentation,” which accompanies the 
idea of “natural experiments” (and, therefore, a material environment), there is a vision of 
econometrics as a case of experimentation between the laboratory experiments made in the 
context of the material world and the thought experiments related to a non-material. if this case 
is compared with the methods of laboratory experimentation, then the statistical methods of 
the econometric experiment —a passive one— might be interpreted as providing a substitute 
kind of control at the level of measurement process. in this regard, it is an indirect control of 
the circumstances, and it requires statistical assumptions that are sometimes unrealistic.
Obviously, the problem is then the application to the real economic world of those results 
obtained through this indirect way of econometric research and, specifically, what are the 
possible causal inferences regarding economic activity. Not only is causality a debatable 
question in this context, but so also are the characteristics of reproducibility and replicability 
of econometric experiments (understood as “passive experiments”) in comparison with 
laboratory experimentation (or “active experiments”).
When the econometricians follow a traditional notion of “experiment,” then they 
disregard the possibility of experimentation in econometrics: “econometric theory is the 
study of the properties of data generation processes, techniques for analysing data, methods 
of estimating numerical magnitudes of parameters with unknown values and procedures 
for testing economic hypotheses; it plays an analogous role in primarily non-experimental 
disciplines to that of statistical theory in inexact experimental sciences (…). As expressed by 
[h. O. A.] Wold (1969)[77], ‘Econometrics is seen as a vehicle for fundamental innovations 
74 BouManS, M. and MorGan, M. S., “Ceteris paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic 
theories,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 8, n. 1, (2001), p. 18.
75 that is the idea of t. haavelmo, cf. MorGan, M. S., The History of Econometric Ideas, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 245.
76 BouManS, M. and MorGan, M. S., “Ceteris paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic 
theories,” p. 19.
77 Wold, h. O. A., “Econometrics as Pioneering in Non-Experimental Model building,” Econometrica, v. 37, (1969), 
pp. 369-381.
New Methodological Perspectives on observation and experimentation in science22
in scientific method, above all, in the development of operative forecasting procedures in 
non-experimental situations’. in Wold’s view, econometrics needs to overcome both a lack 
of experimentation (which precludes reproducible knowledge) and the passivity of forecasts 
based on extrapolative methods.” 78
1.4. From “Traditional” Sciences to the Sciences of Artificial
Contemporary contributions to empirical sciences include some novelties that are related 
to observation: (i) there are new methodological perspectives on “traditional” sciences (natural 
and social); and (ii) there has been the development of new scientific realms, such as the 
sciences of the artificial. this second movement should not be seen as a linear process, insofar 
as the advance of the new sciences of design, such as artificial intelligence, also has had a 
repercussion on the first perspective (the research in “traditional” empirical sciences, both 
basic and applied). in this regard, the sciences of the artificial have played an instrumental role 
for the growth of natural and social sciences.
Concerning the new methodological perspectives on well-known disciplines, we can note 
the progress through the use of a careful observation of empirical reality. A good example is the 
“behavioral economics,” which has challenged the mainstream of economics (usually labeled 
as “neoclassical economics”) based on observation of the conduct of the economic agents in 
the decision-making. thus, the bounded rationality view replaces the economic perspective 
of rationality based on the maximization of subjective expected utilities. Furthermore, 
bounded rationality offers a general approach to rationality in the social science different from 
very influential conceptions. 79
De facto, the observational methodology of economic behavior has shown in this case 
epistemological consequences: a theory of rationality related to the decision-making. 
Moreover, it was an interdisciplinary project, because the psychologists working on 
the “cognitive approach” have also gathered evidence in this regard. While Simon was 
developing specific economic applications of bounded rationality, “numerous researchers in 
both psychology and economics have also been busy applying the (jointly produced) theory 
to economic phenomena (for example, bromiley, Kahneman and tversky, Vernon Smith, 
Selten, Gingerich, and so on).” 80 
Neuroeconomics is another example of recent methodological perspectives in the “traditional” 
science of economics. it focuses on how the human brain interacts with its environment 
—institutional and social— to make economic decisions. “Neuroeconomics begins with the 
observation that humans face many opportunity cost tradeoffs in their daily activities. these 
tradeoffs are modelled as a strategy that maps information sets into actions.” 81 Following 
78 hendry, D. F., Econometrics: Alchemy or Science? Essays in Econometric Methodology, new edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000 (1st edition, 1993), p. 13.
79 Cf. SiMon, h. a., “bounded Rationality in Social Science: today and tomorrow,” Mind and Society, v. 1, n. 1, (2000), 
pp. 25-39. On this topic see also Selten, r., “bounded Rationality,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 
v. 146, n. 4, (1990), pp. 649-658; Selten, R., “Features of Experimentally Observed bounded Rationality,” European 
Economic Review, v. 42, (1998), pp. 413-436; and Selten, r., “What is bounded Rationality?,” in GiGerenzer, G. and 
Selten, r. (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, pp. 13-36.
80 SiMon, h. a., “On Simulating Simon: his Monomania, and its Sources in bounded Rationality,” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science, v. 32, n. 3, (2001), p. 502.
81 MccaBe, K. A., “Neuroeconomics and the Economic Sciences,” Economics and Philosophy, v. 24, n. 3, (2008), 
p. 349.
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Simons’s ideas, the strategies of bounded rationality “are likely to be encoded in the brain as a 
mapping from partitions of circumstances into partitions of actions together with inferential (…) 
and reasoning mechanisms (…) that modify and scale these partitions.” 82 the understanding 
of those encodings and mechanisms requires both strategies models and experimental methods of 
economics as well as computational models and experimental methods of cognitive sciences.
Methodologically, research in neuroscience starts with observation but soon ends up in 
experiment. this study of human decision-making combines procedures based on natural 
sciences (the neuronal research) and the processes of a social science —economics—, which 
is also a science of the artificial in the case of the rationality of the decision-making. 83 this 
mixture of several components raises questions of several kinds, due to the combination of the 
levels of analysis at stake and the difficulties of interpretation of the results. 
Prima facie, it seems that a better understanding of how the brain operates should help 
us to understand more about observational economic behavior. but the critics point out that 
they do not learn much about the broad substantive issues of economics reviewed. thus, the 
“concern is whether neuroeconomists have added insight to already-confused experimental 
designs, or just covered up those confusions and promoted one plausible story over another.” 84 
they are afraid of getting the latter and of adding neural correlates to pre-confused designs, 
which does not help in order to improve scientific research.
A propos of the development of new scientific realms, we have several subjects directly 
related to observation, the topic here considered. Some of the cognitive sciences developed 
within the sciences of the artificial fit in this group, such as artificial intelligence. they are 
purposeful insofar as they are sciences of design: they seek some aims and prepare some 
processes in order to get certain results. Within the cognitive realm, these subjects have 
analyzed aspects connected to observation, such as “simulation” and “computer simulation.” 
herbert Simon was interested in all these aspects. initially, instead of the expression “artificial 
intelligence,” he preferred phrases like “complex information processing” and “simulation of 
cognitive processes.” 85 
Evidently, not all simulations are “computer simulations.” in addition to the indispensable 
use of the computers, there is a difference in the utilization of the “analog simulations,” such as 
using fluids to simulate the case of the dynamics of black holes. 86 Simulation is connected to 
the idea of resemblance of reality. in this regard, Simon stated that “we now call the imitation 
‘simulation,’ and we try to understand the imitated systems by testing the simulation in a variety 
of simulated, or imitated, environments.” 87 Meanwhile, he considered that computer simulation 
has a wider range of possibilities because it is more creative than simulation. For him, computer 
simulation is useful for the social sciences: it is “a tool for achieving a deeper understanding of 
human behavior.” 88 
82 MccaBe, K. A., “Neuroeconomics and the Economic Sciences,” p. 349.
83 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design Science,” 
in Galavotti, M. C., Scazzieri, R. and SuppeS, P. (eds.), Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, pp. 165-186; especially, 
pp. 171-179.
84 harriSon, G. W., “Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration,” Economics and Philosophy, v. 24, n. 3, (2008), 
p. 339.
85 Cf. SiMon, h., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 4.
86 Cf. WinSBerG, E., “A tale of two Methods,” Synthese, v. 169, (2009), p. 576.
87 SiMon, h., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 13.
88 The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 21.
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With the sciences of the artificial there is de facto an amplification of the possibilities 
for scientific research. in a strict sense, “the models built and manipulated in computer 
science (…) are not physical at all. Computer science is a science concerned with the study of 
computational process.” 89 the computational process is different from an electrical process 
or other empirical processes, insofar as it is studied in ways that ignore its physical nature. 
however, Simon conceived artificial intelligence as an empirical science, 90 and he thought 
that it could be tested through methods of observation and experimentation.
Ontologically, the components of the artificial world are different from the events in 
nature or the social actions. in addition, the models used in artificial intelligence that present 
computer simulations are commonly inspired by abstract entities. 91 Methodologically, 
artificial intelligence has two main options in this regard: a) to develop intelligent tasks 
without imitating the human mind, or b) to simulate the human case. besides the acceptance of the 
first option, the mimesis is explicitly defended by Simon: “the claim for simulation of human 
thought is that brain and computer, using quite different machinery, can execute the same programs, 
thereby carrying out the same functions organized in the same way.” 92 Epistemologically, the 
programs that imitate human processes can enlarge human knowledge. 93 they do things faster 
than bounded human mind and with a quite different size on storage of information.
Moreover, besides the contributions of the artificial intelligence, there are other angles 
of simulation in recent times. Some come from the cognitive sciences related to certain 
psychological aspects. in this case, simulation is associated to the attempt of grasping the 
mental states (thoughts, feelings, etc.) of others. there are two different ways actually 
considered: a mode that is theorizing on other minds based on the observed behavior of other 
people, whereas Alvin Goldman and Kelby Mason propose to predict the mental states by 
simulating them. in this cognitive use of the word “simulation,” the link is with empathy, 
imagination and projection on other minds of what is in our mind. 
their basic idea here on simulation is “that in predicting the target’s mental states, we try 
to simulate or reproduce in our minds the same state, or sequence of states, that they are in.” 94 
in this way, these authors maintain that “simulation can be considered a kind of empathy, 
if empathy is understood as feeling one’s way into another’s position by identifying with 
them, or imaginatively projecting oneself into their position. Alternatively, simulation can be 
understood as automatically matching or replicating another person’s mental state, without 
any deliberate imagination or projection. Simulation also has conceptual ties to psychological 
research or perspective —and role-taking and egocentric attribution.” 95 thus, simulation is 
89 colBurn, t., “Methodology of Computer Science,” in Floridi, l. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Computing and Information, blackwell, Oxford, 2004, p. 318.
90 Cf. SiMon, h. a., “Artificial intelligence: An Empirical Science,” Artificial Intelligence, v. 77, n. 1, (1995), 
pp. 95-127.
91 Cf. WinSBerG, E., “A tale of two Methods,” p. 578.
92 SiMon, h. a., “Artificial intelligence,” in kazdin, A. E. (ed.), American Psychological Association Encyclopedia 
of Psychology, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, N. york, 2000, p. 254.
93 Cf. SiMon, h. a., “Machine as Mind,” in Ford, k. M., GlyMour, c. and hayeS, p. J. (eds.), Android Epistemology, 
AAAi/the Mit Press, Menlo Park, CA, 1995, p. 25.
94 GoldMan, A. and MaSon, K., “Simulation,” in thaGard, P. (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 267.
95 GoldMan, A. and MaSon, K., “Simulation,” in thaGard, P. (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive 
Science, p. 272.
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understood sometimes as beyond a mere resemblance of a given reality to be seen as consistent 
“replication” —in the sense of coherent reproduction— of an observed phenomenon.
1.5. Actual Observations and Simulations
Actual observations look for a reliable representation of what is perceived. a) they include 
a perceptual component of a kind of entity that is already available, be it either a tangible reality 
or a virtual construction that might be perceived. b) this orientation towards an alter reality has 
an epistemological characteristic: the perception is made through a process of a careful attention 
to something present (which distinguishes an actual observation from something observable).
c) Commonly, the observation can serve methodologically for as a starting point of research (for 
example, in an inductive or in abductive procedure) or it can perform the role of an ingredient in an 
evaluation, which is made by means of a control mechanism focused on some specific variables. 
d) Scientific observations have a patent aim: they seek to control phenomena in a systematic way.
Undoubtedly, a simulation is different from an actual observation insofar as simulation 
includes a creative facet that is basically either imitative or innovative. (i) A simulation might 
be a resemblance of something real, either present or past. this is the use as “imitation,” 
which is initially pointed out in Simon’s The Sciences of the Artificial. (ii) A simulation can 
also be more creative in order to innovate some possibilities regarding the future, which is a 
common task of “computer simulations.” 96 Sometimes this second case of simulation can be 
used as a sort of “thought experiment.” the sciences of design include both uses, because the 
knowledge in designing benefits from imitations and innovations.
Clearly, both directions of simulation —the imitative and the innovative— have 
characteristics that differ from actual observations. in the first case, simulation is connected to 
observation in an analogical way, insofar as the imitative simulation has a part that comes from 
an observed reality and a part that goes beyond what might be observed in the real world (e.g., a 
computer that imitates events of the human brain). this “analogical” path is used to explore the 
unknown based upon what is already known: it is not simple “imitation” because heuristically 
it has a purpose. in the second case, the connection to actual observations is weaker than 
in the previous situation. When the aim is innovative, the simulation —commonly made by 
computer— can go far beyond the observed processes and might reach new possibilities (e.g., 
in the artificial world by means of the digital simulation). in the innovative case, the target is 
not a mere resemblance of real world but rather an enlargement of human possibilities.
though there is a caveat: the need for the distinction between “simulations” and 
“replications.” it is a corollary of the criticisms made by John Searle to some approaches in 
artificial intelligence (those that take for granted that similarities in performance indicate 
similarities in intelligence). 97 According to this distinction, some systems simulate one another 
when they generate the same outputs from the same inputs, whereas some systems replicate 
96 “Computer simulations involve no direct physical interaction between the machine they are run on and the 
physical systems they use to investigate,” BarBerouSSe, a., FranceSchelli, S. and iMBert, c., “Computer Simulations 
as Experiments,” Synthese, v. 169, (2009), p. 557.
97 the critique is known as “the Chinese Room,” and it is used as a counterexample of the turing test, cf. Searle, J. 
r., “Minds, brains, and Programs,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, v. 3, (1980), pp. 417-424; reprinted in Boden, 
M. (ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 67-88.
there are several versions of “the Chinese Room”, cf. copeland, b. J. and proudFoot, D., “Artificial intelligence: 
history, Foundations, and Philosophical issues,” in thaGard, P. (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 429-482; especially, pp. 456-463.
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one another when they generate the same outputs from the same inputs by means of the same 
processes or procedures. 98
Some cognitivist seems to use “replicate” in a broader sense of “reproducing.” Apparently, 
this is the case when they claim that “simulation does not require that the simulated state 
replicate the target state exactly (…) All that is required is that one try to replicate, in some 
significant aspects, the state. When this point is kept in mind, it becomes highly plausible 
that at least some forms of imaginery are simulations.” 99 but to imitate the visual imagining 
of someone is not identical to “replicating” those forms of imagery. in addition, it should be 
taken into account that “simulations involve complex inferences as they move from theory to 
data, and they certainly generate new knowledge.” 100
if we look for a broader philosophical-methodological framework for observation and the 
role of simulation, then some features can be pointed out. 1) Fallibilism is a feature of empirical 
knowledge, which also has repercussions for observation. in this regard, every source of 
primary data is in principle fallible. Observation is liable to correction in the light of reflection 
or subsequent experience. 101 2) Observational processes can be used for testing, but the sphere of 
human knowledge can certainly go beyond immediate experience. Observation and testimony 
might be used for historical knowledge and as a basis for future knowledge. 102 3) Empirical 
knowledge utilized in science (natural, social or artificial) cannot exclude non-observational 
concepts. thus, the simulation of human behavior should take into account that an explanation 
(or an understanding) of persons requires concepts such as “intentional human action” (there 
is not a purely physical “behavior”). 103 4) in the social sciences and in the sciences of design, 
human knowledge needs intensional concepts: “any attempt to purify the theory of knowledge 
of all intensional notions is doomed to failure.” 104 in this regard, the simulations as well as the 
computer simulations require intentionality to grasp the observational human behavior or to 
make new designs intelligible.
2. the COnCePt(s) Of “exPerIment” used In Our tImes
looking at the characterization of “experiment” there are several aspects to be considered 
in order to present this notion in our times. they are related to central factors of science. 105 
i) Semantically, experiment originally has a sense and a reference that differs from 
98 Cf. Fetzer, J. h., “the Philosophy of Ai and its Critique,” in Floridi, l. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy 
of Computing and Information, p. 122.
99 GoldMan, A. and MaSon, K., “Simulation,” in thaGard, P. (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive 
Science, p. 272.
100 WinSBerG, E., “A tale of two Methods,” pp. 578-579.
101 Cf. StraWSon, p. F., “the incoherence of Empiricism,” pp. 140-141.
102 Most of the work done on testimony is from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our 
reliance on testimony in some way. the Popperian view is different, cf. diller, A., “testimony from a Popperian 
Perspective,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, v. 38, n. 4, (2008), pp. 419-456.
103 Cf. “the incoherence of Empiricism,” p. 142. On the distinction between “action” and “behavior,” cf. Gonzalez, 
W. J., “Rationality in Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical Reconstruction of bounded Rationality and its 
Role in Economic Predictions,” Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, v. 61, (1997), 
pp. 205-232; especially, section 3.
104 StraWSon, p. F., “the incoherence of Empiricism,” p. 143.
105 On the central factors of science, cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Philosophical Approach to Science, technology and 
Society,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 
2005, section 2, pp. 10-11.
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“observation.” ii) logically, experiment is a structural ingredient of science that is different 
from “theory” and, in principle, it is also distinct from “model.” iii) Epistemologically, 
experiment is related to a kind of reliable knowledge acquired through a non-immediate 
process. iV) Methodologically, experiment is connected to a process that should be repeatable 
and, thus, it is commonly associated to reproducibility and repeatability. V) Ontologically, 
experiment is related to the idea of otherness (i.e., something —real or not— which is used 
to test). Vi) Axiologically, the experiments can be oriented through different values according 
to distinct aims (i.e., experiments in basic science could be diverse from experiments in applied 
science). Vii) Ethically, there is concern about some kinds of experiments, mainly when they are 
related to certain human affairs (either to people as individuals or to society as a whole). 106
these aspects of a general characterization of “experiment” can be developed in different 
ways, in accordance with the kind of variables to be controlled and the type of procedure used 
to control them. this variety accounts for the diversity of experiments —in the material and 
non-material spheres— that may be accepted in the enlarged vision of “experiment.” but, as it 
has been pointed out, many authors have questioned in the past —or even now— the possibility 
of experiments in the social sciences, including economics, if they are understood according 
to the traditional notion. in this view, “experiment” is a human intervention suggested by a 
theory, and there are some variables to be controlled in a repeatable material context. 107 
Although “experiment” and “control experiment” could be considered almost synonymous, 
sometimes a distinction is used between experiments at large and specifically controlled 
experiments. thus, particularly in the social sciences, the idea is to distinguish between a 
broad sense of “experiment” and the strict sense of this notion. in the first case, the reference 
is commonly the society as a whole or a large-group, whereas in the second case there is a 
small or medium size group that could be controlled in a clearer way. this emphasizes the 
difference between large-scale groups, where a controlled experiment seems hard or is even 
virtually impossible, and small or medium size groups (communities, micro-societies, …) 
where the actual process of control is possible. Following this distinction, large-scale groups 
rely on comparative analysis (“field research”) based on observation, and the level of control 
is then usually inferior to the controlled experiments.
Reliable knowledge and repeatability are then emphasized, even though the possibility 
in science of having the “same” experiment raises some questions. 108 When we are working 
on controlled experiment, the aim is “to reproduce the conditions required by a theory and 
then to manipulate the relevant variables in order to make measurements of a particular 
scientific parameter or to test the theory. When the data are not collected under controlled 
conditions or are not from repeatable experiments, then the relationship between the data 
and the theoretical laws is likely to be neither direct nor clear-cut. this problem was not 
106 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” p. 278. the present 
section on experiments in science works upon the contents of “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the 
Case of Economics,” pp. 278-282 and 284-286. there is here an updated and enlarged vision of the points discussed 
in the previous paper.
107 “in experiments we actively interfere with the material world. in one way or another, experimentation involves the 
material realization of an experimental process (the object[s] of study, the apparatus, and their interaction),” radder, 
h., “towards a More Developed Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation,” in radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Scientific Experimentation, p. 4.
108 Cf. urBach, P., “On the Utility of Repeating the ‘Same’ Experiment,” American Journal of Physics, v. 59, (1981), 
pp. 151-162.
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(…) unique to economics; it arose in other social sciences and in natural sciences where 
controlled experiments were not possible.” 109
2.1. The Traditional Approach to the Laboratory Experiments
traditionally, laboratory experiment was the exemplar for the concept of “experiment.” 110 
this was the case in modern science as well as for many contemporary scientists. Even now 
laboratory experiment is often considered as the archetype of what an experiment is in science. 
thus, besides the human intervention and the repeatability for getting a reliable knowledge, a 
laboratory experiment is performed in a material setting. Moreover, as the history of science 
frequently describes, there is a specific scenery where the experiment can be carefully 
conducted. in laboratory experimentation, the relevant factors are commonly epistemological 
and methodological. the environment should be under the control of the experimenter.
Consequently, “this distinguishes laboratory experiments from ‘field’ experiments, in 
which relatively few aspects of the environment can be controlled, and in which only limited 
access to most of the economic agents may be available. it is precisely this control of the 
environment, and access to the agents (sufficient to observe and measure attributes that are not 
controlled) that give laboratory experiments their power.” 111 if the research is on economics, 
the basic level is in the study of some economic processes (bargaining, exchange relations, 
etc.) and the search is for stable or structural features of economic behavior associated to them 
(while bargaining, in auctions, etc.).
Much of what is done in laboratory experiments is thought of as addressing problems that are 
not studied in other ways. in this regard, it seems that aims, processes and results of laboratory 
experiments in economics relate to aspects of economic phenomena that, in principle, are not 
investigated by other kinds of economic research. Methodologically, the experiment starts with a 
design, which should consider the parameters and the procedures to be used. then it follows the 
“experiment” itself: the process of control of the behavior of trial subjects in laboratory situations 
that are of interest for economic science. thereafter, the experiment can get some results (e.g., of 
auction markets or of bargaining) that should be compared with other experiments made. 
insofar as it is a human activity, laboratory experimentation can be designed with different 
aims in mind. When the case is economics, the design can be originally oriented towards 
economic theory (thinking of descriptive economics) or to applied economics (mainly towards 
policy guidance). thus, (i) an experiment can be designed to test some particular formal 
hypothesis (e.g., on the preference reversal phenomenon), looking for observations that may 
support a relatively general conclusion; and (ii) the experiment may be designed to resemble 
some complex reality (such as a market), where the observations which are made seek to be 
relevant for a particular issue of policy (e.g., on market stability). 112 the experiments seek “to 
collect data on interesting phenomena and important institutions, in the hope of detecting 
unanticipated regularities.” 113
109 MorGan, M. S., The History of Econometric Ideas, p. 9.
110 in the seventeenth century “experiment was officially declared to be the royal road to knowledge,” hackinG, i., 
Representing and Intervening, p. 149.
111 roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview,” The Economic Journal, 
v. 98, (1988), p. 974 (reprinted in hey, J. d. and looMeS, G. (eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental Economics, 
vol. i, p. 3).
112 Cf. roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and its Relation to Economic theory,” in reScher, 
N. (ed.), Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, University Press of America, lanham, 1987, p. 160.
113 roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics,” Economics and Philosophy, v. 2, (1986), p. 246.
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As regard the process itself of laboratory experimentation, there are several options, which 
are connected with the aims of the research proposed. in the case of economics the process 
is often used to test a theory from the point of view of prediction. Even so, there are several 
possibilities, according to the objectives of the methodological task of testing: “in the case 
of experiments that test the predictions of existing theories, it will be useful to distinguish 
between those that test a theory in its specified domain of application, and those that explore 
its applicability outside the strict confines of this domain. We will also want to know whether 
the results of these experiments falsify the predictions of the theory or support it” 114 (i.e., 
evidence that fails to falsify the theory). 
thereafter, we get the results of laboratory experimentation. the variety of aims and the 
diversity of processes can lead us to a large range of results. they are normally interpreted 
in the context of the specific aims of each experiment carried out in the laboratory. these 
results obtained by means of laboratory experimentation in economics can show us that 
well-established conceptions, such as the assumption that economic agents move according 
to an expected utility function, have serious problems with empirical data. 115 Moreover, it 
happens that a substantial body of empirical work offers a number of systematic ways in which 
individual preferences of economic agents fail to exhibit the regularities represented by an 
expected utility function. 116
hitherto, laboratory experiments in economics have been criticized in several ways. 1) in 
laboratory situations trial subjects are commonly university students (and above all economics 
students), which may offer different results from other kinds of economic agents. hence, the 
experimental design should consider a broad class of agents in order to avoid biases. 2) the 
process itself of laboratory experiment is clearly artificial. thus, its completeness regarding 
the whole real picture as well as its resemblance with the actual economic world may be 
questioned (and, consequently, the reliability of the economic knowledge which is obtained). 
3) the results obtained through experiments in economics might be of limited applicability. 
De facto, even some important economic experimentalists are cautious when they expect that 
“patient experimental research will yield new behavioral theories of limited application” 117 
(i.e., comprehensive theories can appear only in the long run). 
2.2. The Enlarged Vision of the Diversity of Experiments
Up to now, the existence has been pointed out of a difference between a traditional 
conception of experiment —mainly, the “laboratory experiment”— and the enlarged vision 
of experiment, which involves a diversity of experiments. this distinction is made here based 
above all on “internal” criteria (especially, epistemological and methodological) rather than on 
the basis of “external” factors (social, cultural, institutional, economic, etc.). the difference 
between the traditional conception and the enlarged vision is both historical and structural. in 
addition, the dynamics is also different, as can be seen in the aims, processes and results.
114 roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and its Relation to Economic theory,” p. 148.
115 i recall several conversations with herbert Simon (in 1993, 1996 and 1999) where he insisted on the idea of 
gathering empirical data through experiments in order to refute well-established assumptions of the mainstream of 
economics. the set of publications in this regard are pointed out in Gonzalez, W. J., “herbert A. Simon: Filósofo de 
la Ciencia y economista (1916-2001),” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. 
Simon, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2003, pp. 7-63; especially, pp. 29-63.
116 Cf. roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics,” p. 248. 
117 Selten, R., “Emergence and Future of Experimental Economics,” p. 68.
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From the point of view of experiment as a human activity, the diversity in the kinds of 
experiments in science comes principally from different aims, processes and results. they 
are related to an environment, which has a role for testing. thus, among the components of 
the traditional view on experiment there are several elements related to a given situation. As 
happens in the laboratory experimentation, they are commonly connected to a material setting 
(which frequently includes very specific instruments):
 a) An experiment is an intervention in the world. thus it includes a manipulation of 
some aspects of reality to identify certain items, such as causal mechanisms, or to test a 
theory about those phenomena. b) Experiments are thought of as a way of grasping certain 
relatively enduring structures of the world. then, they involve mechanisms that act in a 
characteristic manner when there are some specific circumstances. c) the experiment is an 
active interference in order to enable or trigger the mechanism that is under investigation. but 
it could also be used to prevent any countervailing mechanism. 118
Repeatedly, the critics of experiments in the social sciences maintain that all of them —and 
specifically economics— are not in a position to isolate, control and manipulate social (in this case, 
economic) conditions. 119 thus, lawson asserts that “it is certainly reasonable to doubt that controlled 
experimentation will ever be particularly meaningful in economics due to the impractically of 
manipulating social structures and mechanisms in order to more clearly identify them.” 120 What 
he acknowledges is the existence of social regularities (or “partial regularities”) that come from 
the reproducibility of certain mechanisms of a social world that is open, dynamic and changing.
Nonetheless, there is a full branch of economics —experimental economics— that focuses 
on laboratory experimentation and then assumes the traditional notion of “experiment,” which 
includes a purposeful intervention. Furthermore, “economic experiments in the laboratory 
aspire to the standards of laboratory experiments found elsewhere in science. Depending 
on the experiment in question, economists may focus their design aim on the control of the 
environment in which the experiment takes place, on controlling the communication between 
subjects, on setting limits on the range of input behaviour allowed and the variation of output 
responses and so forth.” 121 this economics in the laboratory raises new methodological issues, 
such as those on completeness of economic theory. 122
however, besides laboratory experimentation, it has also been common in the past to use 
“thought experiment” (Gedanken experiment) as a heuristic tool. this was the case both in 
natural sciences (physics, 123 biology, etc.) and in social sciences (history, 124 economics, political 
118 Cf. laWSon, t., Economics and Reality, pp. 202-203.
119 On trygve haavelmo and this issue, cf. MorGan, M. S., The History of Econometric Ideas, pp. 245-246.
120 laWSon, t., Economics and Reality, pp. 203-204. 
121 BouManS, M. and MorGan, M. S., “Ceteris paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic 
theories,” p. 17. Cf. FriedMan, D. and Sunder, S. (eds.), Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
122 Cf. Guala, F., “Economics in the lab: Completeness vs. testability,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 12, 
n. 2, (2005), pp. 185-196. See also Guala, F., The Methodology of Experimental Economics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005.
123 it is well-known that the Gedanken experiment was used by Albert Einstein, which can be seen in his paper on 
relativity: einStein, A., “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper,” Annalen der Physik, v. 17, (1905), pp. 891-921. 
thomas Kuhn has emphasized this fact as well as that “thought experiments have more than once played a critically 
important role in the development of physical science,” kuhn, th. S., “A Function for thought Experiments,” in cohen, 
i. B. and taton, r. (eds.), Mélanges Alexandre Koyré, v. 2: L’aventure de la science, hermann, Paris, 1964, p. 307. 
Reprinted in kuhn, th. S., The Essential Tension. Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, the University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, p. 240.
124 Cf. reiSS, J., “Counterfactuals, thought Experiments, and Singular Causal Analysis in history,” Philosophy of 
Science, v. 79, n. 5, (2009), pp. 712-723.
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science, etc.). Certainly, whether being related to a counterfactual or not, there is no material 
intervention in a thought experiment: it could be seen as an imaginative narrative to test a specific 
theory or a hypothesis. in effect, the thought experiment considers hypothetical or imaginary test 
conditions, where some particular instantiations of a real process —it maybe a causal one— that 
is identified by the theory, and the thought experiment displays a concrete state of affairs that 
needs an explanation as the end result of the process that is being studied. 125
Nowadays, in the empirical sciences (natural, social and artificial), we work de facto with 
an enlarged notion of “experiment.” Nevertheless, the experiments with material intervention 
—laboratory experiments— are still the archetype among them. Furthermore, there is a 
discussion on the acceptability as experiment of some of them. Commonly, the criteria used to 
distinguish the diversity of experiments are features related to epistemological, methodological 
and ontological elements. they are mainly the following: 1) the range of controllability of the 
variables; 2) the level of materiality of the processes employed in the research; and 3) the 
sphere —real, ideal, a hybrid, …— to be analyzed. Again, among these sciences, economics is 
an interesting case study to see the differences between laboratory experimentation and other 
experiments, because it is a science that uses a variety of experiments.
1) As for epistemological issue of the range of controllability of the variables, there are 
at least three possibilities: (i) direct control; (ii) indirect control (or statistical control); 
and (iii) assumption in model. Concerning the kind of control of variables, the last one is the 
most complex, especially if we follow the analysis made by Alan Musgrave on the Milton 
Friedman approach on the lack of realism of the assumptions. For Friedman, an economic 
theory should not be criticized for containing “unreal assumptions,” because he considers that 
the important point in order to evaluate a theory is successful predictions. 126 Musgrave thinks 
instead that Friedman’s dictum (the so-called “F-twist”) is false according to three types of 
assumption: negligibility assumptions, domain assumptions, and heuristic assumptions. 127 
2) Regarding the methodological issue of the level of materiality of the processes employed 
in the research, there are relevant aspects. 128 the differences are noticeable, and in the case of 
economics regarding several possibilities: a) the empirical domain of laboratory experimentation 
(when a material realm is under direct control); b) the “passive experimentation” of the 
econometric case (when a material realm receives an indirect control or statistical control); c) the 
simulations and, above all, computer simulations (when the quasi-material realm or the pseudo-
material sphere depends on the assumptions in the model); and d) the thought experiments (when 
the non-material realm depends upon the assumptions in the model). 129
125 Cf. lennox, J. G., “thought Experiments in Evolutionary biology today,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Evolutionism: 
Present Approaches, pp. 109-120.
126 Cf. FriedMan, M., “the Methodology of Positive Economics,” in FriedMan, M., Essays in Positive Economics, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953 (6th repr., 1969), pp. 3-43.
127 Cf. MuSGrave, A., “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic theory: the F-twist Untwisted,” Kyklos, v. 34, n. 3, 
(1981), pp. 377-387. “Negligibility assumptions state that some factor has a negligible effect upon the phenomenon 
under investigation. Domain assumptions specify the domain of applicability of the theory. Heuristic assumptions are 
a means of simplifying the logical development of the theory,” MuSGrave, A., “‘Unreal Assumptions’ in Economic 
theory: the F-twist Untwisted,” p. 386.
128 there is an ongoing discussion on the relevance of materiality for experiments and computer simulations. Cf. 
parker, W. S., “Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality,” Synthese, v. 169, 
(2009), pp. 483-496.
129 Cf. BouManS, M. and MorGan, M. S., “Ceteris paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic 
theories,” p. 20. Although the origin of this distinction is in the analysis of ceteris paribus conditions, i think that the main 
differences which are drawn in this differentiation have a rather general consideration for the methodological process.
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3) both the range of controllability of the variables and the level of materiality of the 
processes employed in the research are related to the ontological issue of the sphere —real, 
ideal, a hybrid, …— to be analyzed. Unquestionably the sphere to be analyzed by experiments 
varies from real (a direct tangible object of study or statistical data based on previous evidence) 
to clearly ideal (a thought experiment or a purely mathematical model). between these poles 
—real, although artificially constructed, 130 and ideal— there is the realm of hybrids (e.g., in 
simulations) which could be quasi-material or pseudo-material. 
if these epistemological, methodological and ontological distinctions on the kind of 
experiments are basically correct, then there are clear differences in the methodological 
processes to test scientific predictions (which is a central issue in the methodology of economics). 
Experimental economics —mainly in the case of Selten— is well aware of this question, and he 
tries to emphasize the laboratory experimentation as the most reliable kind of experimentation 
to deal with the predictive success (and, therefore, with the notions of accuracy and precision). 131 
Nevertheless, he also points out limits: “experimental research (…) cannot replace field research. 
the institutional environment of economic participants must be investigated in the real world. 
Once we are sure we have modeled such an environment, however, we can and must test or 
redevelop the behavioral assumptions of theory in the laboratory.” 132
2.3. From the “External Validity” to the “External View” on Experiments 
Once the analysis of experiments in “internal” terms (epistemological, methodological, etc.) 
has been made, the focus can move to the “external” consideration. in this regard, two 
different directions on experiments can be pointed out here. the first one affects what, from 
a methodological perspective, is originally extrinsic or peripheral to the actual realm of 
research that is being experimented on. Meanwhile, the second view emphasizes the contextual 
aspects around the experiment, seeing them as relevant or even crucial for understanding the 
experimentation made. however, although the “external validity” is discussed in the former 
case, the primacy is still in the philosophical-methodological approach, whereas in the latter 
option the predominance is in the contextual values (social, cultural, economic, political, 
ecological, etc.).
Philosophically, “internal validity”-“external validity” of experiments is an issue connected 
with the discussion on artificiality in experiments, especially in the social sciences. 133 the 
question is then if the stylized form of experimental institutions allows us to make legitimate 
conclusions about the “real world.” in other words, to what extent is it valid for the complex real 
world of economic affairs that have been obtained in a limited setting of a laboratory? thus, 
the problem of artificiality for experiments —which can have various goals— is associated 
to the external validity of experiments out of the sample, when there is a search of empirical 
regularities for testing a theory.
130 “in the laboratory an artificial economic reality is constructed, for example a market or an auction,” Selten, R., 
“Emergence and Future of Experimental Economics,” in Galavotti, M. C. (ed.), Observation and Experiment in the 
Natural and the Social Sciences, p. 63.
131 On the distinction between “accuracy” and “precision,” cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the 
Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” section 5, pp. 295-298.
132 Selten, R., “Emergence and Future of Experimental Economics,” p. 68.
133 Cf. SchraM, A., “Artificiality: the tension between internal and External Validity in Economic Experiments,” 
Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 12, n. 2, (2005), pp. 225-237.
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initially, this discussion about the internal versus external validity was particularly important 
in psychology, in the search for the factors relevant to the validity of experiments in social 
settings. 134 the approach is methodological: “an internally valid design will yield results that are 
robust and replicable. External validity refers to the possibility of generalizing the conclusions 
to situations that prompted the research.” 135 Meanwhile, in the option that prefers external values 
(social, cultural, economic, political, etc.), the issue is the possibility that those external values can 
determine the support of evidence in favor of a theory, 136 instead of those contextual values 
being merely elements to understand the acceptance of a scientific theory. hence, the discussion 
includes the role of the environment of the laboratory when the scientists perform an experiment. 
Frequently, this view has philosophical roots in Kuhnian approaches on contextual influences, 
but it reaches positions far beyond Kuhn’s actual conception. 137 
behind the first case is the issue of the range in the results of the scientific research. in this 
regard, “an experiment result is internally valid when the experimenter is genuinely learning 
about the actual system he or she is manipulating —when, that is, the system is not being 
unduly disturbed by outside interferences. An experimental result is externally valid when 
the information learned about the system being manipulated is relevantly probative about the 
class of systems that are of interest to the experimenters.” 138 this methodological distinction 
is sensible, and it affects what is “extrinsic” or “peripheral” to the phenomena actually 
studied —it might be an expansion— rather than genuinely “external” or “contextual” to the 
experiment made. Moreover, in this distinction the activity itself of experimenting still has 
more weight than the environment around it.
Quite different is the external view of the experiment due to the “social turn” in philosophy 
and methodology of science, which is behind the second case. According to the social turn, 
there is a new panorama in the philosophical approach to science and technology. instead of the 
previous ideas on scientific findings and technological contributions, which were frequently 
thought of as context-independent (mainly, as epistemic contents and instruments to control our 
surroundings), the new “external” vision presents a different picture where contextual values 
(cultural, political, economic, ecological etc.) have a central role in science and technology. 
Moreover, the landscape is then an interdisciplinary endeavor, where the empirical studies 
on science and technology commonly accompany the philosophical reflections on scientific 
activity and technological doing. 139
Ethnomethodology is one of the consequences of the “social turn,” in general, and of 
external characterization of experiments by latour 140 and Woolgar, 141 in particular. An 
134 Cf. caMpBell, D., “Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings,” Psychological Bulletin, 
v. 54, (1957), pp. 297-312.
135 Cf. SchraM, A., “Artificiality: the tension between internal and External Validity in Economic Experiments,” p. 226.
136 Cf. BoGen, J., “Experiment and Observation,” p. 136.
137 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “las revoluciones científicas y la evolución de thomas S. Kuhn,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), 
Análisis de Thomas Kuhn: Las revoluciones científicas, trotta, Madrid, 2004, pp. 15-103; especially, pp. 36-43.
138 WinSBerG, E., “A tale of two Methods,” p. 579, note 6.
139 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Philosophical Approach to Science, technology and Society,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), 
Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, pp. 3-49.
140 See note 7 in this chapter. Cf. latour, b., The Pasteurisation of France, harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1988; and latour, b., We have Never been Modern, harvester, brighton, 1993 (translated by C. Porter.)
141 Cf. WoolGar, S., “Critique and Criticism: two Readings of Ethnomethodology,” Social Studies of Science, v. 11, 
n. 4, (1981), pp. 504-514; WoolGar, S., Science: The Very Idea, tavistock, london, 1988; and WoolGar, S. (ed.), 
Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge, Sage, london, 1988; and lynch, M. and 
WoolGar, S. (eds.), Representation in Scientific Practice, the Mit Press, Cambridge, 1990.
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ethnomethodological study of the activity developed in the laboratory is a kind of social 
anthropology of science. the social interests (or even the political attitudes), the negotiation 
among the agents that develop the experiments, the sort of leadership presented, etc., are then 
analyzed through the methodology of “participant observation.” According to barry barnes, 
latour “wanted to erode the distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘political’ actions, and began 
to speak as if all the actions of the scientists without exception were political.” 142
barnes criticizes that, in analyzing the performance in the laboratories, latour went 
on to describe the actions of the scientists “using metaphors draw on from aggressively 
individualistic forms of economic and political theory, offering a picture of science as a 
form of hobbesian war. And it was a still greater surprise when this particular aspect of 
latour’s work was acclaimed with enthusiasm by sociologists, for whom a tradition going 
back to Durkheim had decisively demonstrated (or so i had imagined) that not even war of the 
usual kind could be possibly hobbesian war.” 143 thus, this social anthropological view —the 
ethnomethodological approach— is seen as built upon an “unsociological sociology,” insofar 
as the focus is only in individual agency in normalized societies.
Undeniable is the existence of a social dimension of experimentation, because it is a human 
activity in a social setting and there are important institutional elements around it. Obviously, 
there are some non-epistemic factors that can influence laboratory experimentation or other 
forms of experiment. but it seems that latour goes very far with his “model of political contests 
in which competitors employ rhetorical and other devices to gain and consolidate support.” 144 
the key for understanding laboratory experimentation should not be in “external” factors, such 
as those on the intersubjective dynamics of potential friends and foes. in this regard, when 
Kuhn insisted on the historical character of scientific experimentation within a social setting of 
scientific communities, he still gave more relevance to the internal constituents of science than 
to the external factors of the scientific environment. 145 this justifies putting more attention on 
“internal” factors of the analysis on experiments, considering its different kinds. 
2.4. From Simulations to Computer Simulations in the Context of Experiments
Until now, the philosophical-methodological reflections on simulations —and, above all, 
computer simulations— have been focused on their status in the relations between theory 
and experiment. basically, there are three main approaches available in the literature: the first view 
considers that the simulations are a new kind of experiment, different from the laboratory 
experiment; the second perspective emphasizes that simulations have a singular status between 
experiments and theories; and the third option sees the computer simulation as an advance in 
quantitative terms (i.e., in the speed in the use of information), but does not deem them as an 
actual change for methodology of science. 146
142 BarneS, B., “thomas Kuhn and the Problem of Social Order in Science,” in nickleS, th. (ed.), Thomas Kuhn, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 134-135.
143 BarneS, B., “thomas Kuhn and the Problem of Social Order in Science,” p. 135.
144 BoGen, J., “Experiment and Observation,” pp. 136-137.
145 Kuhn is very explicit in his criticisms to the Edinburgh School, one of the key lines in the social turn: “i am among 
those who have found the claims of the strong program absurd: an example of deconstruction gone mad,” kuhn, th. 
S., The Road Since Structure. Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, edited by James 
Conant and John haugeland, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, p. 110.
146 Cf. lenhard, J., “Computer Simulation: the Cooperation between Experimenting and Modeling,” Philosophy of 
Science, v. 74, n. 2, (2007), pp. 176-194; especially, p. 188.
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After dismissing the third option, due to the methodological improvements introduced 
by the computer simulations in the three realms of science (natural, social, and artificial), 
the first view and the second perspective should be taken into account: they are somehow 
complementary. the reason is this: computer simulations are methodologically a hybrid, insofar 
as they combine mathematical models with experimental ones. increasingly, simulations 
—and, above all, computer simulations 147— have been characterized as “experiments” or, 
what is more appropriate, as “virtual experiments.” 148
Simulations, in general, and computer simulations, in particular, can be used for quite 
different purposes, including those related to social life, such as traffic flow and automobile driver 
behavior under different sorts of conditions. From a descriptive perspective, computer simulation 
in these cases can be readily compared with real world behavior, and from a prescriptive point of 
view, road management can improve if the rules take into account that information and are well 
designed. thus, they can be used in “descriptive models” of basic science (i.e., the simulation 
as an approximation to facts of the world) as well as in “prescriptive models” of applied science 
(i.e., the patterns of solution of concrete problems based on a simulation).
Considered as “virtual experiments,” computer simulations seem to fit the characterization 
of economics quite well: “this kind of experimental activity has a comparatively long tradition 
in economics, predating the computer simulations of the type so familiar nowadays. it consists of 
statistical or mathematical models that are simulated, or ‘run’, to generate output series with the 
aim of mimicking observed economic time-series data. For example, one of the most commonly 
available, but least understood, sets of economic data is that of stock market prices.” 149
Epistemologically, in this sphere of research there is an interweaving between the character of 
social science and the dimension of science of the artificial (understood as “science of design”). 150 
this is the case of economics. 151 (i) Simulations can use empirical information of the world 
that might be obtained through observations or even through experiments (including laboratory 
experiments); and (ii) simulations include a nonmaterial component that seeks to resemble 
aspects of the world (a virtual representation oriented towards an imitative representation of the 
real world). the point of this hybrid of social and artificial seems to me clear: to produce new 
outcomes in areas where other kinds of research seem infeasible or defective. 
Frequently it happens that simulations, in general, and computer simulations, in particular, 
can play a similar role to “thought experiments.” 152 in fact, they can contribute to establishing 
147 On this issue, cf. keller, e. F., “Models, Simulation, and ‘Computer Experiments’,” in radder, h. (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, pp. 198-215.
148 Mary Morgan distinguishes between “virtual experiments” and “virtually experiments:” “Virtual experiments 
(entirely nonmaterial in object of study and in intervention but which may involve the mimicking of observations) and 
virtually experiments (almost a material experiment by virtue of the virtually material object of input),” MorGan, M. S., 
“Experiments without Material intervention. Models Experiments, Virtual Experiments, and Virtually Experiments,” 
in radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, p. 233. An analysis of her views is in parker, W. S., 
“Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality,” pp. 484 and 488-496.
149 MorGan, M. S., “Experiments without Material intervention. Models Experiments, Virtual Experiments, and 
Virtually Experiments,” pp. 224-225. 
150 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Configuración de las Ciencias de Diseño como Ciencias de lo Artificial: Papel de la 
inteligencia Artificial y de la racionalidad limitada,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño: Racionalidad 
limitada, predicción y prescripción, pp. 41-69.
151 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design Science,” 
pp. 165-186, especially, pp. 171-179.
152 this was accepted by Simon in The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 14.
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some phenomena as possible and to ruling out certain events as impossible. however, not all 
thought experiments are eo ipso simulations: they can follow different heuristic routes. but 
both share the consideration of nonmaterial elements (or, at least, non tangible components). 
Methodologically, simulations can be considered “virtual experiments” —they work on a 
hypothetical data stream in the case of economics— and ontologically they rely on constructed 
items within the artificial world (e.g., a resemblance of the real economic processes). 
Unfortunately, as Alvin Roth has pointed out, there is a “distressing tendency to confuse 
computer simulations, and the kind of investigations one can do with them, with experiments 
involving the observation of real people in controlled environments. (…) Computer simulations 
are useful for creating and exploring theoretical models, while experiments are useful for 
observing behaviour.” 153 De facto, there is a difference between the conclusions obtained by 
computer simulation (e.g., in the case of computer “tournaments” reported by R. Axelrod 154) 
and the experimental results obtained in the laboratory (e.g., in the experiments made by R. 
Selten and R. Stoecker 155). 
Roth emphasizes the difference in results, which is connected to the difference between 
computer simulations and actual experiments: “While the computer simulations which produce 
this result were conducted with an element of experimental flavour that is missing from 
conventional computer simulations (in that tournament entries were solicited from others), 
experiments with human subjects introduce a certain amount of open-ended complexity in the 
form of human behavior, that is absent from a tournament in which individuals are represented 
by short (or even moderately long) computer programs.” 156
Again, the emphasis is on “experiment” as something artificial (with a purposeful target) 
that depends on a human intervention in order to control a phenomenon or a set of phenomena. 
but this cannot be the whole picture: there is —in my judgment— an increasing complexity in 
the study of the economic events, according to the scale of phenomena. thus, the investigation 
may start from computer simulations —a clear artificial situation—. then, through the 
analysis of controlled experiments in the laboratory environment —a less artificial case 
than the previous one— the research of economic phenomena may reach the following steps 
of complexity: the real economic activity of human beings. 157 in this search the historical 
character of economics plays a relevant role, 158 which should be considered as well.
153 roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview,” p. 1000 (reprinted in hey, 
J. d. and looMeS, G. (eds.), Recent Developments in Experimental Economics, vol. i, p. 29). A different view is this: 
“computer simulation studies are material experiments in a straightforward sense,” parker, W. S., “Does Matter Really 
Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality,” p. 483.
154 Cf. axelrod, R., “Efective Choice in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, v. 24, 
(1980), pp. 3-25; axelrod, R., “More Efective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
v. 24, (1980), pp. 379-403; and axelrod, R., The Evolution of Cooperation, basic books, N. york, 1984.
155 Cf. Selten, r. and Stoecker, r., “End behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames: A 
learning theory Approach,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, v. 7, n. 1, (1986), pp. 47-70.
156 roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview,” p. 1001.
157 On complexity as a typical feature or economic reality, cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Economic Prediction and human 
Activity. An Analysis of Prediction in Economics from Action theory,” Epistemologia, v. 17, (1994), p. 262; and 
Gonzalez, W. J., “Complexity in Economics and Prediction: the Role of Parsimonious Factors,” in diekS, d., Gonzalez, 
W. J., hartMan, S., Stadler, F., ueBel, th. and WeBer, M. (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New 
Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered, Springer, Dordrecht, forthcoming.
158 Alvin Roth sees a parallel between evolutionary biology and economics because they deal “largely with historical 
data,” roth, A., “laboratory Experimentation in Economics,” p. 270.
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2.5. Two Cases Reconsidered: Thought Experiments and Mathematical Models
thought experiments were used a long time before computer experiments were available. 159 
however, computer experiments and thought experiments have some epistemological, 
methodological and ontological similarities insofar as virtual and mental are different from 
empirical. in this way, computer simulations can be “experimental” in an analogous sense in which 
a thought experiment is “experimental.” 160 important differences lie in the process employed: the 
computer permits the working out of the implications of a hypothesis more rapidly than the speed 
of thought, and can also consider a large range of variables at a specific moment. 
Originally thought experiments are a creative procedure related to a non-material domain 
but their aims, processes and results are oriented towards the real world. thus, thought 
experiments are used to show the possibility and the impossibility of natural phenomena and 
social events as well as their limits in our world. thought experiments belong to an ideal 
context when aims are designed, and while processing the information. but their results can 
be used for other kinds of experiments as well as for theoretical contributions. Moreover, they 
have been connected to computer experiments and to mathematical models, as can be seen in 
several sciences, such as economics.
Econometrics might be seen as offering a tertium quid between the experimentation made 
in the economic laboratory and the thought experiments. (i) An econometric model shares with 
laboratory experimentation the constructed character of the process and the artificial nature of 
the environment, even though in the laboratory there are real agents (and then there is a direct 
control of variables). Meanwhile in an econometric model there is a package of statistical data 
related to economic phenomena (and then the control of variables is indirect). (ii) An econometric 
model has no clear-cut relation to the circumstances of economic undertakings (above all when 
the model relies on a process of generating data), and the thought experiments work on a sphere 
of possibilities (and also impossibilities) rather than on an actual environment. 
Unmistakably, there is a relevant methodological connection between thought experiments 
and mathematical models. Morgan has insisted on the link: “in the post-1950s period, economists 
have become avid users of mathematical models. (…) i suggested that their usage involved being 
able to trace through deductively the answers to ‘what if’ or ‘let us assume’ type questions 
about the economic world represented in the model [161] (…) We can portray this modern use 
of mathematical models as extending economists’ verbal thought experiments of earlier times 
that were limited by the capacity of the mind to follow the paths of more than two or three 
variables in a system. in characterizing such model usage in terms of (…) thought experiments, 
we can see how asking questions and exploring answers with mathematical models have allowed 
economists to think through in a consistent and logically deductive way how a large number of 
variables may interrelate and find the solutions to systems with a large number of units.” 162
159 thought experiments has also been used in philosophical approches, cf. ReScher, N., What if? Thought 
Experimentation in Philosophy, transaction, N. brunswick, 2005.
160 Cf. keller, e. F., “Models, Simulation, and ‘Computer Experiments’,” p. 204.
161 Cf. MorGan, M. S., “Models, Stories and the Economic World,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 8, (2001), 
pp. 361-384.
162 MorGan, M. S., “Experiments without Material intervention. Models Experiments, Virtual Experiments, and 
Virtually Experiments,” p. 218. See has developed other aspects on models and experiments in MorGan, M. S., 
“Model Experiments and Models in Experiments,” in MaGnani, l. and nerSeSSian, N. (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning: 
Science, Technology, Values, Kluwer, New york, 2002, pp. 41-58; and MorGan, M. S., “Experiments versus Models: 
New Phenomena, inference, and Surprise,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 12, n. 2, (2005), pp. 317-329.
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Mathematical model exploration works in basic science and in applied science. it can be related 
to questions on theories (such as economic theory) and issues connected to policy problems from 
the real world (such as applied economics). in the first case, the models can be used to develop the 
scientific theory (i.e., explanation and prediction), whereas in the second case they can perform 
a task to resolve concrete problems of the world (i.e., prediction and prescription). however, 
the utilization of mathematical models understood as experiments —similar to laboratory 
experiments— requires us to take into account some important differences. 
Fundamentally the differences are three. First, how the experimental control is achieved in 
both cases is different, because the material world has limits on intervention (i.e., control and 
manipulation), while the mathematical models should always place care on the capacity of their 
assumptions to represent the world properly. Second, the production of experimental results 
is also different: in laboratory experimentation it is material (for the particular situation found 
in the experimental setup), whereas in the mathematical model experiments are based on the 
(deductive) reasoning power of mathematics to derive the results. third, the range of potential 
inference is different as well: the case of the results of experiments made in the laboratory differs 
from those obtained by mathematical model experiments. 163
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‘VOICe’ and the faCts and  
OBserVatIOns Of exPerIenCe 1
Mary s. Morgan
the facts of social sciences are ones that stem from scientific expertise, but in the social 
world, everyone is their own expert. Everyone lives in society, and experiences either 
first-hand, or closely second-hand, the same phenomena that social scientists investigate. 
Consequently, people are not only the subjects of scientific investigation, but are themselves 
amateur reflexive scientists: observing and making sense of their own experiences in social 
and economic affairs. And, in a democratic community, such personal experience claims a 
legitimate place in knowledge discussions. these two qualities mean that the observations 
from personal experience can not be so lightly dismissed by the social scientist in the same 
way that the traditional observations of folk-lore can be trumped by the facts of scientific 
knowledge in the natural sciences. yet, these facts of personal experience may not travel 
easily, for the possibilities of voicing that experience depend in part on the nature of the social 
science involved and in part on the civic epistemology of the environment within which they 
can be expressed. the considerations which underlie the successful articulation of experienced 
knowledge suggest that ‘voice’ differs from both ‘engagement’ and ‘understanding’ as a 
way to characterize public participation in social science —as opposed to natural science— 
knowledge discussions.
1. PersOnal exPerIenCe In fOrms Of knOwledGe
i approach the idea that a public’s social science knowledge can be understood as the 
observations and facts of their experience by beginning with a case that lies neatly at the 
intersection of the natural sciences and the social sciences, namely the well-known MMR case 
in medicine. 2 the Measles, Mumps and Rubella triple vaccine is the standard vaccine, but in 
the late 1990s and early 21st century in the UK came to be associated in the public mind with 
the triggering of particular conditions including the onset of autism in children. this prompted 
1  this paper originated in a shorter paper originally entitled “Facts of Expertise and Facts of Experience” given at a 
conference on The Social Sciences and Democracy: A Philosophy of Science Perspective at Gent University, September 
2006. it was heavily revised for the conference Observation and Experiment in Science: New Methodological 
Perspectives at University of A Coruña, 8-9th March 2007 at the invitation of Wenceslao J. Gonzalez. i thank 
participants at both meetings for their comments. 
i also thank for their help: tiago Mata, trisha Greenhalgh, and my colleagues from “the Nature of Evidence: how 
Well Do ‘Facts’ travel?” project (funded by the leverhulme trust and the ESRC grant F/07 004/Z, at the Department 
of Economic history, london School of Economics) which supported this research; and Nat ishino for her research 
assistance. Comments are welcome: m.morgan@lse.ac.uk. © M. S. Morgan 2010.
2  this paper intersects with the work of two broad literatures: the public understanding of science discussions, and 
standpoint theories of knowledge. i discuss the former in various places in the text and in footnotes 6 and 33; the latter 
is only briefly referenced in footnote 30.
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many exhortations from the relevant state officials to parents not to forgo the vaccine on the 
grounds that: the vaccine was safe; that medical knowledge was certain; and that the dangers 
from not having the vaccination were real. in the UK context, such medical science facts 
did not travel well to a public which had learnt to distrust governmental assurances about 
the certainty and content of scientific knowledge. the crisis also prompted further medical 
research, and the medical establishment in due course re-affirmed their view that there was 
no evidence that the vaccine was harmful or triggered these particular conditions.3 At the end 
of all this, Richard horton, the editor of The Lancet (which had published the initial findings 
relating the vaccine to the onset of the conditions based on a small sample of children, parts 
of the subsequent medical debates, and a partial “retraction” of the original paper) said (in a 
seminar) that you could not tell a mother that her child’s autism was not the result of the MMR 
vaccine despite the negative findings of the scientific work.4 Why not?
No doubt there are many reasons why not, for the MMR case is highly complex in its cultural, 
social, medical and scientific aspects and i am not trying to judge these in any substantive way.5 
the aim here is merely to explore the epistemic and cognitive difficulties of persuading a parent 
about some aspect of their child’s health of which they have observed experience. On this ground, 
we can, at first sight, interpret this case as an example of the public’s failure to understand 
science: the implication is that such a parent cannot have understood either the nature of the 
evidence or the specific medical findings. the public appears stupid and the medical profession 
both more discerning (about the nature of scientific evidence) and more knowledgeable (about 
the medical conditions involved). this aligns with the standard “deficit model” of the public 
understanding of science literature, here seen as a two-fold deficit, about both the content of 
scientific knowledge and about methods of scientific enquiry.6 but horton was serious and not 
belittling the mother in question. So the question “Why not?” still requires an answer: why can’t 
you tell a mother that her child’s autism is not the result of the MMR vaccine? What is involved in 
the knowledge structure of such a situation that might lead horton to make such a statement?
3  For one particularly interesting example of this review work, see SMeeth, l. et al., “MMR Vaccination and 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders: A Case-control Study,” The Lancet, v. 364, September 11, 2004, pp. 963-969. 
(i am grateful to trisha Greenhalgh for pointing me to this work.) See also the statistical work discussed in horton, R., 
MMR Science and Fiction, Granta books, london, 2004; and references to other studies in both sources. 
4  horton’s comments were made at a seminar at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (london 
School of Economics), 7th December, 2005. 
5  See horton’s book MMR Science and Fiction for an account by one of the main participants and Mike Fitzgerald’s 
account comes from a general practitioner and parent of an autistic child in FitzGerald, M., MMR and Autism, Routledge, 
london, 2004. An example of social science research into the social and cognitive complexity of the problem from 
the point of view of parents is poltorak, M. et al., “‘MMR talk’ and Vaccination Choices: An Ethnographic Study in 
brighton,” Social Science and Medicine, v. 61, (2005), pp. 709-719. 
For a science studies perspective, see collinS, h. and pinch, t., Dr Golem: How to Think about Medicine, the 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, and the DEMOS report: StilGoe, J., irWin, A. and JoneS, K., The Received 
Wisdom, DEMOS, london, 2006, which concludes its discussion of the case: “While the experts and the government 
were noisily talking about the facts, parents were quietly asking about uncertainty,” p. 50.
6  this deficit model is associated with the “public understanding of science” project, which in the UK case, arose 
from the Royal Society’s 1985 paper of that title, though most serious scholars have found it wanting as a conceptual 
tool and show a healthy scepticism about the public’s ignorance. For example, see ziMan, J., “Public Understanding of 
Science,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, v. 16, n. 1, (1991), pp. 99-105. he summed up the general situation 
of public knowledge about science thus: “a simple ‘deficit’ model, which tries to interpret the situation solely in 
terms of public ignorance or scientific illiteracy, does not provide an adequate analytical framework for many of the 
results of our research,” ziMan, J., “Public Understanding of Science,” p. 101. Wynne described the deficit model as 
“discredited … more an ideological construct than a research model,” Wynne, b., “Public Uptake of Science: A Case 
for institutional Reflexivity,” Public Understanding of Science, v. 2, (1993), p. 322.
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First, the fact that, in many cases taken together, there is no statistical evidence for such a 
connection between the vaccine and the condition suggests that a general relationship between 
them is unlikely, but does not necessarily disprove a relation between the events in one particular 
individual case. Such an inference would conflate the probability-based, population or sample 
level finding with a definite claim for one individual (that is, for one observation, or potential 
observation in the statistical data set). this is not a comment on the quality of the statistical work 
in this field, but a comment on the epistemic scope and relevance of statistical reasoning when 
applied to individual cases.7 Statistical findings and probability reasoning apply to populations 
and samples, and are not epistemologically fitted to give an account of any one observation or 
individual case in situations —as here— where there is a large amount of variability in such 
individuals’ behaviour and complex responses in medical and social terms.
the case of smoking and cancer provides a parallel example, where there is a more 
accepted understanding of the nature of the problem of reasoning from statistical evidence to 
an individual case. Statistical evidence and reasoning on a large data base was used to uncover 
the positive co-relationship between smoking and lung cancer. but while the findings are based 
on large samples, the probability of the connection is not 100%; and for any one individual 
with lung cancer, there will be a particular combination of smoking and other causes and of 
background conditions to the onset of the disease. So, some people who do smoke don’t get 
lung cancer and some who don’t nevertheless do get lung cancer.
Of course the smoking case was of a significant and positive correlation, and here 
with the MMR case, we have no significant correlation. yet the epistemic structure of the 
problem remains similar. We can speculate that despite the statistical findings, amongst the 
total population of children who received the MMR vaccination, a particular very finely 
stratified sample might throw up a significant positive correlation between the vaccine and 
the conditions, so that a link might be made for any rare or idiosyncratic case that fell into 
that sub-class.8 in this situation, even the most carefully constructed study that shows that the 
MMR and autism are not statistically related in a large sample of children does not provide 
a fully effective argument that disproves an apparent trigger in any one case. the epistemic 
structure of the situation makes it difficult to persuade a mother that her child’s autism is not 
the result of the MMR vaccine on the basis of the statistical results.
Second, the problem also depends on another potential dissonance —in epistemic terms— 
between the clinical medical knowledge of doctors which is case-based, and that of medical 
research based on statistical work, that is, between clinical and epidemiological traditions. this 
difficulty was recognised in the nineteenth century when statistical arguments were first used in 
medical contexts. by a long traditional understanding, clinical knowledge and expertise relies on 
experience of a series of individual cases and this knowledge is then applied to further specific 
individual cases. this is the pattern that typically creates the “experienced expert.” For such 
a modern clinician, unless their medical knowledge based on learning from the laboratory or 
experimental work taken in conjunction with their clinical knowledge, and their experience of 
this particular case, all accord, it may well be difficult for an individual doctor —in spite of the 
statistical or epidemiological information— to tell an individual mother that their child’s autism 
7  Nor does this discussion consider the very real problems that both medics and patients have in understanding 
probability and statistical reasoning, on which there is a considerable literature; nor the differences between different 
modes of such reasoning, on which there is an even more extensive literature!
8  As horton himself noted, cf. MMR Science and Fiction, p. 25.
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was not triggered by the MMR vaccine.9 Of course, the patient’s (or their parents’) medical 
knowledge is even more case-based: usually they only experience one such case. the observations 
of such individual personal experience even in the single case may be very powerful. A mother 
may recognise more than her clinician the signs of what has happened and when it happened by 
observing two closely related events —because it is her own child, whom she knows more about 
and has watched more carefully and consistently than a doctor ever could —even though she 
may not know why, that is, the nature of any connection between them.10
this brings us to the third point: for both doctor and mother, there is no ‘why’ answer in 
the statistical studies. the non association between the vaccine and autism in epidemiological 
studies says nothing about why autism occurs, and the causes of autism are little understood. 
if we asked the question the other way around: What would convince a mother that the 
vaccine did not cause her child’s autism?, the answer would probably require the doctor to 
know and explain some already established causes of autism.11 thus, for both parties, having 
no explanation, no definite causal determinants of the condition, is a severe problem that 
makes it very difficult to convince a mother that her child’s autism was not due to the MMR 
vaccine. the experienced expert: the clinician, may not have the explanatory means to trump 
the observations of individual personal experience.12
the fourth reason is to do with recent changes in the knowledge relations between doctors 
and patients. Medical knowledge is no longer compellingly authoritative in the UK and patients 
are more demanding in their requirements. On the one hand, patients have been rebranded 
as consumers and are expected to make informed consumer choices. Medical treatment 
occurs in a market place inside and outside a state provided service.13 the consumer rights of 
patients gives them the power (oftentimes only nominal) to pick and choose amongst a set of 
medical “services” provided by the various medical practitioners. On the other hand, doctors 
—particularly at general practice level— have become less “all-knowing” and other sources 
of information about treatment (the internet etc.) have to some extent made the information 
relationship more even. Patients have not only the power to question, but to research and 
bring their own findings from the publicly available knowledge about medical science to the 
9   the hierarchy of “scientificity” of medical knowledge methods involves not just epidemiological (statistical) but 
experimental investigations of various kinds in contrast to the clinical knowledge of practising doctors with their 
experiential case-based knowledge of individual patients. (this may make the general practitioner also a member of 
the “public” in this case, though clearly one with high medical knowledge —i am indebted to tiago Mata for pointing 
this out.) these different epistemic approaches have different ways of investigating causes, but it is not clear that 
the hierarchy of methods for finding knowledge of associations meshes well with methods for clarifying knowledge 
of how causes work. thus, in the parallel smoking case, the standard account is that the epidemiological finding 
persuaded some people to give up smoking, but others were not convinced until the causal links were established 
through experimental work. 
10 See for comparison, the account of medical versus parental knowledge of Down syndrome discussed in 
StilGoe, J., irWin, A. and JoneS, K., The Received Wisdom, p. 32.
11 For example, the idea that autism may be genetically related has a long history, but the evidence is still being gathered 
(see aMSterdaMSka, O., Making Autism Genetic, How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel?, Workshop paper, lSE, March 2008). 
12 Ziman’s general claim seems apt here: “it cannot be assumed that their [the public’s] formal ignorance of science 
makes them quite unwise in their actions,” ziMan, J., “Public Understanding of Science,” p. 103.
13 Of course, the history of medicine is largely a history of a market, which only turned into a near state monopoly 
in the UK after WWii. Although some ‘private’ (i.e. market) medicine continued in the intervening years, the state 
monopoly is now turning private again. For an interesting discussion of the implications of this pertinent to this 
argument, see doWnie, R. and randall, F., “Choice and Responsibility in the NhS,” Clinical Medicine, v. 8, n. 2, 
(2008), pp. 182-185; i am grateful to Erika Mattila who brought this paper to my attention. 
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consulting room.14 Changes in information and in culture have combined to alter the accepted 
boundaries of knowledge, and so power, between doctor and patient in terms of legitimate 
discussion about scientific knowledge as well as to choices and rights to treatment. these 
changes in the personal relations of knowledge between doctor and patient have made it not 
so easy for a doctor to say with easy authority to a mother that her child’s autistic condition 
is not due to the vaccine. And, on the other side of the relationship, the increased expectation 
that patients (rather than doctors) will be the ones to make responsible and informed medical 
choices gives parents particular worries where that responsibility is their child’s future health. 
Recent changes in the way we think about medical knowledge no longer treats it as “other” 
knowledge —knowledge that only scientists understand and therefore make decisions about. 
Rather it has become an area of shared responsibility and sharing of knowledge.
2. PersOnal exPerIenCe and the exPerIenCed exPert
Understanding the epistemic structure of the situation in which an informed doctor cannot 
tell a mother that her child did not develop autism from the MMR vaccine gives insight into 
another set of cases, which share some of the same characteristics, but in the social sciences.15
the bbC often has a science slot in its early morning Radio 4 news. if this is a natural 
science story —the scientist is interviewed, and questioned about his/her discovery and is asked 
to explain his/her work and its potential relevance, usually with a certain deference to his/her 
particular and superior knowledge. if this is a social science or medical treatment news item, 
there is less deference to the learning of the scientist interviewed, and there is nearly always 
someone else brought in to provide ‘balance’: usually a non-scientist —i.e. a single mother, a 
social worker, a teacher, a parent, a charity worker, a patient, or so forth. the bbC format pits 
the expert from NiCE (the UK National institute for Clinical Excellence) vs the patient as they 
do the education expert from a university vs the parent or school governor of a school. this bbC 
habit of pairing scientist and non-scientist may be interpreted as an example of a double standard 
in which natural sciences are understood to make or discover knowledge compared to the less 
effective and objective social sciences, and so the provision of an alternative voice in these 
circumstances seemed to be for the purpose as ensuring a balance of opinions, as in political 
interviews and debates. No doubt there maybe some element of this “two cultures” divide.16 but 
following the discussion above, i now understand what is happening here somewhat differently, 
for these bbC social science enactments have the same structure as the MMR situation depicted 
by horton. these second interviewees brought in to confront the scientists are not ‘lay’ persons 
14 this phenomenon is known as the “expert patient” in health policy circles (again, thanks to trisha Greenhalgh 
for supplying this point). See the discussion of general practitioners’ responses to this development in the StilGoe, J., 
irWin, A. and JoneS, K., The Received Wisdom, pp. 41-43.
15 i concentrate here on the knowledge of personal experience versus that of the scientist, but there are other 
characteristics that these social science cases often share with the MMR case. For example, both the MMR and the 
smoking case were characterised by difficulties in applying the science of the population to individual cases. Exactly 
the same thing can happen in economics, where the individual observations of statistics travel easily into the aggregate, 
but it is not so easy to reverse this. Den butter provides relevant examples of this “road back from macro to micro” 
(den Butter, F., “National Accounts and indicators,” in BouManS, M. (ed.), Measurement in Economics: A Handbook, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 223), such as the problems of applying measures of inflation relevant at the general level 
to specific kinds of households (such as pensioner households). 
16 i thank tiago Mata for bringing to my attention Dunwoody’s paper about the coverage by science writers of the 
social sciences: dunWoody, S., “When Science Writers Cover the Social Sciences,” in GoldStein, J. h. (ed.), Reporting 
Science: The Case of Aggression, lawrence Erlbaum, hillsdale, NJ, 1986, pp. 67-82.
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with opinions: this is the wrong label. Rather, they are individuals with personal experience, or 
they are experienced experts, in the field of the social science and its knowledge sets.17
A good example of this bbC news genre —in medical science— occurred on 27th October 
2006 when a respected medical scientist, Dr tom Jefferson, was interviewed about his findings 
on the efficacy of influenza vaccination (to be published the following day in the British 
Medical Journal).18 he argued that there was currently insufficient evidence, based on his 
survey of a wide set of investigations, that flu jabs worked sufficiently effectively to justify 
the policy of annual widespread vaccination against the flu. he was paired in the science slot 
with Mrs Fish, who suffered from asthma, and had had flu vaccinations annually for 12 years. 
She reported having experienced no respiratory/chest infections during that period compared 
to frequent ones in the years before. in the interview, Jefferson stressed that the evidence 
was weak on certain groups (the elderly), and not always consistent when taking account of 
different background medical conditions, and those in different living circumstances (e.g. 
nursing homes versus the community). his science based evidence did not actually contradict 
the personal experience of Mrs Fish and it was clear that he recognised the validity of her 
experience. At the end of the interview, he was asked what has become the standard question 
in these interchanges: “if you had an elderly mother who’d been going to get vaccines each 
year, would you be advising her to get it this year?” to which he replied “it’s a personal thing. 
i wouldn’t.”19 the question immediately makes the case a non-abstract, personal, one to match 
the experience of Mrs Fish, but in the british context, its use indicates both the public lack of 
trust in the scientific knowledge and an associated willingness to see personal experience as 
offering some equally valid knowledge. it is worth noting also that in these situations, there 
is no such catch question to Mrs Fish, for an interviewer cannot possibly cast doubt on her 
experience except by casting doubt on her truthfulness.
What is there about the structure of these situations which allows this recognition of the 
validity of personal knowledge, a recognition that we find also in the social science interviews? 
First, there is the mismatch between the epistemic scope of the scientific work (a meta-survey 
of the existing research findings) being reported and the personal experience expressed on 
the subject considered. in equivalent cases of social science knowledge, much of the social 
science work reported is either statistical work or survey work. Survey work is an interesting 
combination of the personal with the statistical: asking sufficient people about their experiences 
17 i am told by my colleagues at the University of Amsterdam that similar pairings occur in the Dutch news media, 
for example, see footnote 52. 
18 the pairing can be heard at the bbC News Section, “listen Again” facility for 27th October, 2006, 7.34 am. 
available at: www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/tomorrowtoday/pip/archive.
 Jefferson was writing as “co-ordinator” of the vaccines section of the influential Cochrane Collaboration; his survey 
of the evidence is found in JeFFerSon, t., “influenza Vaccination: Policy versus Evidence,” British Medical Journal, 
v. 333, n. 7574, (2006), pp. 912-915. he also featured in the MMR debate by writing critically of the methodology of 
adverse event studies; see price, D. and JeFFerSon, t., “Methodological Problems in the interpretation of Adverse 
Event Data included in a Systematic Review of Adverse Events Following MMR immunisation,” 4th Symposium on 
Systematic Reviews: Pushing the Boundaries, Jefferson, Oxford, July 2002.
19 Although the interviewer’s motivation here may have been to establish “balance” by finding a divergence between 
the scientific and personal knowledge, this did not occur and the scientific and personal evidence, listened to carefully, 
did not conflict. Nevertheless, the question was an important one in this context, and might be called the “Gummer 
question.” this is named after a government minister who asked his daughter to eat a beefburger in front of the tV 
cameras in order to persuade the british public that beef was safe to eat during the bSE (mad cow disease) crisis. Of 
course, as it turned out, it was not safe and the event has ever since typified the british public’s reason to mistrust 
scientific expert judgements when heavily endorsed by the state.
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to enable statistical analysis to be done with the answers. in these radio interchanges, the social 
scientist is rarely faced with an individual actually included in the survey (for such surveys 
respect the anonymity of the respondents), but rather by a person from the set of people who 
might have been surveyed, or by a worker who works with such a group —for example of drug 
addicts, of single parents, of adoptive parents, of pensioner households etc. in both these kinds of 
one-to-one exchanges, the individual experience is set against the social scientists’ knowledge 
of the population or sample surveyed. Such survey work is presented as the more obviously 
scientific method of knowledge gathering, but in these bbC set-ups, as in the Jefferson-Fish 
interchange, it is not seen as necessarily providing a more legitimate mode of knowing or 
of producing a more salient piece of knowledge. An example of this juxtaposition was the 
pairing of Professor Sue hallam reporting her survey on the musical instruments that children 
chose to play with a successful female trumpeter, Alison balsom.20 it seems, according to the 
social survey research, that children choose musical instruments pretty equally in their primary 
school, but by the time they reach secondary school (or by age 11-12yrs) a gender difference has 
set in (e.g., boys choose to play brass instruments, girls woodwind ones). the discussion was 
about how, when, and why, this occurred, comparing the survey findings with the individual 
experience of Ms balsom. Once again, both sides of the pairing found ways to show how their 
knowledge and experience were complementary rather than contradictory.
So, what exactly is the knowledge set against the scientific knowledge here? My second 
point is (as with the medical case) to suggest that the alternative knowledge responses are 
not based on ignorance or stupidity —rather such knowledge is personal knowledge of 
experience.21 the facts of social sciences are ones that stem from scientific knowledge, but 
in the social world, everyone is their own expert. Everyone lives in society, and experiences 
either first-hand, or closely second-hand, the same phenomena that social scientists investigate. 
Everyone acts in the market place, has experience of working, choosing what to buy, and so 
forth. Everyone has an education, knows someone who is a single parent, or is a pensioner. 
Everyone has seen police in action, entangled with bureaucracy and dealt with corporations, 
if not directly themselves, at close hand to someone else. Consequently, people are not only 
the subjects of scientific investigation, but are themselves observing and making sense of 
their own experiences in social and economic affairs. Just like individual parents who watch 
their child, personal observations and personal experience creates both some kinds of factual 
knowledge and some insight into relevant relationships.
Very often, the “non scientist” in such pairings may be an individual who has long experience 
of working with other people and so they draw on a range or set of repeated experiences: a teacher 
with twenty years experience of five year olds in a classroom; a social worker with years of 
experience of housing problems; etc. this results not in one individual case-based knowledge to be 
set against statistical knowledge or survey-based scientific knowledge. Rather, in such experienced 
people, we find a somewhat broader personal knowledge, not the scientific knowledge of a social 
scientist, but akin to the many-cases knowledge of the clinician, an accumulated knowledge: so 
the personal knowledge on offer is the knowledge of experience of someone who, in their daily 
life, is a professional dealing with such experiences, ie, the experienced expert.
20 this pairing occurred on 11th April, 2008, 7.42 am (see footnote 18 for web-reference). hallam, a professor at 
the University of london’s institute of Education (and sometime professional musician) researches issues of musical 
education. her paper is hallaM, S., roGerS, l., and creech, A., “Gender Differences in Musical instrument Choice,” 
International Journal of Music Education, v. 26, n. 1, (2008), pp. 7-19. 
21 to use the term “personal knowledge” requires a reference to polanyi, M., Personal Knowledge, Routledge, 
london, 1958, though this paper has been more informed by polanyi, M., The Tacit Dimension, Routledge, london, 
1967. My sense of personal knowledge might be understood as lying between the personal and articulated nature of 
scientific knowledge discussed in his former book and the un-articulated but individual knowledge of his latter. 
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because it is personal and experiential, such experienced expert knowledge may sometimes 
be labelled in these interchanges as “opinions” by the professional social scientist as a way 
of downgrading its legitimacy and validity, but this is clearly a rhetorical strategy. Nor is this 
knowledge expressing “values,” i.e., left or right political values, or about ideological elements. 
(this is not to say that these are not involved; rather that, in the fields of social science, such 
elements are equally found embodied in the knowledge of the professional social scientist.22) Nor 
are we talking about “tacit” knowledge, the kind of personal craft knowledge of materials and 
technologies that is revered, but remains mysterious precisely because it can not be articulated. 
Rather, this social science experiential knowledge of the experienced expert is a personal but 
articulated knowledge of facts and relations; it is the kind of knowledge that —gained under 
careful observational circumstances, or from long-standing interaction with the circumstances 
and cases— can be quite well articulated and analysed. indeed, judging by the bbC science 
slots, such experienced expert knowledge is often better articulated than the knowledge held by 
the conventionally labelled “scientist”! Knowledge obtained from observation and experience 
is not a folklore category, rather it refers to the method of acquiring scientific knowledge that 
goes back to the baconian tradition, well before the method of experiment developed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries while statistical evidence and reasoning became an 
acceptable scientific way of finding knowledge only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Of course not all social scientists have the same kinds of methods. Some social (and human) 
sciences are particularly dependent upon methods of careful observation: ethnographies, case 
work and survey work. these modes of research are either consistent with individual experience 
(for example, case studies dominate management sciences, some areas of sociology, and history) 
or privilege personal experience (survey and ethnographic work in sociology, psychology and 
anthropology). Other social sciences have tended to eschew the individual experience and been 
more heavily dependent —as economics— on statistics and models.23 Scientists in fields which 
privilege personal or self-reporting accounts, or operate ethnographically may be more likely 
to accept the personal knowledge of individuals. those that operate through more technocratic 
methods —as economics— are less likely to do so, and indeed, professional economists are rarely 
faced at the bbC with an opposing personal knowledge account as are sociologists. instead, 
the bbC prefers to conduct single interviews of a professional economist from either academic 
or business life, or to enact a debate between those with similar knowledge levels.24 Stephen 
turner’s observation that economics, despite its technocratic nature, has a weak cognitive 
authority is relevant here.25 Jokes about economists who say to any question “it all depends,” 
or that “ask any two economists and you will obtain at least three solutions,” are one aspect of 
this weak cognitive authority. if one doubts this, a simple comparison between the way medical 
authorities pronounced on the MMR vaccination crisis and economists on the 2007-8 financial 
crisis is instructive. Whereas members of the medical establishment pretty much agreed amongst 
themselves in the former case, in the latter case we see this weak cognitive authority in the way 
that the media often produce several different academic and experienced economic experts, 
22 For a classic statement, see SchuMpeter, J., “Science and ideology,” American Economic Review, v. 39, (1949), 
pp. 345-359. 
23 A new interest in the directly expressed individual economic experience in the work on ‘happiness’ and in 
behavioural economics is returning economists to the survey method last used in the field in the late 19th century.
24 business people are treated by the bbC more like politicians, to be questioned not for their knowledge, but to 
account for their actions, for example in allowing prices to rise, or for giving loans too easily, or not easily enough. 
their personal experience is seen as an expression of self interest, not as experience relevant to knowledge questions. 
25 Cf. turner, S., “What is the Problem with Experts?,” Social Studies of Science, v. 31, (2001), pp. 123-149; especially, 
p. 132. 
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who discussed different symptoms, gave different diagnoses, offered different treatments and 
dissected different elements of what they all considered a complex economic crisis.
yet, even in the field of economics, we can find spaces in the media where personal experience 
and experienced experts are given voice in the same public domain. the single most important 
economic policy moment in the UK year is the annual “budget.” this is not just an accounting 
of forthcoming governmental income and expenditures. Rather, it involves documents and a 
speech by the Chancellor (the chief economic and financial minister and usually the second 
most powerful political figure after the Prime Minister) which survey the current state of the 
economy, forecast its future path, and announce a wide range of economic policy changes 
for the forthcoming period. in its coverage of this event, the serious UK newspapers have 
developed a mode of reporting which manages to be both educational and informative while 
reporting the analysis and responses of both scientific experts, experienced experts, and a range 
of personal experiences. Even the Financial Times, generally regarded as the most focussed on 
economics matters, follows this path. in the 2007 budget, for example, it gave space to three of 
the most senior policy economists in the UK for their “viewpoints” in which they gave general 
but critical comments on the budget.26 Experienced experts appear equally with academic 
economists in particular analyses. thus, an article on productivity and the budget quoted 
two professors of economics, while one on growth used two business economists (considered 
both professional and experienced experts in these contexts). An article on the economics of 
science involved comments from leaders of science lobbying groups, university commentators, 
the President of the Royal Society (the most prestigious science body) and the union leader 
representing technical workers in science. An article on low income families incorporated 
interview material from the heads of the main charities involved, namely One Parent Families 
and the Child Poverty Action Group. All these different academic and experienced experts 
were given equal status in the way their knowledge was reported.
None of this is surprising given that the Financial Times is aimed at those who are 
professionally interested in these matters. it is more surprising however that the knowledge of 
personal experience was also brought in and given direct expression in the pages of the Financial 
Times, in ways which seems to be specific to its budget coverage. this was not just the personal 
experience of those in the business community, which was well covered with columns of quotes 
(for example on research and development or on investment) under the headline “business 
Speaks.” More space was actually given to an alternative set of reports offering insights from 
a greater variety of personal economic experience under the heading: “My budget.” Each of 
these boxed items contained a photo, and an account, from a series of individuals.27 these 
people were named, but also labelled: the chief executive, the manufacturer, the environmental 
campaigner, the entrepreneur, the professor, the health service worker, and the pensioner. Each 
person was interviewed by an “economics reporter,” and given space to react with an analytical 
and critical stance to the budget, and to reflect not on their own position, but as someone 
who held specific personal knowledge according to their given labels, eg, whether the budget 
was helpful for the environment, or the National health Service, or for pensioners in general. 
the Financial Times’s 2008 coverage employed the same device and reported some trenchant 
and insightful criticisms from its chosen people: the tailor, the regeneration specialist, the 
26 in “three economists give their viewpoints” (Financial Times, 22/03/07, p. 11 of budget Supplement) the 
economists were Robert Chote, Director, institute of Fiscal Studies; De Anne Julius, Chairman of Chatham house 
(and ex bank of England Monetary Policy Committee and ex professional business economist); and Martin Weale, 
Director, National institute of Economic and Social Research. 
27 Each was from the same marginal parliamentary seat, though not much was made of this point. 
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professor (a university leader), the commuter, the pensioner, the brewer and the entrepreneur. 
“the brewer” pointed to a failure to use economic policy to affect a big social and health 
problem: “you do despair. We have been getting lots of lectures about tackling binge drinking 
and had been looking for some long-term vision from the government. but lifting duty [tax] 
across the board just raises more cash for the government —and will not prevent drink being 
sold by supermarkets as a loss-leader.” “the entrepreneur” commented, succinctly but equally 
effectively on the £60m set aside for training: “it doesn’t seem like a lot of money to train a 
country.”28 in other words, these people were using their personal experiences and specific 
working knowledge to give a response to a general policy decision.
The Times offered something similar, presenting a double page spread under the heading 
“the Jury.”29 these eleven people (with their households) were first described according 
to their economic situation (their occupation, age, income, and main assets), and they were 
clearly chosen to represent a cross-section of individuals in the economy: small business 
owner, professional couple, single pensioner, young professional, tradesman, nurse, retired 
couple, student, single mother, disabled worker, and company director. After the description, 
each provided a “verdict” about the budget impact on them, and on something general that 
they had experience of: for example, the “disabled worker” commented favourably, not on 
disability benefits, but on increasing money to defence (because she had three sons who were 
in the forces), the nurse discussed investment in the National health Service, but noted that 
more money was unlikely to be spent on what she thought were the right things (buildings 
and cleaners).
What we find here then is the use of individual people labelled by the characteristics of their 
household or their occupational or their geographical position, and given the chance to offer 
insights from their own economic experience into some of the details of the economic policy 
in the budget. What kind of representing quality do these chosen few share. it seems not to be 
occupational classes according to our normal socio-economic characteristics, nor does it seem 
to be any statistical notion of representativeness (that is, there is no sense in which tailors are a 
statistically significant class of workers). indeed, these labels seem more like a modern version of 
the children’s counting rhyme: “tinker, tailor, soldier, sailor, rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief” 
—a cross section of occupations and income, rather than a well accepted set of categories of people.
the notion that these people are chosen and act like a jury captures the notion of 
representation going on here. these selected individuals represent a range of economic 
experiences and socio-demographic characteristics, and, having heard the Chancellor’s 
speech, give their verdicts. but they do not directly represent economic classes nor always give 
comments that reflect an occupational or income group that they come from: it appears that 
they are not chosen individually for their representativeness, but collectively for their ability 
jointly to represent the public voice, the voice of an economy rather than a society.30 And, as 
in a legal jury, their verdicts can not have been made on hearing just one expert witnesses, in 
28 the Financial Times Budget 2008, thursday March 13th, 2008.
29 Cf. The Times, london, 22/03/08, pp. 10-11.
30 this account of voice has much in common with standpoint theory which also provides an epistemology based 
on personal experience. this discussion of juries may have clarified a difference in emphasis here: the individual 
speaks not as a member of a particular group because of certain shared characteristics with other members of that 
group but rather as individuals, or experienced experts, with personal experience relevant to a particular question. (See 
anderSon, E., “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://
plato.standord.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology, access on 17th April, 2008, for an introduction to the literature on 
standpoint theory in the context of feminist epistemology.) 
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this case, the Chancellor, for this would not be enough evidence for them to make the critiques 
they do. Rather, as in other juries, they each judge his analysis and his policies by weighing up 
his budget’s claims against their own lifetime experience and understanding of the economy.31 
they are not a lay public commenting on an economic matter, but a economic jury of citizens, 
using their experiential knowledge of the economy to judge —on behalf of their peers, i.e., 
citizens— the adequacy of the analysis and policies for the future of the economy.32
3. ePIstemOlOGy, exPerIenCe and VOICe
What enables such personal and experienced-based knowledge to gain voice in the public 
sphere. it is important to stress here that my question is about the articulation of personal 
knowledge from experience by participants in the society and economy. it is not about the 
attempts to understand science made by a public who are generally defined and framed, in 
the literature on natural science, as an audience or consumer of science. there, it is generally 
assumed that the public cannot fully understand and participate in that same knowledge space 
as the scientists because it is knowledge of another kind of content and acquired in another way, 
that they, by definition, do not hold.33 Nevertheless, the literature on public engagement, rather 
than understanding, does prove useful in clarifying certain issues of the public’s knowledge of 
social sciences.34 We can investigate the knowledge gap between the public and the traditional 
sciences in terms of three elements in science “its intellectual contents, its research methods, 
and its organizational forms of ownership and control.”35 this triad is equally useful in 
considering the relationships between the knowledge of the experienced expert compared 
31 this account of using the knowledge of personal experience in providing “a jury of peers” contrasts with the 
discussion of lay juries (i.e. non expert) for science policy decisions, see evanS, R. and ploWyS, A., “listening 
without prejudice? Rediscovering the value of the disinterested citizen,” University of Cardiff, website paper, www.
cf.ac.uk/socsi/contactsandpeople/harrycollins/expertise-project/expertisepreprints.html#listening (access on 26th 
April, 2008), pp. 17-18.
32 how these token economic citizens are chosen is an interesting question raised by tiago Mata. 
33 See also footnote 6. Science studies tend to treat public engagement with science as an engagement with “the 
other”: the public are not the scientists and do not have the scientists’ knowledge and so must always effectively remain 
in some deficit. the discussion about expertise and experience in these circles is sophisticated, yet the base assumption 
remains that the experience or expertise of the lay public must be qualitatively different than that of the scientists 
because the content of the sciences are about something other than them as people, or their experience, or their social 
arrangements. (Of course, this important assumption is the very one that does not hold here.) thus, even where there 
is recognition that there may be groups with relevant expertise or experience, it remains knowledge that has to be 
constructed or found —not experienced, and so of something that remains “other.” References and recent reviews 
of this literature are found in collinS, h. and evanS, R., “the third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise 
and Experience,” Social Studies of Science, v. 32, (2002), pp. 235-296, and in the various responses to it by Jasanoff, 
Rip and Wynne (cf. JaSanoFF, S., “breaking the Waves in Science Studies,” Social Studies of Science, v. 33, (2003), 
pp. 389-400; rip, A., “Constructing Expertise: in a third Wave of Science Studies,” Social Studies of Science, v. 33, 
(2003), pp. 419-434; and Wynne, b., “Seasick on the third Wave? Subverting the hegemony of Propositionalism,” 
Social Studies of Science, v. 33, (2003), pp. 410-417).
34 brian Wynne’s work is particularly useful for he tends neither to privilege the status of science and scientists, 
nor treats such scientific knowledge as an other kind of knowledge, nor assumes an unbridgeable ignorance in the 
public (see Wynne, b., “Knowledges in Context,” Science, Technology and Human Values, v. 16, (1991), pp. 111-121; 
Wynne, b., “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social identities and Public Uptake of Science,” Public Understanding 
of Science, v. 1, (1992), pp. 281-304; and Wynne, b., “Public Uptake of Science: A Case for institutional Reflexivity,” 
pp. 321-337). Another exception, and one of the few treatments that pitches this issue of cognitive authority in the 
context of liberal political traditions, and without treating the public as “the other,” is offered in turner, S., “What is 
the Problem with Experts?,” pp. 123-149. 
35 As Wynne suggests in “Knowledges in Context,” p. 120. his distinctions seem obvious, but like all obvious 
distinctions, they were and remain immensely useful in sorting out confusions: they help to locate exactly where the 
public mis-understanding or mistrust of scientists lies in any particular case. 
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to scientific knowledge in the social sciences. While the knowledge of experienced experts 
maybe about the same stuff as that of social scientists, their research methods may be different 
and the mode of organisation will also likely be different.
there are scientific fields where amateur scientists can still claim discoveries and make valid 
scientific contributions: the amateur botanist perhaps or the amateur astronomer. these sciences 
are in part dependent on meticulous observation and description by the individual working on 
their own, observing particular aspects of the world with patience over long periods, taking note 
of variety and of changes in the most ephemeral of things and of the smallest of deviations in the 
natural world that surrounds them. Some sciences indeed have been historically dependent upon 
such contributions of amateur scientists. these amateur scientists have followed the same kinds 
of knowledge paths as their professional colleagues, they are specialists in somewhat the same 
kinds of ways. it is these same grounds that give them voice in the scientific world.36
in the social sciences, there are people who work in this same kind of way as in these natural 
sciences, observing with patience the particularities of behaviour of people, social events, 
cultural changes, economic cycles and so forth. but, in contrast to amateur astronomers, such 
amateur social scientists rarely claim expertise in the scientific ways of knowing recognised by 
social scientists. they do not know about social science from using the modes of social science 
research: surveys, event studies, statistics, modelling —rather, they know things about society 
and economy from personal experience because they live in the world, they observe that world, 
and they interact within that world. Such events and behaviour are not separate objects to be 
studied from afar, but part of their life. the characteristics of such personal knowledge fit ill 
with the stereotyped “deficit model” of the public understanding of science project, which fails 
to have quite the same resonance in dealing with the social sciences as with various natural 
sciences. the fact that everyone lives in society and knows something of it, mean that the facts 
about events and relationships drawn from personal experience cannot simply be dismissed as 
ignorance just because they are not known through the methods of science.37
We may hone this idea of personal knowledge in the social sciences further by contrast 
with other characterizations of personal scientific knowledge based on experience. brian 
Wynne outlined the notion of “lay expertise” based on his research with the hill farmers of 
NW England during the period after the Chernobyl disaster.38 the knowledge of farmers was 
presented as complementary to the knowledge of scientists dealing with the effects of the fall 
out: they had different kinds of knowledge and about different aspects of the problem of how to 
decontaminate the sheep from nuclear fall-out. the farmers’ knowledge was a personal craft-
based knowledge, articulated in the sense that it was shared and discussed with other farmers 
and equally applied in their own decision making (in the same way as mothers share similarly 
acquired knowledge of their children’s health). the contrast i want to point to is that such 
“lay expertise” (e.g., of how lambs behave, how farming goes on) is seen as complementary 
knowledge to the “scientific expertise” (e.g., of the life of radioactive fall-out) because they 
36 the ways in which such amateur scientists’ knowledge intersects with professional knowledge is of course 
a complex matter; for an example especially pertinent to this paper, see Secord, A., “Science in the Pub: Artisan 
botanists in Early Nineteenth-century lancashire,” History of Science, v. 32, (1994), pp. 269-315.
37 this is perhaps why economists like counter-intuitive findings so much, because they are less likely to accord with 
personal knowledge, which can then be seen as folklore (for example, J. M. Keynes in the Great Depression advised 
people: don’t save for a worse rainy day, go out and spend!). 
38 See Wynne, b., “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social identities and Public Uptake of Science,” pp. 281-304.
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are different not just in origin —how that knowledge was acquired— but in content. Such 
personal knowledge can thus be dismissed by natural scientists on two grounds —content 
and method. in contrast, in social science cases, although the personal knowledge and the 
scientific knowledge may be differently acquired, they are not necessarily different in content. 
the parent whose child is taught spelling and reading by phonetics has experience which may 
agree with, or may contradict, the findings of the educational specialist who researches how 
learning by phonetics occurs using social scientific techniques of investigation. that is, it is 
knowledge about the same problem, even though differently acquired.
We can get a bit closer than this to the way these two different sources of knowledge 
—personal knowledge from experience and scientific knowledge— fit together in social 
sciences. i return again to commentary by Wynne in 1991, for while his discussion is oriented 
towards more traditional fields (for example, of the knowledge held and used by patients and 
families about a specific medical condition, or by local communities about the variability of 
local pollutants), his findings prove particularly relevant to the claims made here about the 
social sciences. he observes that the extra knowledge about a particular situation or condition 
held by such individuals and groups is often “more specifically accurate” about that problem 
even while “less generally authoritative” than the knowledge held by professional scientists. 
this more specifically situated knowledge may even “confound formal scientific authorities” 
and “come into conflict with the generalized claims of the more remote technical specialists.”39 
And, as he noted, the content of this additional knowledge from personal experience even 
proved sufficiently close to that of the scientists to be used by these personal or experienced 
experts to measure or judge the quality of the knowledge offered by scientists.40
these characteristics of personal experience are likely to be more generally relevant to 
discussions of the social sciences where there is likely to be a much wider base of knowledge 
based on experience than in cases based on natural science and their technologies. Wynne’s 
finding are certainly consistent with my examples of personal experience knowledge of social 
sciences reported in the print and radio media discussed above. in these, it seems that knowledge 
from experience consists of facts about situations and events, and some understanding of 
relationships, the kind of knowledge which can be built up without necessarily having the 
theories and concepts that we associate with scientific knowledge and which allow scientists to 
make more general claims. As we would expect, the knowledge of personal experience is less 
theorized and less conceptualized than the knowledge from the scientific community.41 this 
does not mean that social scientists rejected the situated knowledge of experienced experts as 
inaccurate. in the cases i have reported, for example, the flu vaccine and the musical instruments 
cases, the academic expert and the person with experience did not confound or contradict each 
other (though in the former case, there was the potential for the evidence of personal experience 
to be inconsistent with that from the expert; as it was, his evidence was inconclusive) and when 
we listen to them carefully, we find that the scientist was able to accommodate the specific 
personal knowledge within their wider more general knowledge.
39 Quotes in the previous and in this sentence come from Wynne, b., “Knowledges in Context,” pp. 114 and 118, 
respectively.
40 this process in turn depends on people’s social and institutional experience of such interactions with scientific 
experts (cf. Wynne, b., “Knowledges in Context,” p. 115).
41 My reflections here rely on a close listening and reading of the media uses of personal experience, rather than any 
ethnographic or survey of experienced experts in the social sciences. there seems much less work done on the public 
understanding of social sciences and its manifestations than on the natural sciences.
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Where then lies the difference between my notion of voice and that of public engagement? 
the significant point about the voicing of personal knowledge in the social sciences is that it 
comes from a general democratic right of the expression of social and economic experience. 
Amateur social scientists —individuals and our experienced experts— claim a voice in the social 
scientists’ account of that world not from following a social scientific mode of enquiry (as their 
botanist and astronomer cousins do) but because of their position as citizens in their own society: 
everyone has the right to be expert in their own experience and to express it. if someone has been 
ill-treated by the police, they have a right to say so; if someone has personal knowledge of drug 
addiction through working in rehabilitation, they have a right to share in discussion on that topic. 
in a democratic society and economy, everyone has a right not just to express their opinions, but 
to evaluate and tell the facts of their experience of the social, economic and political world. thus, 
the voicing of experience (from personal or accumulated experience) comes from the right of 
expression in a democratic society; from the rights of citizens to use their own experience to argue 
about political, economic and social arrangements that affect them, their clients, their students or 
their children, directly. And, as political and economic rights are extended into other domains, eg, 
medical ones, then those rights of the expression of experience follow on. Remember the case of 
Mrs Fish —she cannot be called a liar by the bbC interviewer, but nor by the medical expert that 
is lined up against her, even if his wider and more general evidence had been sufficiently strong 
to be contradictory to the facts of her personal history. Such personal experience knowledge has 
not just a legitimate claim to be voiced, but to be listened to.
these citizenship claims to articulate the knowledge of economic and social experience 
are both stronger and more generic (less specialised) than the rights associated with the notion 
of stakeholders, which seem more like property rights. Again, a comparison with the sheep 
farmers case is instructive. As Wynne presented that case, the scientists were unable to take 
advantage of farmers’ significant lay knowledge in the behaviour of sheep and economics of 
hill farming to make their own scientific knowledge relevant and effective and thus reduce their 
own scientific ignorance about how to decontaminate the sheep. And while the farmers felt 
their specialist knowledge had a right to be expressed and wanted to make use of it to save 
their own economy, its expression was mired in difficulties for both sides in dealing with each 
other. Farmers found the power of the bureaucracy over their decisions, the scientists’ modes 
of decision making, their own lack of trust towards the scientists, and the community relations 
that the hill farmers had with the workers at the Sellafield nuclear plant, all intervened. the 
scientists faced their own parallel set of constraints in communicating with the farmers. Neither 
side were able to articulate their knowledge to each other in such a way as to solve the problems 
they faced in an effective manner. While Jasanoff has interpreted the failure of both sides to use 
their complementary knowledge as due to their radically different ways of understanding the 
world,42 Wynne’s three way distinction (noted earlier) suggests that the lack of communication 
between these groups came not from their different knowledge sets, nor their different ways of 
knowing such knowledge but from the distrust —based on experience— by the sheep farmers of 
the institutional set up of the nuclear science knowledge and, on the scientists’ side, by the lack 
of an institutional basis for the farmer’s knowledge.
yet this last interpretation undervalues the stakeholder rights of the farmers to express 
their own experience —this was not just a matter of safety of themselves and their families, 
42 Cf. JaSanoFF, S., “breaking the Waves in Science Studies,” p. 392.
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but of their economic livelihood, a right that seems to have been hardly recognised by the 
scientists. Why didn’t the sheep farmers make their stakeholder knowledge heard? there are 
many occasions in which stake-holders’ rights, voices, and experiences, are brushed aside 
in the economic world, for example, by capital holders who believe a firm belongs only to 
them and ignore the rights and knowledge or their workforce or the experiences of their 
pensioners. Stakeholder rights nearly always overlap with the rights of others, which is why 
their expression is so often resisted. but even when not resisted, such experienced knowledge 
claims are expected to be expressed within the terms and limits of those stakeholder rights. 
For example it is a legitimate right of workers to express their personal experience of the pay 
system in their company, and so those paid below the minimum wage are expected to report 
their employers for not doing so (though here, as in many other such situations, the relative 
power of those involved will intervene to prevent that expression). yet their rights to voice other 
aspects of their knowledge which might be regarded as beyond their particular stakeholder 
rights, for example, commercial secrets about a production innovation, would generally fall 
outside this legitimate range of expression. that is, the expression of personal experiences are 
usually restricted to those aspects of knowledge defined as relevant to the particular interests 
of such a stakeholder (which is why they carry the intuitions of property rights). thus the 
problems of “whistleblowing” arise where the interpretation of these stakeholder rights differs 
between the company (or state) and the whistle blower: where the organisation may regard the 
voicing of such personal knowledge as dangerous and inappropriate and the whistle blower 
may have the view that it is dangerous and inappropriate not to voice the knowledge —for 
example, about pollution caused by the company’s activities.43 the classical economic analysis 
of such problems suggests that the choice that the individual must make is between leaving 
the situation, expressing their knowledge as a way of changing the situation, or staying and 
keeping quiet: exit, voice or loyalty.44
in contrast, the citizen’s legitimate expression of personal knowledge of social and economic 
experience is restricted only by general social conventions (expressed, for example, in the laws 
of slander and libel). this makes such knowledge potentially more powerful in a very particular 
sense. Voice: the citizens’ articulation of experienced knowledge, is not just an expression of 
such knowledge but —because it is unrestricted— contains the power and gives the means to 
question the framing of the issues and thus to contest both the questions and analysis offered 
in the social scientific research. For example, whereas the academic expert Sue hallam was 
worried about the negative aspects of gendered decisions by children (such as the likelihood 
of boys who chose to play the flute being teased), Alison balsom, the trumpeter, effectively 
43 in the UK, civil servants are covered by the Official Secrets Act, which stops people voicing their experience 
as civil servants, a particularly problematic blanket charge which, nevertheless, proves my point that citizens will 
otherwise take this expression as a right. 
44 this choice —for individuals in failing institutions such as firms or states— has been analysed most memorably in 
the social science literature by Albert hirschman in hirSchMan, A. O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline 
in Firms, Organisations and States, harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, where he associates voice with both 
stakeholder rights and with citizenry rights. in my account here, voice is more narrowly defined as the articulation of 
knowledge, not the choice between actions. 
Of course, there are other reasons, often more powerful, such as the relative funding which opens or closes access 
to media, courts and so forth that limit the effective expression of personal or experienced knowledge and restrict the 
travels of that knowledge to the relevant communities or decision makers (for an example from climate science, see 
for example oreSkeS, N., “My Facts Are better than your Facts: Spreading Good News about Global Warming,” in 
hoWlett, P. and MorGan, M. S., How Well Do Facts Travel?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming).
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reframed the question by turning it around onto the positive aspects of being different.45 the 
budget respondents in the Financial Times reinterpreted and reframed the economic policy 
of the budget to make it relevant to much narrower concerns than the broad brush groups and 
categories such as “pensioners” or “families” or “education spending” offered in much of the 
budget and its commentary. the voice of experienced knowledge does not just add to the 
knowledge of the social scientists, but can reframe their questions or findings.
the denial of voice is therefore not just the denial of the knowledge of experience, but the 
denial of citizens’ abilities to frame and interpret their own experience and so affect the way 
a question is discussed. this is how ‘voice’ contrasts with ‘engaging’ the public in one-sided 
knowledge discussions, or carrying out projects to make them ‘understand’ science, or even 
the legitimate but limited expression of stakeholder interests.46 that is, the denial of voice is 
about the exclusion of particular problems, issues, and the framing of particular meanings 
rather than just the exclusion of people with relevant knowledge. the possibility that the 
experienced expert enjoys to frame the questions and meanings of the debates in their own 
terms follows from their rights as citizens, not as stakeholders.47
it might reasonably be argued that, as it is, this is only one particular national account of 
personal or experienced knowledge, and the account will not travel well! Of course, this is a 
national story: voice is only heard within a particular ‘civic epistemology’ which creates the 
environment within which the facts of experience can be made to travel. While the chance to 
voice personal knowledge of experience is a feature of a democratic society, the ways in which 
voice can be expressed, or may be heard, are shaped by the local civic values, mores and laws 
of any particular society.
We can see how the expression of this individual, personal but articulated, experiential 
knowledge of social sciences is shaped by looking more closely at this notion of “civic 
epistemology,” a notion that Sheila Jasanoff defines by asking how scientific and technical 
knowledge come to be seen as reliable in public spaces, so that collective choices can be 
made based on publicly shared knowledge.48 Civic epistemology is the process by which 
democratic societies come to know about and make decisions about science and technology 
matters. Jasanoff treats this civic epistemology as based on tacit-knowledge, not at the level 
of individuals but at the level of society: “modern technoscientific cultures have developed 
tacit knowledge-ways through which they assess the rationality and robustness of claims that 
seek to order their lives.”49 this civic epistemology contrasts with the personal articulated 
knowledge of citizens that i have been describing. but they are not inconsistent.
45 Mrs Fish effectively reframed the question about the flu vaccine: whereas much of the medical evidence surveyed 
was an analysis of deaths and hospital admissions that were likely to have been avoided by the vaccination programme, 
her experience was about illness without hospitalisation, and the medical analysis might not even have counted the 
benefits of her experiences even though it would count the costs of the vaccine. 
46 these are one-sided not just in knowledge asymmetry, but because the public is usually “engaged” within the 
framework defined by the scientists.
47 Wynne, in his provocative critique of Collins and Evans’ “third wave” paper noted of his sheep farmers’ case, that 
“the power to define the meaning of the questions remained with the … scientists and officials” (Wynne, b., “Seasick 
on the third Wave? Subverting the hegemony of Propositionalism,” p. 408). My point may be seen as the positive other 
side of this coin: in the social sciences, such reframing power comes with the citizen’s rights to voice experience which, 
as i noted, is stronger than his farmers’ stakeholder rights.
48 Cf. JaSanoFF, S., Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2005, chapter 10, pp. 247-271. 
49 JaSanoFF, S., Designs on Nature, p. 255.
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how civic epistemology is constituted depends on the society one lives in for it is defined 
as “culturally specific, historically and politically grounded, public knowledge-ways.”50 the 
particularities of different national civic epistemologies that she presents from her case studies 
(with respect to bio-technologies in agricultural and biomedical sciences) are presented as having 
a wider cultural grip. As such, they intersect with the possibilities for expression of the kind of 
personal yet articulated knowledge of the social sciences —citizenry personal knowledge— that 
i am discussing here. For example, Jasanoff’s three way comparison of the US, Germany and 
the UK points —for the UK— to the relatively strong role of empirical science in demonstration 
practices, the importance of the expertise of experience (relative to the professional skills required 
in the US mode, or the training and accredited skills of the German expert), and the relatively 
high value placed on consultation rather than formal reasoning. these are all consistent with a 
public mode of civic epistemology for the social sciences in which people with non-accredited 
expertise —i.e., knowledge based on experience not qualifications —are valued and able to 
voice that knowledge. thus Jasanoff’s characterization of the civic epistemology of the UK fits 
with my observations about social sciences in the UK.51 the fact that civic epistemologies differ 
suggests either that other societies are likely to see social science personal knowledge experience 
somewhat differently, or that their citizenry’s personal knowledge might have a less powerful 
voice in their civic epistemology, or that its range and places of expression may be different, but 
not that in other societies voice does not exist, albeit in various different forms.52
4. COnClusIOn
Societies have different ways to develop democratic process with respect to scientific 
knowledge within the context of various civic epistemologies. yet most of the literature that 
treats questions about public scientific knowledge does so in the context of natural science 
where the public is seen as handicapped compared to the knowledge of the scientist. this paper 
has explored the structure of situations in medical and social science where the observations 
of experience or the experienced knowledge held by citizens, is presented as valid knowledge 
of these topics.
While voice represents the citizens’ right to express, not just their opinions, but, their 
knowledge based on experience, the articulation of that knowledge is always going to depend 
on the local civic context. For this reason it is difficult to generalise about how the individual 
gets the facts of their personal experience to travel into the public domain. by implication, 
the pragmatics of the articulation of personal social science knowledge need to be explored, 
analysed and compared in different societies. Until then, “voice” offers a generic concept, a 
way to understand why social science personal knowledge has a different validity, and so is 
likely to be expressed in different ways, than public expertise about other sciences. this in turn 
50 JaSanoFF, S., Designs on Nature, p. 249.
51 in the context of the civic epistemology of the UK, current ideas about governance argue for stake-holders, users 
and lay persons to be part of governance structures of most organizations. i suggest that, over a range of questions in 
the social and economic realm, their importance is not as “lay” persons, or as “disinterested” persons but as interested 
citizens bringing relevant social science experience to those organisations and voicing it. 
52 For example, my Dutch colleagues report examples from the Netherlands where governmental claims about 
the rising real incomes of the population due to government policy were challenged in tV news slots by individuals 
whose incomes had fallen, with ministers faced across the media table by a personal case evidencing the limitation 
of their statistical claims about the events in the economy —see den Butter, F., “National Accounts and indicators,” 
pp. 189-230. 
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suggests that neither the public engagement literature nor the public understanding literature 
applies to the social sciences without some re-consideration. (in-between fields, such as those 
of medical treatments, might also appear differently in this new frame.) Making use of the 
concept of “voice” not only shows how and why personal knowledge may be complementary 
to the scientific work of social scientists, but why it has the possibility to challenge and reframe 
that knowledge of social scientists more effectively than the processes of civic epistemology 
do for the natural sciences.
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new fOrms Of sCIentIfIC OBserVatIOn and  
theIr ePIstemOlOGICal ImPaCt 1
amparo gómez
the field of scientific research has widened with the appearance of new forms of observation 
which involve non-material aspects in their objects and interventions, i.e., simulations or 
computer based experiments. these non-traditional forms of observation have become 
increasingly important in science. they have been developed in contexts involving highly 
complex phenomena in which material experimentation has difficulties. Computer based 
experiments have an important use in social sciences and biology, physics and engineering. in 
cognitive science, they have almost become the principal resource for research, and have been 
developed to a high level. 2 
Computer based observation has given rise to interesting methodological and 
epistemological analyses. 3 in the epistemological field, a number of relevant questions are 
posed in relation to, for example, materiality, simplicity, differences between deriving and 
producing results, or between models and simulations. Some of these topics will be dealt 
with in this essay, although it will be focused in two important questions. Firstly, to what 
extent do computer based observation give rise to scientific knowledge? in other words, is 
it a resource for increasing scientific knowledge? And secondly, to what extent the results 
obtained in computer based observation can be applied to the corresponding material systems 
—albeit with sufficient approximation using Giere’s terminology? the answer to these two 
questions will help us to establish whether simulations offer scientific knowledge about 
empirical systems and whether there are any essential epistemic differences between material 
and computer based observation. 4 
the main aim of this article is to try to sketch an answer to these questions. it will be 
analyzed to what extent the computer based observation depends of instruments, agreements 
and scientific theories, whether it happens in a different degree or way than in the material 
observation and therefore, whether it involves new epistemological problems.
1  this chapter has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and innovation (Research Project 
FFi2009-09483). i am very grateful to Michela Massimi for insightful comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this paper.
2  Cf. peSchel, M. F. and Scheutz, M., “Explicating the Epistemological Rol of Simulation in the Development 
of theories of Cognition,” in korta, k. and larrazaBal, J. M. (eds.), Truth, Rationality, Cognition and Music: 
Proceedings of 7th International Colloquium of Cognitive Science, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 274-281.
3  See Fox Keller’s considerations about the computational physics and her answer to the question “what exactly is 
that is so distinctive about this new endeavour?,” keller, e. F., “Models, Simulation, and ‘Computer Experiments’,” in 
radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2003, p. 200.
4  the term material is used to refer to laboratory experiments in which inputs, intervention and outputs are material. 
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1. Instruments and aGreements In COmPuter Based exPerIments
Scientific observation involves active and constructive elements; it implies design, 
preparation, instruments, techniques, procedures, manipulation and control. An experiment is 
an extreme case of empirical observation, in which the operations of comparison, manipulation 
and control are extremely strict and technology has an important role. therefore, at the base of 
science we do not find simple observations, but rather observations mediated technically.
the conventional nature of the procedures, instruments and measurements in scientific 
observation has been highlighted in philosophy of science. the fact that they are conventional 
means that said procedures, measurements or instruments are feasible in a specific stage of 
scientific development, and that scientists accept them as valid. these agreements are basic 
in science. 
however, in spite of this conventional dimension of observation, scientists consider the 
data obtained through the application of instruments and procedures as data on the objects 
they are observing. instruments and procedures are conventional, but what can be done 
with them and the results thus obtained are not. i am 1.60 m. tall. this is a fact, once we 
have accepted the metre as our unit of measurement. Any subject who repeats the operation 
exactly will obtain the same result as me, if said operation is executed correctly. As Agazzi 
affirms, “what is observed using certain instruments, applying the correct rules of uses, is 
what scientific community accepts without objection and is what everyone may verify by 
repeating the same experiment.” 5 
Data thus obtained enable researchers to formulate basic propositions of science about 
phenomena. these propositions are accepted precisely because they are established through 
inter-subjectively agreed-upon operative procedures. in this sense, Agazzi notes that if we 
agree to research using a pair of scales, a chronometer and a rigid rule, we can establish 
propositions which contain predicates such as mass, duration and length according to standard 
measurement procedures. From here, we can then establish a whole series of basic affirmations, 
and make empirical assertions of classical mechanics. later, we can, for example, introduce 
infinitesimal analysis and other concepts, and use them to gradually construct the theoretical 
edifice of mechanics. 6 
in the case of computer based observation, it is possible to find an increasing number of 
agreements among scientists regarding the procedures involved in modelling, mathematical 
operations, computational techniques or constrictions and controls. An important effort is 
being carried out to agree what similarities and differences can be established among material 
experiments, computer based experiments and models. in this context it is a key question the 
Morgan’s distinction between computer based experiments on highly idealised representations 
of the material object (what she designates as “like a virtual experiment”) and computer based 
experiments on very realist computerised representations of the material object. the latter type 
of experiment is what Morgan terms “experiments with semi-material objects (or inputs)”. An 
example of this second type of experiment given by Morgan is a section of hipbone which is 
converted in a computerized image with “a high degree of verisimilitude of structure,” being 
5  aGazzi, e., “il significato dell o´ggettività nel discorso scientífico,” in Minazzi, F. (ed.), L´ oggettività Della 
conoscenza scientifica, Ed. Franco Angeli, Milano, 1996, p. 31.
6  aGazzi, e., “Problemi di epistemologia contemporanea,” Quaderni Della Società Filosofica Italiana, n. 1-2, 
(1979), p. 39.
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carried out a simulation of what happens when the hipbone structure is subjected to extreme 
stress. 7 this class of experiment is considered by Morgan to be virtually experiments. 8
in both types of experiment computer resources are used: there is a model of the object, 
an intervention model, and mechanical resources are replaced by mathematical ones. Despite 
these parallelisms, in the first case (like virtual experiment) the experiment is more similar 
to the manipulation on mathematical models, while in the second (virtually experiment) it is 
more akin to material experiments. in words of Morgan, “despite of the role of mathematics 
in the intervention (…) i want to describe at least the first of these two interventions (virtually 
experiments) as close to a regular experiment.” 9 
Differences between virtually and like virtual experiments affects the status of the 
experimental results. it is not possible to extend the results of the second type of experiments 
to the material systems. in the case of virtually experiments it is possible to extend them, albeit 
approximately, but, this is not very different to what occurs in the laboratory experiments 
—which also involve idealisation and abstraction. As hacking points out, experiments include 
to work on accurate images and representations, and he affirms: “We study photographs taken 
with microscope (…) Any image can be digitized and retransmitted on a screen (…) Suppose i 
take an electronic paint brush and paint, on a television screen, an accurate picture (a) of a cell 
that i have previously studied, say by using a digitized and reconstituted image (b).” 10
One example of experiment with highly idealised objects is the simulation of the behaviour 
of diverse animal species, including humans. here, simulation is conducted with highly 
schematised creatures which react in accordance with a set of a priori defined rules. the results 
of the simulation are already built into the model that we construct and are revealed through 
simulation. the situation is more akin to that which occurs in the manipulation of formal or 
mathematical models than to laboratory experiments: researchers intervene by deriving rather 
than producing results. Morgan affirms that “this difference between deriving or producing 
results is the contrast between mathematical demonstration and experimental demonstration.” 11 
On the other hand, in this type of experiment, simulation sometimes produces results that may 
surprise the researcher, but not confuse him (this last is a property of virtually experiments).
Virtually experiments share with laboratory experiments the control over circumstances and 
variables. the researcher makes an effort to take into consideration all the conditions and factors 
that interfere or may interfere in the process. Disturbing causes are controlled, some because of 
7  Cf. MorGan, M. S., “Experiments Without intervention: Model Experiments, Virtual Experiments and Virtually 
Experiments,” in radder, h. (ed.), The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, p. 223. She affirms: “his team 
converts a real cow hipbone into a computerized image… making a photographic digital image of the slice. these 
digital image of the slices are reassembled in the computer to provide a high-quality 3-D image of that particular 
real hipbone,” MorGan, M. S., “Experiments Without intervention: …,” p. 222. For her, “the computer experiment 
calculates the effect of the ‘force’ on individual elements in the grid and assembles the individual effects into an overall 
measure of the strength due to structure,” in “Experiments Without intervention: …,” p. 222. 
8  Cf. MorGan, M., “Experiments Without intervention: Model Experiments, Virtual Experiments and Virtually 
Experiments,” pp. 224 and 232.
9  “Experiments Without intervention: …,” p. 223 (parenthesis is mine). the essential difference is in the process of 
creating a 3-D computer image of the bone structure, the “model was constructed a new by the scientist first visualizing 
the bone structure along radically idealized lines: a simple grid structure is hypothesized,” MorGan, M., “Experiments 
Without intervention: Model Experiments, Virtual Experiments and Virtually Experiments,” p. 223.
10 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 206-207. 
11 MorGan M., “Experiments without intervention: …,” p. 220.
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their absence from the experiment, others because they are controlled by procedures that keep 
them constant during the experiment, and yet others because they are considered to be of minor 
importance and their effects are not taken into consideration. however, what is relevant here is 
that disturbing causes are identified, they are known, can be explained and their effects can be 
calculated. this enables us to extend the results of the experiment to the material object. 12 
2. sImulatIOn, OBserVatIOn and theOry
the arguments expressed above imply a close relationship between instruments, procedures 
and observation. instruments of course involve theory, the theory of the instrument, but this is 
somewhat different from that maintained by theorist perspectives about the relationship between 
theory and observation. For these perspectives the key relationship is between specific theories 
and observation, any form of observation not determined by theory is unthinkable. 13
theory plays some role in observation, but this role is not necessarily that specified by 
holistic, relativist and theorist theses, among other reasons because observation is not always 
based on questions formulated in the context of a specific theory. Many experiments are 
developed not to test a specific theory, but rather to resolve problems, to establish new data, to 
complete models of certain phenomena, to introduce new concepts or adjust existing ones, or 
to increase our knowledge about the behaviour of the objects (the example of the experiment 
with the structure of a hipbone falls into this last category). 14 As hacking point out —from the 
analysis of diverse experiments—, although in some cases theory precedes to experiment in 
other experiment and observation precede to theory.
there is a greater independence between theory and observation than that affirmed 
by post-empiricist philosophy through the famous hanson thesis of theory-ladenness of 
observation. this independence is based, at least, on the following postulates: a) the existence 
of a world independent of our senses and theories with which our senses interact to produce 
our sensations and the regularities of our experience, b) the possibility of scientific access to 
the empirical world not completely determined by the theory. 15
these two basic theses are shared by scientific realists, experimental and entities realists 
or empiricists in spite of the remarkable differences among these approaches. in this sense, 
12 the situation is very different with computer based experiments in social sciences. Firstly, the representations 
of material objects are highly idealised; and secondly, there is a lack of knowledge regarding disturbing causes and, 
therefore, a lack of control of said causes and their effects. Ceteris paribus clauses assume that all factors are constant, 
but these factors intervene in the material systems. For this topic, see GóMez, a., “Rational Choice theory and the 
Economics laws. the Rol of Shared Values,” in aGazzi, e. echeverría, J. and GóMez, A. (eds.), Epistemology and the 
Social, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 191-206. 
13 the social constructivism perspective of science radicalizes this thesis. For an intelligent critique of this 
perspective, see Gonzalez, W. J., “the Philosophical Approach to Science, technology and Society,” in Gonzalez W. 
J. (ed.), Science Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2005, pp. 21-24.
14 Morgan affirms, “the conventional belief from outside the experimental community is that the function of 
experiments in economics is for testing theories. this seems to be understood in the rather strong sense that experiments 
are conducted to confirm or deny some well specified economic theory. Of course, some experiments are indeed the 
place where theories can be tested, but to restrict the legitimate role of experiments to just this one function seems 
unnecessarily limited,” MorGan, M. S., “Experiments versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” 
Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 12, n. 2, (2005), p. 317. 
15 this thesis is affirmed for example for lonGino, h., Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1990, p. 57. As Gonzalez affirms regarding the idea of objectivity: “to accept the idea of objectivity in 
science means, on the one hand, to assume that there is an independent reality (natural, social or artificial) to be known 
(…),” Gonzalez, W. J., “the Philosophical Approach to Science, technology and Society,” p. 23. 
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longino affirms —from an empiricism that implies a minimal realism, as she points out— that 
scientific access to the empirical events of the world (states of affairs in her terminology) is 
not determined theoretically to the extent that we see different things from different theories. 16 
Communication between different theoretical frameworks is feasible. Galileans and Aristotelians 
do not “see” different things in the Kuhnian sense, they simply “see” some different aspects 
of the same thing, which they explain in very different ways. it supposes a minimum level of 
shared experience, what means that, “there is always some minimal level of description of the 
common world to which we can retreat when our initial descriptions of what is the same state of 
affairs differs.” 17 Without this minimum level of shared experience, we would not even know in 
which aspects scientists with different theories differ. We can communicate, engage in critical 
discussion and even agree, albeit partially, through that level of shared experience. therefore, 
as longino notes, “there is no need to suppose that Galilean or Aristotelian must fail to see 
aspects that interest the other, nor to suppose that there is no a description of the situation that 
both could accept and that would then form the basis for discussion of differences.” 18
 this approach implies to reject Gestalt’s theory and its postulate of theory-ladenness of 
all levels of observation. Access to states of affairs of the world is made through experience, 
and experience means an active intervention in the world including manipulation, interaction, 
measurement, and artefacts. Observation is not determined by a theory in such a way, and to 
such an extent, that the theory simply justifies itself. Observation can be used as independent 
tests of theories since “data can be specified independently of hypotheses and theories”. 19 Data 
express the response of reality subjected to manipulation. Once the technical procedures and 
instruments through which we access to the reality have been established (and this is something 
conventional), the behaviour of reality is not arbitrary, and therefore, neither are the results. 
Could this approach be applied to simulations or computer based experiments? Would results 
express the response of reality in this case? Results would obviously express the response of 
the computerised reality, however, would they express the response of the material reality? 
Strictly speaking, no, but a less restrictive interpretation is also possible. in the case of virtually 
experiments with semi-material objects the data obtained express, in a scientifically relevant 
sense, the response that the material object would have if it were subjected to the conditions of the 
simulation. it is possible to make a valid inference from the results found on the semi-material 
object of the simulation to the material object. indeed, this is what scientists do since their aim 
is to obtain information about the material object, even if said information is obtained indirectly 
through the computer based experiments. in other words, the aim of virtually experiments is 
16 lonGino, h., Science as Social Knowledge, p. 46. She differentiates between states of affairs and relevant evidence 
for a hypothesis (or theory). What is interpreted from data as relevant evidence for a hypothesis is what is dependent 
from theories and background assumptions. 
17 lonGino, h., Science as Social Knowledge, p. 222. And, in my opinion, in some cases this description can include 
the phenomenological statements on properties of the entities, but not necessarily. 
18 Science as Social Knowledge, p. 54. the thesis of not totally theory-dependent access to empirical world has been 
affirmed by Kukla when, following Fodor, admits that what we perceive (perceptual process) is one thing and how we 
relate what we perceive to concepts and theory (that is, how we interpret it) is quite another. For this reason, scientists 
with different theories do not necessarily or inevitably see different things. Nor is it true that we cannot understand 
the beliefs held from alternative theories or that we cannot reach a minimum level of description upon which we can 
agree. this means, note Kukla, that we can even learn to see a phenomenon as it is described from the perspective of 
an alternative theory. We can understand combustion as it is described by the theory of phlogiston without necessarily 
having to accept or share this theory. this is enough to resolve the problem of radical incommensurability, cf. kukla, 
a., Studies in Scientific Realism, Oxford University Press, New york, 1998. 
19 lonGino, h., Science as Social Knowledge, p. 56.
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to obtain results that can be applied to the material object. Morgan affirms on this question: 
“i relied on a particular hipbone to produce a model object that maintained (i suggest) enough 
material qualities necessary to establish valid experimental results about that one real bone.” 20 
therefore, results obtained from experimental manipulations (including Morgan virtually 
experiments) tell us about reality and its changes. if experimental manipulations did not 
provide information about reality scientific development would be a miracle. 
this approach is near to hacking’s proposal, which underlines that since the same 
structure can be observed using different instruments —for example, microscopes based on 
diverse principles which involve different physical theories—, then there are good reasons for 
accepting that the structures observed exist. As hacking point us: “we are convinced because 
instruments using entirely different physical principles lead us to observe pretty much the 
same structure in the same specimen.” 21 
in the case of virtually experiments, hacking’s approach poses some problems, since what 
is observed are the interactions with a computerised representation of structure. however, we 
have good reasons to accept that the properties observed through simulated manipulation are 
approximately real in those cases in which: a) we have a realist representation of the material 
object, b) the results obtained through the simulation can be extended to the material system, and 
c) these results are consistent with the data provided by other different material experiments. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to remember that also in the case of some laboratory 
experiments it is not easy to separate what is observed from the utilized instrument to observe 
it. this happens, as Morgan reminds us, with the “apparatus bohrian complexes” (so called by 
Rom harré) in which the observed phenomena are properties of a complex unit: the apparatus 
and the entities of the world. 22 but this does not mean to put in question the existence of such 
entities of the world.
it is true that in a simulation we are not physically interfering with structures in the sense 
proposed by hacking, but the simulated interference is based on both, scientific knowledge and 
knowledge of how to interfere scientifically. this enables us, in the case of virtually experiments 
with semi-material objects to assume that the interference in a laboratory with real forces would 
have the same results as the simulated interference, therefore we can “are convinced about the 
structures we seem to see (…).” 23 On the other hand, the hacking´s notion of “manipulation” 
can be understood in a weak way as “to employ.” 24 in the hipbone experiment we have weak 
manipulation since it has been “employed” stress inputs to simulate what happens with the 
hipbone structure.
the developed argument provides: a) we have sufficient scientific knowledge of the material 
structure to develop a realist representation of it; b) the results of simulated manipulation can 
20 MorGan, M., “Experiments versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” p. 230. As John M. Prausnitz 
and bruce E. Poling wrote, “since 1958 such computer experiments have added more to the knowledge of molecular 
structure of simple liquids than all the theoretical work of the previous century (…).” Quoted in keller, e. F., “Models, 
Simulation, and ‘Computer Experiments’,” p. 208.
21 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 209. 
22 MorGan, M., “Experiments versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” p. 322.
23 hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 209.
24 See Shapere, d., “Astronomy and Anti-Realism,” Philosophy of Science, v. 60, (1993), pp. 134-150; and MaSSiMi, 
M., “Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why we are Justified to believe in Colored Quarks,” 
Philosophy of Science, v. 71, n. 1, (2004), pp. 36-60.
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be extended to the material structure; and c) it is possible to access the material structure 
also through laboratory experiments. if these three conditions are not satisfied the reasons to 
accept that “the properties observed through simulated manipulation are approximately real” 
are weaker (no matter how many parameters we introduce into the computer). this is the case 
of the simulation of the evolution of our Galaxy. 
the simulation of the evolution of our Galaxy is based on information collected over 15 years 
from stars of spectral types F and G, in a total of around 63.000 individual spectroscopic 
observations. this complete census of nearby stars provides information regarding distances, 
ages, spatial velocity and orbits in the general rotation of the Milky Way, and the identification 
of double or multiple stars (around 1/3). A Danish astronomer, Erik heyn Olsen, took the first 
step during the 1980s by measuring the light intensity on various wavelengths of 30,000 stars 
of the types A, F and G, distributed across the whole firmament. Next, the satellite hipparcos 
(ESA) determined the distances and velocities on the celestial plane of these and many other 
stars. however, the movements along the line of vision remained the missing link, although 
this was also eventually calculated by the CORAVEl instrument, on the basis of the Doppler 
shift of the spectral lines of the stars. 25
All this information enables astronomers to simulate on their computers how the stars 
moved around the Galaxy in the past and how they will do so in the future. the initial results 
of the simulation indicate that objects such as molecular clouds, spiral arms and black holes 
would have fostered stellar displacement throughout the entire history of the galactic disk. As 
a result, the evolution of the Milky Way seems much more complex and chaotic than initially 
proposed by traditional and simplified models. 
in this case, we are dealing with the computerisation of a huge amount of scientific data 
obtained by diverse means quite independent of the computer in which they are computerised. 
Nevertheless, the situation is not the same in the experiment with the hipbone subjected to 
extreme stress. Firstly, because no laboratory experiment has been carried out about the 
evolution of our Galaxy, whilst in the case of the hipbone structure they were done, although 
for other parameters. Secondly, because the results obtained from the simulation can only be 
extended to the system very partially, since current knowledge in this field does not enable 
us to control all the variables and disturbing causes acting on a phenomenon as complex as the 
evolution of the Galaxy. And thirdly, and very important, because we only have other theoretical 
models about how our Galaxy evolved, therefore, when the results obtained from simulation are 
extended, they are extended to these models not to the material system.
in the field of Galaxy evolution, current knowledge regarding material systems is closely 
related to the current theoretical model. the simulation is guided by theoretical model since 
the mathematically modelled inputs behave in accordance with certain theoretical hypotheses 
specific to said models. the assertion that objects such as molecular clouds, spiral arms 
and black holes have fostered stellar displacement throughout the history of the Galaxy is a 
hypothesis that has yet to be confirmed.
in order to understand the above arguments about the different epistemic status of the 
phenomena of Galaxy evolution and the behaviour of hipbone structure it is useful to clarify 
the relationship between experiment, simulated or not, and theory, and the relationship 
between data, phenomena and theory.
25 i summarize here from the Report: www.eso.org/public/news/eso0411 (access on 15 January 2010).
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3. data, PhenOmena and entItIes
Returning to the idea that the data obtained from experimental (material) manipulations 
express the response of the reality being observed, does this mean that the empirical basis of 
science are completely independent from theories? 
the difference established by new experimentalism perspective between data and 
phenomena is interesting to answer this question. 26 Data are accessible to our senses and 
instruments, “are records that are visually detectable.” 27 they are produced by experimental 
practice and are independent from theories. Phenomena are the result of statistical inference 
from data registered in successive experiments and in most cases are unobservable. 28 
Phenomena are the general properties of the entities of the world that we infer from data, they 
are therefore independent from theories. 29 As bogen and Woodward note, “we are justified 
in believing claims about phenomena as long as data are available which constitute reliable 
evidence for such claims (…).” 30 Phenomenological statements are fundamental in scientific 
knowledge and their truth content is independent from the theories about the entities mentioned 
in them. 31 
Phenomena such as “hipbones subjected to certain stress break” or “metals dilate when 
heated,” are inferred from observable data manipulated in material or virtually experiment. 
they are general properties inferred from data, therefore are independent from theories. 
however, the inference of the evolution of our Galaxy implies some theoretical hypotheses 
specified by the current theoretical model. in the simulation of the evolution of our Galaxy, 
theory plays a more fundamental role than in the simulation of hipbone structure under 
conditions of extreme stress. Does this fact enable us to be less realist about the evolution of 
our Galaxy or the chaotic behaviour of Milky Way than about the behaviour of the hipbone 
under conditions of extreme stress? the answer to this question depends on whether we accept 
that phenomena and statement about phenomena are independent from theories.
in my opinion, the thesis that phenomena and claims about phenomena are 
independent from theories poses a number of problems. this thesis finds difficulties 
in material experiments since many phenomena are unobservable. in the case of 
unobservable phenomena the transformation of the data in phenomena are not carried 
out in complete theoretical independence. this does not mean that they are totally 
determined by theory since they also depend of the data themselves, of the experimental 
context and of the history of the experiment. but theory also does play a role in it. 32 
26 Cf. BoGen, J. and WoodWard, J., “Saving the Phenomena,” Philosophical Review, v. 97, (1988), pp. 303-352.
27 MaSSiMi, M., “Saving Unobservable Phenomena,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 58, (2007), p. 239.
28 As Massimi has pointed out, according bogen and Woodward, “data provide evidence for the existence of 
phenomena. On the other hand, phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most cases are not observable 
in any interesting sense of the term,” MaSSiMi, M., “Saving Unobservable Phenomena,” p. 238.
29 i thank to M. Massimi for having outlined me that the claim is not always true since some phenomena are 
unobservable and have a special epistemic status. these phenomena are result of two stretching process: an unexpected 
measured value in a data model and the use of theoretical models to achieve better fit with the data model. See interesting 
analysis of these phenomena in MaSSiMi, M., “Saving Unobservable Phenomena,” pp. 235-262.
30 BoGen, J. and WoodWard, J., “Saving the Phenomena,” p. 350.
31 Cf. Suarez, M., “hacking Kuhn,” Revista de Filosofía, v. 28, n. 2, (2003), p. 275.
32 As Resnik has pointed out, “experimenters actually use full-blown scientific theories about the very entities they 
study…the gap between experimenter and theory is not nearly as large as hacking supposes,” reSnik, d. B., “hacking’s 
Experimental Realism,” in curd, M. and cover, J. A. (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, W. V. Norton 
and Company, New york, 1994, pp. 1182-1183.
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As Massimi notes, “evidence and theory are inextricably intertwined in grounding our 
belief in colored quarks.” 33
the process that leads to unobservable phenomena is similar from the process that leads 
to theoretical entities. in the case of causal properties of theoretical entities, which hacking 
speaks about, we do not find a complete independence between statements of general 
properties (phenomena) and theories. 34 Without a doubt, experimental results observed really 
happen (at the laboratory experiments). there is not problem for example in accepting that 
in the experiment with cathode rays thomson found “particles bearing a minimal negative 
charge.” 35 but the fact that these data become electrons is not independent of the theories of 
lorentz and others. 36 the entity referred to by the term electron has a cluster of important 
properties (mass, spin, electric charge, …) which are described by scientific theories. 37 
Experiments in which entities that in principle cannot be observed produce a new 
phenomenon show the existence of causal effects of these entities. 38 but that such effects 
become general properties of the entities of the world (phenomena) not only depends on 
the experimental data, but, at least partly, also on the theories that describe those entities. 39 
Faraday found “that the plane of polarization of a beam of light would rotate when sent through 
this borosylicate glass, parallel to the lines of magnetic force.” 40 Understanding this fact as 
a general and fundamental physical property (the connection between electromagnetism 
and light) depended on the theoretical assumptions, the mathematical representations, the 
physical models elaborated, the used arguments (Maxwell symmetry) and of the physical 
explanations formulated. 41 As Massimi points out in her interesting analysis of parton and 
quark models of hadrons, “seeing the nucleon s´ constituents presupposes a massive amount 
of theory. For instance, it presupposes theoretical assumptions about scattering techniques 
(…) a theory about spectrometers work (…) an interlocking chain of low level generalisations 
as well as recourse to fundamental laws such as momentum and energy conservation. but, it 
presupposes also some batches of crucial theoretical assumptions about the very same facts 
under investigation.” 42
33 MaSSiMi, M., “Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why we are Justified to believe in 
Colored Quarks,” p. 39.
34 hacking affirms, “entities that in principle cannot be ‘observed’ are regularly manipulated to produce a new 
phenomena and to investigate other aspects of nature,” hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 262. this thesis is 
questioned by zeidler, p. and SoBczynSka, d., “the idea of Realism in the New Experimentalism and the Problem of 
Existence of theoretical Entities in Chemistry,” Foundations of Science, v. 1, n. 4, (1995), pp. 517-535. 
35 Cf. hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 83. 
36 thomson called them first “ultratomic particles” and after “corpuscles.”
37 See the Resnik s´ critic of hacking. reSnik, d. B., “hacking s´ Experimental Realism,” pp. 395-412. 
38 On the other hand, as Resnik has pointed out, experimentation is not nearly as theory-free as hacking maintains. 
39 therefore, according to Resnik well-known statement of “the experimental realist can only have knowledge about 
theoretical entities if she assumes that the theories which describe those entities are at least approximately true,” 
reSnik, d. B., “hacking s´ Experimental Realism,” p. 395.
40 Cf. hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, p. 211.
41 Enumerated by hacking who add, “Often the big speculation comes first.” hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, 
p. 212. From Faraday effect was derived that “there might be a single theory unifying light and electromagnetism.” the 
reason of this interpretation was that “(…) Faraday was convinced that all forces of the nature must be interconnected.” 
Representing and Intervening, p. 210.
42 MaSSiMi, M., “Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why we are Justified to believe in 
Colored Quarks,” p. 49.
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On the other hand, the inference of phenomena from data can presuppose assumptions, even 
non-scientific in little developed scientific contexts. One excellent example of this is 19th century 
physical anthropologists’ interpretation of the differences in weight between men’s and women’s 
brains. From the weight data, they inferred a general property: the intellectual inferiority of 
women. Phenomena from differential research on human beings have proved highly sensitive to 
this type of interference.
We can accept that data express the response of the reality, but it is very different to accept 
that necessarily phenomenological statements about the general properties of entities cannot be 
linked to some theory. the realism that we are sustaining is less optimistic. it involves accepting 
the commitment to the existence of theoretical entities, while acknowledging that properties of 
said entities depend, to a certain extent, on theories about them. 43 Properties may vary with the 
theory-change. Obviously, this is not always the case, and certain phenomena remain constant 
despite theoretical changes, while it is their explanation what varies. this does not mean to 
reject the possibility of theory-free observation in fields where observation is more independent 
from underlying theoretical assumptions nor it is being affirmed the thesis that all observation 
is theory-ladenness. the matter is that in some cases what counts as observation depends too 
upon our state of knowledge. 44 it is true that the life of certain phenomena is much longer than 
the life of any theory designed to explain them. but this is not always the case. For instance, 
the property of intelligence as the result of differences in brain weight has not survived. in 
the computer based observation the situation is the same. it is easier for the phenomena of the 
simulation of the evolution of our Galaxy to change than it is for the property of a hipbone 
breaking when is subject to great stress. this second type of phenomena will remain despite 
the fact that it depends on data obtained by simulation and despite the fact that the way in which 
it is explained theoretically may change. however, the first type of phenomena will depend 
closely on the evolution of theoretical models of the universe. 
Regarding the question formulated above of whether the role of the theory in the 
simulation of a phenomena, like the evolution of our Galaxy, prevent us to be realistic about 
this phenomena the answer is negative. the matter is not the role played by theories in the 
transformation (material or simulated) of data in phenomena, but the status of theories and if 
we have good reasons to be realistic about them. 
4. remarks
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning, and according to the epistemological 
approach sustained, we can affirm that: a) virtually experiments with semi-material objects 
are a resource that increases scientific knowledge and provide information which is relevant 
to material systems since the results obtained can be extended to these systems; b) in the case 
of experiments on highly idealised representations of the material object we are basically 
deriving results inherent to the model that we construct, in accordance with the specified 
rules and hypothesis, as in the case of operations on mathematical models. it is possible to 
extend the results to the material systems only very partially. When we cannot extend the 
43 hacking affirms: “Various properties are confidently ascribed to electrons, but most of the confident properties 
are expressed in numerous different theories or models about which an experimenter can be rather agnostic.” hackinG, 
i., Representing and Intervening, pp. 263-264.
44 As note MaSSiMi, M., “Non-defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why we are Justified to believe 
in Colored Quarks,” p. 50.
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results to the material system as in the evolution of our Galaxy, the knowledge obtained is 
very hypothetical and tentative. We can be realist regarding the behaviour of the structure of 
hipbone under conditions of great stress, but we cannot be realist in the same grade regarding 
the evolution of our Galaxy. 
however, type b experiments constitute an important scientific resource since they enable 
us to improve our comprehension of highly complex and yet not very well understood material 
systems, and they help us to define certain relationships and to formulate hypotheses, as indeed 
is the case, for example, of the simulations of the climate change and its effects. Finally, it is clear 
that the new forms of observation do not involve new epistemologies, although they do pose new 
challenges for existing ones. 
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OBserVatIOn and exPerIments In eCOnOmICs:  
analysIs Of herBert sImOn’s aPPrOaCh
María g. bonome
1. herBert sImOn’s aPPrOaCh: the PrImaCy Of emPIrICIsm
herbert Simon frequently emphasizes the role of observation and experimentation 
in economic science to confront the main economic stream. he thinks there are too many 
economists who insist too much on the main role of theory, and they even justify not worrying 
about realism in economics assumptions, 1 so he openly criticizes those that consider economics 
as an a priori knowledge. in this sense, his attitude towards thomas Sargent —one of the most 
important economist of the “rational expectations conception”— is clear: “economists like 
thomas Sargent who have paid the phrase ‘bounded rationality’ (…) miss the point of it when 
they continue to base their models on a priori hypotheses about behavior instead of grounding 
them in fact established by direct observation.” 2
before working for Cowles Commission, where he contributed to the development of 
mathematical instruments to be used in economics, 3 Simon had received the inf luence 
of Rudolf Carnap while he was a student at the University of Chicago. 4 this important 
author of Vienna’s Circle left an unforgettable mark on a young political science student. 5 
Since then, when he develops computer programs into computer science, his determination is 
always to make science with an intense empiric basis. he considers that the goals, processes 
and results of science have to go beyond (the filter of) empirical support.
Carnap’s influence —the empirical epistemology that looks for the “basis” and the 
verificationism methodology of science— is reflected in Simon, mainly in the ideas he rejects. 
Firstly, he ruled out a Popperian rationalist epistemology, where theory prevails over experience 
(and where there is no basis for induction); and, secondly, the need of empirical foundations casts 
a doubt over a priori base for any scientific process (in economics or in any other nature).
1  Simon always showed a critical attitude with Milton Friedman’s Methodology of Economics, cf. SiMon, h. a., 
“Discussion: Problems of Methodology,” American Economic Review, v. 53, (1963), pp. 229-231. Compiled in SiMon, 
h. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 2: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization, the Mit Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1982, pp. 369-371.
2  SiMon, h. a., “introduction,” in SiMon, h. a., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded 
Economic Reason, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p. xii.
3  it was “inside the Cowles Commission, when he developed what for some people is the most important part of 
his philosophy of science: the study of the axiomatization of the scientific theories and the status —within those 
theories— of theoretical concepts (as they are not directly observable),” in Gonzalez, W. J., “herbert A. Simon: 
Filósofo de la Ciencia y economista (1916-2001),” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en 
Herbert A. Simon, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2003, p. 10.
4  he deals with experiments very early: SiMon, h. a. and divine, W. r., “Controlling human Factors in an 
Administrative Experiment,” Public Administration Review, v. 1, (1941), pp. 485-492.
5  Cf. SiMon, h. a., Models of my Life, basic books, N. york, Ny, 1991 (reprinted by the Mit Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1996), pp. 51, 53-55, 193 and 195.
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but it is also possible to see Carnap’s influence in what Simon accepts: his own terminology 
has the trace of a logical empiricism when he writes that in cognitive psychology it is possible 
to “find strong empirical foundations for behavioral decision theory and bounded rationality 
as well as valuable suggestions on experimental and observational methodologies. All of these 
can be helpful for verifying the applicability to economics of the behavioral decision theory 
that has emerged from this research in other domains.” 6
Nevertheless, Simon had a long and extremely varied intellectual path: 60 years of work. 
During this time he did outstanding contributions in very different fields. it is in effect, a 
“multidisciplinary creativity,” 7 but there are some common characteristics within the diversity 
of that field. One of them is that he always claimed the role of observation in the real world, 
thinking of giving a major realism to the models (for example, to develop economic theories). 
Another common characteristic is that besides the empirical foundation (the reason empirically 
grounded) he highlighted the role of experimentation (in economics too) as a methodological 
process to evaluate the validity of scientific hypotheses.
being conscious of his “multidisciplinary creativity,” Simon says that he has been “accused 
of flitting from one social science to another, but the secret really is that i have been preoccupied 
with one topic, decision making and rationality, all of my life. it just happens that that topic cuts 
squarely across all of the human sciences because it is what we human beings are doing a great 
deal of the time. you don’t really have to change very much, except a bit of your vocabulary, to 
move from one of these fields to another if you stick to the topic of decision making.” 8
his points of view are strongly compromised in trying to describe and understand 
economic reality from an objective point of view. And he claimed a model of economic real 
agent, removed from the simplified and ideal models that turn out to be so comfortable for 
some theoretical formulations of the main economics current (the neoclassical one). this took 
form on his study of bounded rationality in decision making, 9 which was the cause of his 
Nobel Prize on Economics in 1978, an approach where he insisted that it is possible to verify 
empirically that the ability of agents to calculate information has a limit. 
When he offers a retrospective vision of his path, Simon’s position is the epistemological 
and methodological primacy of the empirical thing: firstly, as an observation and secondly, 
as experimentation. besides, he stresses the link between the sciences of economics and 
psychology, where the empirical component of the work of the psychological laboratory 
reinforces the characterization of economic behavior. thus, there is a reciprocal enrichment 
between both disciplines, again, against a priori approaches. besides, it is a question of half a 
century of bidirectional relations between economics and psychology:
“the laboratory research extending from the 1950s to present day provided a large body 
of evidence for the theory of bounded rationality and for characterizing science as a social 
endeavor. Vastly more evidence was simultaneously gathered by other psychologists during 
this period of the ‘cognitive revolution’ in that domain. 
6  SiMon, h. A., “introduction,” in SiMon, h. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded 
Economic Reason, pp. x-xi.
7  daSGupta, S., “Multidisciplinary Creativity: the Case of herbert A. Simon,” Cognitive Science, v. 27, (2003), p. 683.
8   SiMon, h. A., “Decision Making: Rational, Nonrational, and irrational,” Educational Administration Quarterly, 
v. 29. (1993), p. 395. 
9  Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad 
de los agentes económicos,” in Gonzalez, W. J. (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, 
Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2003, pp. 65-96.
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Numerous researchers in both psychology and economics have also been busy applying 
the jointly produced theory to economic phenomena (for example, bromiley, Kahneman and 
tversky, Vernon Smith, Selten, Gingerich, and so on). Perhaps this helps to explain why Simon 
devoted only a substantial fraction of his time to specific economic applications.” 10
2. need Of emPIrICal Base fOr eCOnOmICs: BehaVIOral eCOnOmICs
As he insists on the need of an empirical base for economics, Simon proposes an observable 
object of study for this science: the behavior of the economic agents. besides, he thinks it is possible 
to carry out a “direct observation” of the behavior since the influence of the logical empiricism 
during his university stage leads him to conceiving the observation without theoretical load. the 
phenomena of economic behavior are seen by him in terms of methodological individualism (the 
behavior of individual agents that make decisions) and the social context is more a question of 
environment than something which is really significant to the process of economic behavior.
Ontologically, his “behavioral economics” assumes that economic reality is much more 
complex than the natural one, due to its human and social nature. but he sees it only as 
“behavior” instead of conceiving it as “activity,” due to his strong empirical schemes. because 
in my opinion, economics, it is human activity that does not develop in an isolated way, but 
is enriched by its interaction with other activities related to human beings of several kinds 
(social, cultural and political). in this way, we face a reality where its components do not keep 
invariable; what is more, they have a high degree of variation for the fact of being influenced 
by a wide scale of values of all kinds. 11
though Simon remains in the “behavior” without managing to reflect the complexity of 
the “activity,” he has the merit of insisting, against the mainstream tendency, on the need to 
observe the economic reality to see how human beings reason at the moment of choosing 
among the different alternatives when they have to make decisions. “but most economists 
have found that empirical work of that kind is rather arduous and messy and that it’s more fun 
to play with theory (…) there is a very strong tradition of accepting the utility maximization 
hypothesis and then seeing, often with the aid of very powerful and elegant mathematical 
tools, what kind of conclusions you can draw from those premises, preferably by mathematical 
means. And there are even some economists who think that the theory is analytic and not 
refutable (…) While economists have applied very sophisticated econometric techniques to 
these data, the data themselves are almost all highly aggregated and concerned with society as 
a whole or very large segments thereof. there are not detailed data about how individuals or 
individual business firms are behaving.” 12
2.1. Criticism to Mainstream Economic Theory 
According to the mainstream economic tendency, the agents maximize the utility when 
they make a decision, and they do it when they act in an individual level or when they act as 
a group. (i) On the one hand, the function of utility prevails (when we make our decisions we 
10  SiMon, h. a., “On Simulating Simon: his Monomania, and its Sources in bounded Rationality,” Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science, v. 32, n. 3, (2001), p. 502
11 About the presence of values in economy, cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Prediction and Prescription in Economics: A 
Philosophical and Methodological Approach,” Theoria, v. 13, n. 2, (1998), pp. 321-345.
12 SiMon, h. a., “Why Economists Disagree,” Journal of Business Administration, v. 18, n. 1-2, (1988-1989), p. 7. 
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consult our function of utility, that says to us which and what quantity of goods and services 
we prefer to others); and (ii) on the other hand, we make our decisions dependent only on the 
objective environment (for example, the limits of the budget we have). in this case, we make 
our decisions in such a way that we get those goods and services that we prefer with the money 
we have, including the credit we might afford.
this position of the dominant economic tendency implies elements that do not fit with the 
observation of the economic behavior. a) it bears that each of us has a function of utility that is 
wide and consistent, though we are not conscious of it and there are no conscious calculations 
in this task. b) it assumes that we are able of arranging, in terms of preference, any quantity of 
goods and services we can get. So this tendency considers that the human being has a stable and 
well organized system of preferences; besides, the human being is supposed to have a capacity of 
calculation that would allow him/her to reach the highest point in his/her scale of preferences.
it seems to be clear when bearing the observations about economic behavior in mind, 
it is not correct to accept these elements: neither the expected subjective expectations as 
maximizations nor the limited capacity of computation. in this regard, in the middle of the 
50’s, Simon perceived very clearly that the behavior of the economic agent was not as it appears 
in the dominant economic theory. 13 he stimulated the studies on human behavior, which 
Richard Cyert and James March continued. they proved, by means of empirical studies, that 
the decision making process in business firms was very different from the model that appears 
in the standard economic theory. 14
the approach of the utility maximization might make sense as a guideline of reasoning 
in the long term. but this approach, strictly differs in several factors. One of them has been 
pointed out by Daniel Kahneman: the worry for the emotions of the agents. because “utility 
can not be divorced from emotion, and emotion is triggered by changes. A theory of choice 
that completely ignores feelings such as the pain of losses and the regret of mistakes is not 
only descriptively unrealistic. it also leads to prescriptions that do not maximize the utility 
of outcomes as they are actually experienced —that is, utility as bentham conceived it.” 15 
this way, economists and psychologists worried about the controlled observation of the 
behavior, especially in decision making, like Simon, were who have emphasized the presence 
of cognitive factors, and even emotional, that influence the election of the economic agents.
2.2. Appeal to the Psychology-Like Complement of Economics
to form an economic theory closer to reality, Simon contributions to psychology as an 
epistemological and methodological complement of economics. he was interested in cognitive 
factors (the related ones to the process of thought, human intelligence and solution of problems) 
that connect with human behavior. this way, by means of many articles in the matter, he 
carried out an important contribution to the “cognitive revolution,” which exceeded the field of 
13 Cf. SiMon, h. A., “A behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 69, (1955), 
pp. 99-100. Compiled in SiMon, h. a., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 2: Behavioral Economics and Business 
Organization, pp. 239-258.
14 cyert, r. M. and March, J. G., The Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963; and 
SiMon, h. A., “Why Economist Disagree?,” p. 9. 
15 kahneMan, D., “Maps of bounded Rationality: A Perspective on intuitive Judgment and Choice,” Nobel Prize 
lecture, Nobel Foundation, Stockholm, 8/12/2002, www.nobelprize.org, (access on December 2007), pp. 464-465.
89empirical support and experiments in science
psychology to enter the field of artificial intelligence. in fact, with a group of researchers, Allan 
Newell is one of them, he carried out a large contribution in the realm of computer sciences. 16
Methodologically, Simon’s approach consists of controlled observation. this way, from a 
correct observation of the behavior of the economic agents, it is necessary to conclude that the 
rationality that people use when they make their decisions is a bounded rationality. this goes 
against the mainstream tendency, where the theory of the perfect rationality is assumed in the 
economic agents. he thinks that “empirical evidence is overwhelming that people, consumers, 
employees, businesspeople, typically satisfice rather than optimize. the reason, summed up 
in the phrase ‘bounded rationality’, is that their computational means are far too limited to 
permit them to generate all alternatives (or even to calculate the optimal search rule) and 
to estimate a probability distribution of outcomes for each alternative.” 17
instead of having a perfect rationality, which allows us to maximize our expectations to 
reach the highest level of utility in our decisions, the bounded rationality allows us to satisfy 
our needs, through decisions made with help of the knowledge and the tools we have in our 
scope. 18 With the support of observational psychology of the behavior, he presents an economic 
thesis of bounded rationality in decision making:
“bounded rationality is simply the idea that the choices people make are determined not 
only by some consistent overall goal and the properties of the external world, but also by the 
knowledge that decision makers do and don’t have of the world, their ability or inability to evoke 
that knowledge when it is relevant, to work out the consequences of their actions, to conjure 
up possible courses of action, to cope with uncertainty (including uncertainty deriving from 
the possible responses of other actors), and to adjudicate among their many competing wants. 
Rationality is bounded because these abilities are severely limited. Consequently, rational 
behavior in the real world is as much determined by the ‘inner environment’ of people’s minds, 
both their memory contents and their processes, as by the ‘outer environment’ of the world on 
which they act, and which acts on them.” 19
From this description of an “imperfect” human rationality, in the opposite direction to the 
“perfect” maximized rationality of the dominant theory, Simon asks for a change of attention 
towards those phenomena that arise from the limitations that are imposed or that are modified 
in a substantial way by these ones. this turn is fundamental to be able to develop a theory 
about human decision making that is consistent with what we know about human thinking, 
from the empirical studies in all the social and behaviorial sciences. the auxiliary assumptions 
in economics, which are assumptions in fact, and the central theoretical assumptions will 
have to submit to a review through empirical verification of the proposed formulations or its 
consequences. “the social sciences require theories built around realistic models of human 
actors; that capture that realism only approximately, but avoid over-simplification where it 
makes a consequential difference.” 20
16 daSGupta, S., “Multidisciplinary Creativity: the Case of herbert A. Simon,” p. 685.
17 SiMon, h. A., “Satisficing,” in GreenWald, D. (ed.), The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Economics, 2nd ed., 
McGraw-hill, New york, 1993, p. 883.
18 Cf. SiMon, h. A., “A behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” pp. 99-118.
19 SiMon, h. a., “bounded Rationality in Social Sciences: today and tomorrow,” Mind and Society, v. 1, n. 1, 
(2000), p. 25.
20 SiMon, h. a., “bounded Rationality in Social Sciences: today and tomorrow,” p. 30.
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in this direction a considerable work has been carried out in the last few decades. it has been 
made in the field of psychology, and it is due to Amos tversky and Daniel Kahneman. this 
last one received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 with Vernon Smith, an “experimental 
economics” author. his contributions allow one to estimate an effective consolidation of the 
change of direction in the economic research.
Kahneman and tversky carried out research in the psychology of elections and intuitive 
beliefs to make a map of bounded rationality. Opposite the mainstream tendency in economics, 
the elections and optimal beliefs that are supposed in the rational agent models, they 
examined the systematical features in people’s beliefs and in the choices they make. 
Although their research was initially a contribution to psychology that, as a secondary benefit, 
might provide some contribution to economics, they were won over towards an interdisciplinary 
confluence by economists who believe psychology is a profitable source of hypothesis for 
economic theorization, and indirectly, a source of hypothesis for economic research, bringing 
about an active research programme developed by behavioral economists. 21
Nevertheless, Kahneman is aware of the criticisms of some economists: psychological 
research generates lists of errors and biases and, therefore, it fails to offer a coherent alternative 
to the model of rational agent. but here is where the controversy is: the descriptive and 
normative models of economic rationality in the dominant economic tendency are not realistic 
from a psychological point of view. At the same time, as Kahneman says, the alternative 
to precise and simple models is not chaos. Psychology offers integrative and generalizing 
concepts at an intermediate level, which are able to explain apparently different phenomena 
in different realms. 22
if we look backwards, we can define the scientific analysis of human “rationality” as 
limited 23 as the way it began in the second half of 20th century, although there is still a lot 
of empirical work to do. in the year 2000 —and after a large number of publications on 
this topic—, Simon summarizes this situation in three big generalizations related to human 
rationality in the context of social sciences, in general, and in economics, in particular.
1. “the fascination with maximization of expected utility as the core of the theory of 
economic (and other) rationality has waned rapidly in recent years with the discovery of a 
large body of empirical evidence of human behavior that diverges widely from this theory. 
Dissatisfaction has led to the introduction of ad hoc patches to the theory in the form of 
specific, but seldom empirically-grounded, assumptions of limits upon rationality. Economists 
have become increasingly cynical about the neoclassical formalism and increasingly interested 
in alternative theories and new empirical approaches.” 24 Economists have become more and 
more critics about the neoclassical formalism. they have increased their interest in alternative 
theories and new empirical approaches.
2. “Great strides have been made in the past forty years, largely within cognitive psychology, 
to formulate an empirically grounded theory of decision making and problem solving processes. 
the new theory does not exhibit the very high levels of abstraction and generalization that 
21 Cf. kahneMan, D., “Maps of bounded Rationality: Psychology for behavioral Economics,” American Economic 
Review, v. 93, n. 5, (2003), p. 1449.
22 Cf. kahneMan, D., “Maps of bounded Rationality: Psychology for behavioral Economics,” p. 1449.
23 the concept of  “rationality” is not empirical, but his manifestations do, cf. reScher, n., Rationality: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
24  SiMon, h. A., “bounded Rationality in Social Sciences: today and tomorrow,” pp. 34-35.
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characterized neoclassical theory in the last half of our century, but it does lend itself very well 
to formal simulation with computer models, that is to say, with symbolic difference equations 
instead of the more familiar arithmetic differential equations borrowed from physics.” 25 this is 
a theory of decision that includes not only the processes of election among alternatives, but also 
the processes for generating new alternatives. So, in Simon’s opinion, it has a basic requirement 
for any satisfactory theory of long-term economic phenomena.
3. “there remains a large task of organizing and systematizing the empirical picture of 
economic processes that has already been assembled, and of continuing to provide the body 
of facts that are necessary to guide an empirically sound reformulation of the theory.” 26 this 
means that, in Simon’s opinion, the methodology has to be observational and inductive, where 
the empirical base precedes the theorization and the theory is conceived as the harmonization 
of the empirical available knowledge. but this bears more problems than he thinks, mainly if 
we agree to consider that there is “a theoretical charge” when scientific observation is done 
and theory does not simply harmonize the empirical available knowledge (for example, when 
it makes predictions).
3. aCCePtanCe Of exPerIments In eCOnOmICs
Regarding experiments, there has been an attitude of caution in economics, which is 
expressed by tony lawson when he publishes a chapter whose title is “Economic Science 
without Experimentation.” 27 there, he considers how the social scientific research can proceed 
in the absence of real possibilities of experimental control. 28 because it was still questioned 
in 1997 whether there existed an experimental control in economics equivalent to the existing 
one in the most natural sciences (physics, chemistry and biology).
One of the arguments given to explain this is the complexity of the phenomena that the 
social sciences have to study. in the case of economics it is said that there are a lot of variables 
taking part even in an individual decision making process. besides, we have to realize that 
there is a very complex net of relations between the economic decisions made by agents and 
their environment. these are factors that worsen the control of the conditions to do research. 
thus, even if we accept the possibility of the experiment, it would be considered “artificial” 
or with very restricted validity.
3.1. Institutional Area and Thematic Field
Opposite to the critical attitude related to experiments we can argue in institutional terms, 
the development in academic areas, and from a thematical point of view. First of all, there is a 
branch in economics that has for a long period, openly accepted the role of experiments and 
deals with the rationality in decision making. 29 Simon paid special attention to the contributions 
of experimental economics. he has elements of confluence with this economic position, both 
25 “bounded Rationality in Social Sciences: today and tomorrow,” pp. 35.
26 SiMon, h. A., “bounded Rationality in Social Sciences: today and tomorrow,” pp. 35.
27 laWSon, t., “Economic Science without Experimentation,” in laWSon, t., Economics and Reality. Routledge, 
london, 1997, chapter 15, pp. 199-226.
28 Cf. laWSon, t., Economics and Reality, p. 199.
29 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Rationality in Experimental Economics: An Analysis of Reinhard Selten’s Approach,” in 
Galavotti, M. C. (ed.), Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2003, 
pp. 71-83.
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epistemological and methodological. indeed, Simon’s empirically grounded economics as well 
as R. Selten and V. Smith’s experimental economics emphasize the empirical component of the 
discipline, both to conform the economic knowledge and to evaluate its validity.
From a thematic point of view, the question is what we understand when we talk about 
“experiment.” initially, when we think of an “experiment” we think of a process studied in 
a laboratory, where one of the key elements is the intervention in a certain event. thus, to 
experiment consists of intervening in some of the elements or mechanisms of something 
real, isolating other factors, in order to investigate a series of parameters that are controlled. 
but there is not one single way to perform experiments. What is more, there is a diversity 
of experiments. the criteria of differentiation are divided into three types: epistemological, 
methodological and ontological. they are “mainly i) the range of controllability of the 
variables, ii) the level of materiality of the processes employed in the research, and iii) the 
sphere —real, ideal, and hybrid, …— to be analyzed.” 30 thus, when this diversity is accepted, 
it’s possible to watch that economics uses a variety of experiments.
i) in regards to the epistemological issue of the range of controllability of the studied 
variables, there are at least three possibilities in economics: a) direct control; b) indirect control 
(or statistical control); and c) assumption in model. ii) Concerning the methodological issue of the 
level of materiality of the processes employed in the research, there would be three possibilities 
in economics: a) laboratory experimentation (when a material realm is under direct control); b) 
the “passive experimentation” of the econometric case (there is an indirect or statistical control); 
c) computer simulations (when the quasi-material realm or the pseudo-material sphere depends 
on the assumptions in the model). 31 iii) the ontological issue of the sphere to be analyzed varies 
from real (a tangible object), ideal (a thought experiment or a purely mathematical model) or a 
hybrid (as in simulations about quasi-material or pseudo-material things). 32
the need of making experiments in the area of economics increased with the consideration 
of uncertainty as a key element in human decision making. Any theory that tries to do a 
realistic analysis of how economic agents behave has to bear in mind the human uncertainty 
about the present and the future state of the world. in this regard, Simon mentions three events 
that brought about a drastic change in the situation: the probability theory, the game theory and 
the invention of rational expectations. 33 besides, he thinks the development of “experimental 
economics” is attributable to the concern with uncertainty.
First of all, the development of the probability theory incorporated the uncertainty to the 
study of human behavior. but it brought along new problems: a) the question of where the 
decision maker’s probabilities originated and b) computational problems in decision making 
turned out to be much more difficult. Secondly, the game theory, which initially seemed to 
be able to solve situations with uncertainty (the one arising from mutual attempts of decision 
makers to outguess what the persons with whom they were competing think), was a surprise 
due to the conclusions of its own analysis: they proved that agents do not use perfect rational 
strategies. this has lead to the game theory community to complete its theory with experiments. 
30  Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” in kuiperS, t. (ed.), 
General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 280.
31 Cf. BouManS, M. and MorGan, M. S., “Ceteris paribus Conditions: Materiality and the Application of Economic 
theories,” Journal of Economic Methodology, v. 8, n. 1, (2001), p. 20.
32 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” p. 280.
33 Cf. SiMon, h. A., “bounded Rationality in Social Science: today and tomorrow,” pp. 27-29.
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Finally, rational expectations conception gave a solution to the problem of uncertainty related 
to the behavior of others. but it assumed that all the economic actors have the same economic 
model in mind when they make their decisions. Nevertheless, this principle of rationality 
proved to be wrong very soon. 34
the other important development that Simon attributes to the concern with uncertainty is 
experimental economics. in this field, we can mention Reinhard Selten’s contribution, which 
obtained the Nobel Prize for his contributions in game theory together with John Nash and 
John harsanyi in 1994. Selten assumes Simon’s approach about bounded rationality in human 
behavior and he works to bring experimentation in economics closer to the reality of the agents’ 
behavior. because of this, his approach has important differences with other economists who 
are closer to the theory of utility maximization. 35
Epistemologically, Selten grants more importance to the empirical knowledge than to 
the theoretical knowledge. his position is closer to an empirical theoretical frame than to a 
rationalist approach. From a methodological point of view, his approach about experimental 
economics tends to identify some empirical regularities based on experimental data and, from 
there, he tries to build a formal theory to explain them, instead of starting with a formal theory 
submitted to verification in the laboratory. 36
this way of facing up the research is far from other methodological approaches developed 
in experimental economics, in which experiments are designed to perform three tasks: a) to 
verify and modify the formal economic theories; b) to get data from interesting phenomena 
and relevant institutions, trusting to find no advanced regularities; or c) to relate them in a 
direct way with decision making in public policy. 37
3.2. Context for the Experiments
but there is another important issue related to experiments and it is the context where 
they are made. ironically, as Simon points out, experimental economics has its origin in 
experiments made in the university classrooms, using the students as subjects trading under 
specific market rules. the problem is that these economic agents have the same profile and the 
results of their experiments do not fit the complexity of real situations. 38
there are some problems in experimental economics from a methodological point of view 
because “how much of what is obtained in the economic laboratory can be applied directly to 
the complex situation of economic activity within the real world?” Real data are much more 
difficult to obtain and to interpret. So this aspect can have repercussions in the characterization 
of economic activity as such and in the analysis of economic activity as interconnected with 
other human activities into a historical context. 39
in spite of all, it seems that only in laboratory experiments the right conditions to control 
the environment can be obtained and in this way, the behavior of the variables in a certain 
34 Cf. “bounded Rationality in Social Science: today and tomorrow,” pp. 27-29.
35 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Análisis de la racionalidad y planteamiento de la predicción en Economía Experimental,” 
in Gonzalez, W. J., MarQuéS, G. and Ávila, A. (eds.), Enfoques Filosófico-Metodológicos en Economía, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, Madrid, 2002, pp. 145-172.
36 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “Análisis de la racionalidad y planteamiento de la predicción en Economía Experimental,” p. 149.
37 Cf. “Análisis de la racionalidad y planteamiento de la predicción en Economía Experimental,” p. 149.
38 Cf. SiMon, h. A., “bounded Rationality in Social Science: today and tomorrow,” pp. 29-30.
39 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” p. 290.
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situation can be accurately analyzed. Economics has typically ignored contextual variables, 
but “for experimental studies to be judged as ‘representative’, and thus to generalize, claims 
need to be established for this (relative to the theory being tested) on the dimensions of both 
experimental participants and situations.” 40
it is clear that the design of experiments controlling the conditions by the experimenter 
provides interesting results, both to verify descriptive theories (economic theory) and to give 
advice to public policy (applied economics). 41 As Selten stresses too, the focus of the issue 
“is often on designing new experiments to test the predictive value of a theory rather than or 
merely construing a new theory for describing the data observed. in addition, he proposes 
statistical tests to compare a new theory with the previously existing ones in order to show the 
superior predictive power for these experiments.” 42
besides, new tools have been designed to help in experimentation and, so to build 
theories. the use of computer simulations allow to break some limits, as the ones that 
come from the computation capability, the characteristic of organization structure or 
human motivation. An example could be the use of neural networks, where players learn by 
constructing explicitly approximate models of their environment and updating these as the 
information they possess improves. 43
Even though these tools have begun to show their power, “experimental work needs to be 
complemented by field studies in business firms of the actual decision processes employed 
for various kinds of decisions (for example, capital investment, discovery and development of 
new products, reorganization).” 44
An important part of the experiments that are led nowadays to build economic theories 
closer to real world are developed within the psychological area. these mainstream research 
tendencies seek to elaborate a description of the human rationality that, from the cognitive 
processes of people, help to understand decision making. the results obtained indicate that 
there are mainly two ways of thinking that fit with the concepts of reasoning and intuition. the 
reasoning process is done deliberately and with a lot of effort, whereas intuitive thought seems 
to appear spontaneously in our minds without calculation or conscious search and without 
effort. Superficial observation and systematical research indicate that most of our thoughts 
and actions are usually intuitive in this sense. 45
the experiments done by psychologists contribute to the economic research concepts which 
have been ignored until recent days, such as the adaptive function of the access to information, 
deliberate attention, relevant stimuli from an emotional point of view, the role of optimism 
in taking risks, or the heuristic of fondness. to reach some conclusions as the fundamental 
characteristic of the agents is not that they reason in a wrong way, but they usually act intuitively. 
the behavior of these agents is not ruled by what they are able to calculate, but by the things they 
see by chance in the moment they are going to make a decision. 46 For this reason, those who do 
40 hoGarth, R. M., “the Challenge of Representative Design in Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Economic 
Methodology, v. 12, n. 2, (2005), p. 261.
41 Cf. “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” pp. 281-282.
42 Cf. Gonzalez, W. J., “the Role of Experiments in the Social Sciences: the Case of Economics,” p. 292.
43 Cf. Sent, E. M., “the legacy of herbert Simon in Game theory,” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, v. 53, (2004), p. 311.
44 SiMon, h. A., “bounded Rationality in Social Science: today and tomorrow,” p. 37.
45 Cf. kahneMan, D., “Maps of bounded Rationality: A Perspective on intuitive Judgement and Choice,” p. 450.
46 Cf. “Maps of bounded Rationality: A Perspective on intuitive Judgement and Choice,” pp. 449-489.
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research in this particular field, ask for the incorporation of a “common sense psychology of the 
intuitive agent in economic models.” though this is an issue that presents difficult challenges, 
mainly for the formal theory, it is gathering more followers as shown in the latest results. 47
in spite of the difficulties pointed out by the critics of experiments in economics, it is clear 
that it has a place in economic research, both in experimental economics and in game theory. 
Some Nobel Prize winners for the first issue (in 2002) as for the second (in 1994 and 2005) 
have used experiments in the economic field. 48 Experiments in the case of social sciences 
as economics can help, first of all, to explain observable and repeatable phenomena, which 
are analyzed by some theory, and, secondly, to create new situations that can generate new 
alternatives impossible to get by other means.
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the dynamICs Of exPerImentatIOn and Its rOle  
wIthIn a PhIlOsOPhy Of sCIentIfIC PraCtICes
José ferreirós
1. IntrOduCtIOn
it’s already been twenty-five years since ian hacking stated, provocatively, that 
philosophers should start to think about the adventure that began back in the 17th century. 
he meant modern science, of course —what was then termed “experimental philosophy.” 
hacking was intimating that the whole tradition in philosophy of science (including all 20th 
century proposals up until lakatos, laudan, and the semantic and structuralist conceptions, 
at least) is profoundly inadequate to analyse the scientific phenomenon. And the main reason 
would be that philosophers have not elaborated the tools for an adequate understanding of 
experimentation —nor therefore of its role in theory formation.
During these 25 years, a small trend of “experimentalist” authors has grown, among them 
names such as hacking, Franklin, Cartwright, and also historians like heilbron, Galison, 
buchwald, Steinle —not to forget a good number of sociologists such as Collins, Schaffer, 
Pickering, etc. in my opinion, the emergence of new experimentalism has been one of the 
most exciting recent development in the theory of science, if not the most fascinating. the 
reaction among the community of specialists and teachers of philosophy of science still seems 
disappointing to me, being so scarce as it is. but perhaps we can be confident that the situation 
is changing.
Science’s old name, “experimental philosophy,” suggests already that modern science can 
be regarded as a hybrid of philosophy (logic, theory, argument) and experiment (intervention, 
technics, observation). Of course presenting it this way involves a simplification, but i believe 
it constitutes a useful idealisation, if our purpose is to provide a rudimentary model of how 
the cognitive activities of scientists are structured. (Above all, such a model hides the role of 
interactions among members of the scientific community, and between them and other social 
actors. however, the model can integrate social factors, especially if we understand that 
knowledge —data and models and theories— is a social product almost by definition.) 1
Following that suggestion, let me propose a triadic model of scientific activity based on 
considering three ‘phases’ in its cognitive processes, or three broad categories of scientific 
practices (which no doubt would have to be subdivided into finer types): theoretical activities, 
experimental activities —subsuming here the particular case of observations— and also 
communicational activities. this in itself cannot sound new, but the key idea is to emphasize 
that the experimental ‘phase’ is not reduced or subordinated to the theoretical one, and that it 
calls for a deeper and novel analysis. Furthermore, both types of activities are in interaction, and 
the complexity of those interactions still defies philosophers of science.
1  Which does not mean (beware the non sequitur) that the analysis of knowledge can be merely sociological.
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Such a scheme is very different from the views offered by traditional authors, which by 
following the linguistic turn and emphasizing logic were led to something like a model where 
there is one principal ‘phase’ of theory formation, merely punctuated by the injection of basic 
statements (corresponding to what are usually called observational data). What is characteristic 
of experimental and observational activities remained outside the philosopher’s analysis, be 
it because it was considered transparent (as with empiricism) or regarded as exasperatingly 
swampy (as Popper liked to say). in joint work with Javier Ordóñez, we have criticized such 
models for their theoreticism, and we have also traced the origins of this tendency back to 
philosophically inclined theoretical physicists such as boltzmann. 2
No doubt, betting for a philosophy of science that is able to analyse the experimental phase 
complicates matters for the aspiring philosopher, because it will force her to augment her 
panoply of tools. A fine analysis of the factors that enter into experimental activity should 
include questions belonging to the cognitive sciences; it cannot be reduced to a logical scheme, 
nor can it be treated in the style of the linguistic turn, and it is also insufficient to speak of 
“paradigms” or “values.” Considered from this angle, the misery of theoreticism stems from 
the way it reduced the richness and complexity of scientific procedures to an affair merely of 
conceptual and theoretical elaboration. 
A philosophy of science that closes its eyes to the epistemic specificity of experimental life will 
thereby renounce the goal of understanding what is most characteristic of scientific knowledge. 
Properly considered, this already offers an explanation for the peculiar situation we saw towards 
the end of the 20th century, when the rationalism and faith in progress of philosophers was 
confronted head-on by strong sociological approaches. the views originating in theoreticist and 
“logicistic” approaches to the philosophy of science were, malgré lui, feeding the sociologism 
of the 1980s and 90s. that is because of the way they promoted losing sight of the processes by 
which data are obtained (produced?) in science. they promoted excessive simplification of our 
models of scientific practice, and also rigidly formalistic conceptions of human rationality. 3
in my opinion, the “third way” that can take us out of that bog consists in a reflection upon 
scientific practices, understood not as an attractive yet void formula, but rather as the decision 
to fully consider the epistemic and cognitive specificity of scientific activities, and in particular 
experimental activities. the plural form is of the essence: there is not scientific practice in the 
singular, but a plurality of coexisting practices, and the crux of the analysis has to do with 
their heterogeneous cognitive roots and their complex interactions. it is for this reason that, 
as a first step and to counter their traditional oblivion, we must consider the roots and the 
dynamics of experimentation. 4 the way opened by studies of the philosophy of experiment 
opens a promising course for navigating the waters between the Scilla of theoreticism and the 
Caribdis of sociological reductionism. 
2  Cf. FerreiróS, J. and ordóñez, J., “hacia una Filosofía de la experimentación,” Crítica, v. 34, n. 102, (2002), 
pp. 47-86.
3  the importance of formalistic rationalism as a stimulus for sociological conceptions is clear in the work of a central 
author like harry M. Collins. See in particular his classic collinS, h. M., Changing Order. Replication and Induction 
in Scientific Practice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992; original edition 1985). it is also abundantly 
known how simplified versions of the theses promoted by Popper, lakatos, or Quine have been appropriated by 
specialists in StS or sociology of science.
4  Note that this formulation, properly understood, involves the theoretical phase, since both ‘phases’ are in almost 
constant interaction. but it emphasizes that which is still the least known and understood. 
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2. exPerIment and Its InterPretatIOn: the BasIC struCture
in traditional speech about data and experimental results, these are presented as ready-
made elements emerging from some black box. the possible structural and dynamical 
complexities in the modus operandi of that black box, what i shall call the “processes of 
data formation,” are not a focus of attention. indeed, the traditional idea of empiricists 
is that we are actually talking of a “white box:” a transparent process of reception of 
impressions, which ends up in an automatic and infallible disposition to formulate basic 
statements. On a completely different line, we find Popper’s peculiar idea that basic 
statements are like pillars introduced from above (theories rule) into the “swamp” of 
observational and experimental work, pillars ultimately justified “by convention.” 5 
Although Popper never extracted the radical conclusions that this position is calling for, 
others (e.g., lakatos) did.
it will be worthwhile to pause for a note on terminology. here, as in previous work, 
i follow the scientist’s usual way of talking when it comes to experimental and observational 
data. An alternative terminology has been proposed by bogen and Woodward, who 
contrast “data” and “phenomena” with connotations that are fundamentally different from 
mine, as their “data” mean the f luctuating outcomes of particular experimental trials, 
while “phenomena” are the stable constructs which are theories are meant to predict and 
explain. 6 So the reader should beware: data in my sense are the “phenomena” of bogen, 
Woodward and others, which is why i emphasize the need to speak about processes of 
data formation.
in detailed considerations, it is customary to think that the production of an experimental 
result involves at least three elements —a material procedure, an instrumental model, and a 
phenomenic model: 7
a) the material procedure is a complex of objects and actions, or interventions, performed 
practically in the material world: arranging the apparatus and the specimens, and making 
them function properly (i.e., setting them to work in the proper sequence and controlling 
their performance). 
b) the instrumental model expresses a certain conceptual understanding on the side of 
the experimenter about how the apparatus works; this is central to the design, realization, and 
interpretation of the experiment. Such models can be of a highly theoretical and mathematical 
nature, but sometimes they depend on a modest amount of low-level theory. 
c) the phenomenic model codifies basic elements of the way in which the experimenter 
understands conceptually aspects of the phenomenal world that are under study; without it, the 
results would lack sense and meaning and could not be interpreted. And again, phenomenic 
models do not always depend on high theory. 8
5  Cf. popper, K. R., Logik der Forschung, tübingen, Mohr, 1935, chapter 5. (translated into English by the author 
with the assistance of Julius Freed y lan Freed: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, hutchinson, london, 1959.)
6  Cf. BoGen, J. and WoodWard, J., “Saving the Phenomena,” The Philosophical Review, v. 97, (1988), pp. 303-352. 
A good number of other philosophers (for instance, Mauricio Suarez) have adopted this peculiar terminology.
7  See, e.g., pickerinG, A., “living in the Material World,” in GoodinG, d., pinch, t. J. and SchaFFer, S. (eds.), The 
Uses of Experiment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 276-277.
8  Remember, e.g., the “taxonomies” of Kuhn’s late work.
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to present these ingredients concretely, giving a clear and simple example that we shall 
continue using in the sequel —Newton’s famous experiments on the decomposition of 
sunlight—, the three elements are as follows: 
a’) the material procedure includes the prisms (made of some or another kind of glass, 
sometimes filled with water), screens, procedures to modify the incident light (from simple 
holes on a window shutter, to lenses employed to colimate the light), etc. 
b’) the instrumental model is built upon an interpretation of the material procedure in 
terms of an antecedently established theory, geometrical optics, so that in this case it depends 
on high theory. (the model did not consider details about possible differences between 
different kinds of glass, and this was historically important.)
c’) the phenomenic model is again formulated by means of geometrical optics, concretely 
by using the concepts of a ray of light and ideas about its behaviour upon reflection or 
refraction. the model assumed idealisations that are typical of geometrical optics, like 
ignoring the fact that shadows have fuzzy edges.
On this last point i should add a clarification. you know of course that Newton was a 
corpuscularist, believing light to consist in tiny corpuscles travelling at great speed, and that 
he opposed the wave theories that had been formulated at the time. however, in his optical 
writings he made an effort to establish key theses —in particular the principle that simple light 
rays are associated with colours and have a characteristic refrangibility— on a basis that was 
neutral with respect to the physical theories in dispute. this is why his phenomenic model 
does not presuppose corpuscularism and is based on geometrical optics, by then a classic 
theory, well established at least among “mathematicians.” 
traditional images of experimentation would suggest that, at the stage of justification, the 
material procedure and the instrumental model remain fixed and unaltered. their features would 
be relatively natural and uncontroversial, both for the particular scientist who first proposed 
them, and for the scientific community that must replicate the experiments and judge the results. 
Meanwhile, the phenomenic model would be more flexible or “plastic,” since of course one 
allows for the possibility of competing theories defended by different scientists. Moreover, 
in what was traditionally (since the 19th century) presented as the prototype experiment, the 
main goal would be to measure in great accuracy some data to be contrasted with theoretical 
predictions, or perhaps some parameter fixed by theory (e.g., a physical constant, as a result of 
which the phenomenic model would be refined and specified to a greater level of precision).
but sociologists of science have challenged those assumptions, studying in detail cases 
where one finds the scientist showing almost no flexibility as regards the phenomenic model, 
but treating the other two components as very flexible indeed. Famous in this regard is 
Pickering’s work on what he called “the hunting of the quark,” some experiments performed 
by the italian physicist Morpurgo during a period of 15 years. the studies of harry Collins on 
the search for gravitational waves are also well known and have been celebrated. 9 Pickering 
concludes that the three structural elements a), b) and c) are equally plastic resources that, 
9  For discussion and questions about the details of the case studies offered by Collins and Pickering, see Franklin, 
A., “Experiment in Physics,” in zalta, e. n., (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/physics-experiment (access on November 2007) See also the 
abridged Spanish version: Franklin, A., “Física y experimentación,” Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 221-242. An 
interesting exchange between Franklin and Collins took place in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, v. 25, 
n. 3, (1994), pp. 463-503.
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far from being fixed and determined, can be modified at will until a result of coherence 
is attained. he believes that experimental work begins in such a way that there no definite 
relation between the structural ingredients: “incoherence and uncertainty are the distinctive 
seals of experiment,” as shown abundantly by studies of laboratory life. but at the end of 
the day, some form of non-trivial coherence is obtained, a stabilization such that “material 
procedures, (…) when interpreted through an instrumental model, produce facts within the 
framework of a phenomenic model.” 10 
the analysis of such processes of interactive stabilization between the three structural 
elements constitutes what, in the sociologist’s perspective, would correspond to our dynamics 
of experimentation. Any conclusion we may finally extract about experimental activity, be it 
about its epistemic relevance, or say its dependence upon contextual factors, will obviously 
hang on the characteristics attributed to the structural ingredients, and to their interrelations.
if Pickering’s position is somehow typical, the main point in dispute today would no longer 
be the “social construction” of experimental results, a conception of sociological reductionism 
that has been superseded by many promoters of social studies of science. but there remain the 
hot problems of the epistemic reliability of experimental data, the extent to which they provide 
information on natural processes, as opposed to the possibility of vicious circles, 11 or a mere 
coherentist stabilization such as described by Pickering. 12 All of this depends on whether the 
structural elements are “equally plastic” or not. 
the coherentist thesis has been formulated again by hacking, who speaks of a “self-
vindication” of laboratory sciences, and presents the idea as a kind of expanded Duhem thesis. 13 
if correct, the thesis of Pickering and hacking would have noteworthy consequences. it would 
be definitive confirmation of the “theory-ladenness” of results, certainly in the company of 
their correlative “technics-ladenness” and “social-ladenness,” but forcing us to abandon as 
elusive or noumenical —to abuse of Kant’s terminology— any possible “nature-ladenness.” 
Maybe the business of science would have its continuity and production of technological 
effects guaranteed (albeit one could not quite understand why), but from an epistemic point of 
view it would lack any special justification.
Points like those are thus crucial to any conclusion with respect to the epistemic reliability 
of the whole scientific enterprise, hence to the project of a philosophy of science. After all 
Einstein, even during his period of greatest enthusiasm for the theoretical and mathematical 
components of science (and although he was willing to grant that “the creative principle resides 
in mathematics”), emphasized that “experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the 
physical utility of a mathematical construction.” And some years later, Feynman would begin 
his lectures saying: “the principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test 
of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth’.” 14 So, is that 
“metaphysical” idea, the concept of Nature, totally foreign to this game?
10 pickerinG, A., “living in the Material World,” in GoodinG, d., pinch, t. J. and SchaFFer, S. (eds.), The Uses of 
Experiment, pp. 277-278.
11 Cf. collinS, h. M., Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, passim.
12 Cf. pickerinG, A., The Mangle of Practice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.
13 Cf. hackinG, i., “the Self-Vindication of the laboratory Sciences,” in pickerinG, a. (ed.), Science as Practice and 
Culture, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp. 29-64.
14 Quoted from the famous Franklin, a., Feynman Lectures on Physics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1963, in 
Franklin, A., “Experiment in Physics,” in zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, note 1.
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3. the “exPerImenter’s reGress”
let us come back to Newton’s famous experiments. Contrary to common lore, historians 
have established that his work on the composition of light, and in particular his experimentum 
crucis, were by no means an immediate success. indeed, Schaffer has turned this case into 
another argument for the decisive influence of sociological factors in science’s decision 
making. the experimentum crucis was contested during some fifty years, mainly —but not 
only— due to the difficulty of replicating its quantitative results. 15 A quick reading of the 
controversies suggests that Newton was arguing as follows: “simple” rays of light behaved 
according to his statements, but this could only be detected using “good” prisms, and “good” 
prisms were those which produced “simple” rays.
thus the case is presented as a clear illustration of what Collins has termed the “experimenter’s 
regress,” that menaces the epistemic reliability of experimental results. the experimenter’s 
regress of Collins consists in a vicious circle that stems from severe problems with the replication 
of experiments and the calibration of scientific instruments. the main problem is that correct 
results are only obtained using apparatus that functions properly, while the apparatus is 
functioning properly only if it provides correct results. 16 So in the last analysis the outcomes of 
a scientific controversy do not depend so much on what “Nature” has to “say,” or on any special 
use of methods with some epistemic virtues, but on who is the experimenter in a social position 
of dominance, that enables her or him to determine what is correct and what functions properly. 
Collins offers as prototypical the case of J. Weber’s experiments on gravitational waves, 17 but 
the example of Newton’s experiments, in Schaffer’s interpretation, is by no means worse. in 
this case, Schaffer argues that it was well into the 18th century (around 1715), when Newton 
enjoyed a position of extraordinary influence as President of the Royal Society, that he displayed 
diplomatic activities ending up in the promotion of his scientific views in France. 
i believe that this interpretation is incorrect, which incidentally shows that good history 
of science (such as Schaffer’s) is still not sufficient for an in-depth philosophical analysis. i 
shall now offer my own revision of the case, where the third kind of practices mentioned above 
(practices of communication) plays an important role. 
in good measure, the polemics generated by Newton’s work and his experimentum crucis 
were caused by himself, by what we might call a youthful error in his strategy of argument. 
Retrospectively one can locate the main error, not in anything Newton did while investigating 
the matter, but in the way he wrote his first published paper on natural philosophy. 18 the 
‘error’ was motivated by Newton’s great experience with mathematical texts, and his lack 
of experience in physical controversies. the young Newton believed that he could solve 
the question in great brevity and full precision by writing more geometrico: two carefully 
15 See SchaFFer, S., “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” in GoodinG, d., pinch, t. J. and 
SchaFFer, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, pp. 67-104. 
16 Cf. collinS, h. M., Changing Order, chapters 4 and 5.
17 See collinS, h. M., Changing Order, chapter 4, pp. 79-111, and Franklin, A., “Experiment in Physics,” passim. 
Collins makes a lot of the statement that “there are no formal criteria” that could be applied to decide whether the 
instruments are functioning properly. On this topic, see footnote 4 above.
18 Cf. neWton, i., “A letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, Professor of the Mathematicks in the University of Cambridge; 
Containing his New theory about Light and Colors,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, v. 80, (1672), 
pp. 3075-3087. Available on the web, see www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/prism.php?id=47 (access on November 
2007). Reprinted (among others) as “letter to Mr. Oldenbourg on light and Colours,” in horSley, S. (ed.), Opera Quae 
Extant Omnia, J. Nichols, london, 1779-1785, vol. iV; reprinted by F. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1964.
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planned experimental “demonstrations,” together with a series of definitions and propositions, 
would suffice to convince his readers. (the reader should notice that modern protocols for 
doing and reporting experimental research only consolidated during the 19th century, while 
the millenary Euclidean style of writing mathematics remained paradigmatic for scientists 
throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.)
Newton based all of his argument on two experiments, of which the first was extremely 
rudimentary, even though he offered some variations of the theme (one prism projecting an 
elongated image onto a screen), and the second was quite sophisticated, being offered in a 
single purportedly definitive version. this “experimentum crucis” employed two prisms and 
two screens by means of which a monochrome ray of light was isolated, with results that were 
meant to stamp the key proposition that sunlight consists in a mixture of coloured rays with 
different specific refrangibilities. the famous “crucial experiment” was thus made to support 
all of the weight of proof, single-handedly.
both experiments turned out to be difficult to replicate, again in large measure because of 
their “mathematical” character, i.e., and perhaps surprisingly to the reader, precisely because 
the results were quantitative. the elongated image that Newton obtained in Cambridge was 
a palette of colours (an artificial rainbow) enlarged by a factor of 5, but the Jesuit Antoine 
lucas working in liège only obtained an elongation by a factor of 3. Was this perhaps 
because sunlight is different in both locations? When lucas published his discrepancy in the 
Philosophical Transactions, Newton took it very seriously as an offence to his honesty as a 
gentleman and his reliability as a reporter of observed physical phenomena. the discrepancy 
was relevant in the context of discarding alternative explanations of the result, by an argument 
relying on Snell’s law of refraction. therefore Newton felt an imperious need to attack his 
opponent and annihilate him. Quite unfortunately, it never occurred to him that they could 
be confronting a real problem caused by differences in the nature of the prism’s glass. As the 
crystalline composition of glasses produced in different places and factories differed greatly, 
it was plainly naïve to expect standardized quantitative results as an outcome!
Another source of difficulties was made manifest by a highly reputed French experimenter, 
Edme Mariotte, founding member of the Académie des Sciences. Around 1680, Mariotte 
set out to reproduce the supposedly “crucial” experimentum crucis, finding results that he 
interpreted to contradict and even refute Newton. having isolated a “simple” violet beam of 
light, he obtained after the second refraction tones of red and yellow colouring both ends of 
the violet image. 19 What the English was inclined to consider an understandable imperfection 
of the experimental setting, was interpreted by his much more empiricistic colleague as a very 
clear contrary result, a vindication of the old theory of the modification of light by the prism 
(that Newton was intent on refuting). it was “evident” that in this experiment a ray of light 
of the kind that Newton called “simple” had been modified or shown to be complex. Given 
Mariotte’s deserved reputation as an experimenter, this episode brought as a result a very long 
delay —almost 40 years— for the acceptance of Newton’s theory in France and other places.
this time the discrepancy between both actors can be located in their instrumental and 
phenomenic models, or more precisely in what we may term —following hempel— the 
19 See Guerlac, h., Newton on the Continent, Cornell University Press, ithaca, 1981, pp. 98-99. Mariotte’s work 
appeared as a book: Mariotte, E., De la nature des couleurs, Estienne Michallet, Paris, 1681; which can also be found 
in his Oeuvres, vol. 1, Pierre Vander, leiden, 1717.
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“bridge principles” necessary for Newton’s interpretation of the results. their discrepancy 
measures the conceptual distance between the simple ray promoted in geometrical optics, 
hence in Newton’s models, and the concrete beam of light that the experimenter was able to 
isolate. in a sense, the epistemic character of modern science was at stake: whether it was to 
be crudely empirical, based directly upon the observed in the style of Mariotte, or inextricably 
linked with mathematical idealisations, as Newton advocated. in the latter’s opinion, the study 
of Nature had to be mathematical, and the narrowest beam obtained by an experimenter was, 
self-evidently, very far from the “simple” ray in the model. the corresponding adjustments 
were more than enough to explain away Mariotte’s observations.
Such incidents show the enormous difficulties encountered by scientific research in its 
infancy, and make us wonder how it was possible to obtain any clear advances given all the 
material and technical difficulties: inexistence of standardized instruments, lack of experimental 
protocols, unreliability of the practical and intellectual training on the side of the savants. little 
wonder that, if you wish to look for rhetorical elements in writings and letters from the time, you 
will find plenty of material that can be used for the conclusion that Collins’ regress was fully 
in action, that the dispute was impossible to close except by an appeal to politico-diplomatic 
operations. A clear example of social construction and negotiation, it seems. 
4. COmPlICatIOns In the dynamICs Of exPerIment
is that really so? Were there elements that made it possible to break the vicious circle of 
Collins and Schaffer? i believe the answer is yes. in the present case, those elements were 
elaborated by Newton himself in the initial researches during the period 1666-1670, and were 
presented to the public mainly in the Opticks of 1704. let me argue the case.
the two polemics mentioned above indicate two important aspects of the complex 
dynamics of experimentation. First, experiments are dependent on technics, 20 so that it has 
often happened like in Newton’s case: it is impossible to strengthen the experimental results 
without a simultaneous advancement of technics, and this complicates experimental work 
enormously. Knowing the composition of light made it necessary to learn about glass, its 
composition, and the techniques for its production. Without this process of refinement of glass 
production techniques, the later development of spectrography would have been impossible. 21 
And of course, the process could not be completed quickly, but required many years. We have 
seen how this created considerable difficulties for the early attempts at quantification. And 
yet, all that is not sufficient to produce a vicious circle.
Second, we have encountered complications linked with the models employed (models of 
the experimental design and of the phenomena), and very especially difficulties linked with 
the “bridge principles,” relating to the kind of theoretical development that was sought. Such 
problems could not be avoided, even with Newton’s special effort to employ instrumental and 
phenomenic models that remained neutral between the theories in confrontation. Newton’s 
idea was to force his results upon all parts, and so it happened with those who were favourable 
20 i employ this uncommon term in order to try to capture the Spanish distinction between technology (a sophisticated 
form of technical development, dependent upon science) and the more primitive and basic “technics” (in my language, 
respectively, Tecnología and Técnica).
21 On this topic, see e.g., McGucken, W., Nineteenth Century Spectroscopy, Johns hopkins University Press, 
baltimore, MD, 1969, and SÁnchez ron, J. M., Historia de la Física Cuántica, Crítica, barcelona, 2001.
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to mathematisation, to an alignment between physical optics and the other mathematical 
sciences. but these were not “all” parties. 
looking at the long duration, modern science has sided with Newton, with the option to go 
“beyond the appearances;” it has made a bet for mathematised theories. by contrast, Mariotte’s 
case is reminiscent of the later criticisms of Goethe against the theory of colours: An option 
for the empirical and the visible, sometimes based on (geometrically) very poor arguments, 
but sometimes offering an intelligent critique of insistence on the idea that Natura has an 
interior and an exterior, an apparent shell hiding a real content. Such insistence, however, 
triumphed due to the predictive efficiency of the models that were based on it, their high level 
of empirical adequacy, the considerable explanatory abilities shown, and not least their very 
important technological applications. 22
but there are more aspects to be considered. third, and already suggested, is the idea that 
the qualitative aspects of a series of experiments can be crucial. Experimental complexities 
have the effect that sometimes the attempt to quantify may be premature, as happened with 
Newton’s experiments around 1670. this idea runs against the image of experimentation 
created in the 19th century, which depicts it mainly as quantification. the truth is that 
experiments always have an important qualitative component, which can be decisive not only 
in favouring some theory against some other, but also in supporting a certain interpretation 
of the experimental results themselves. 23 Qualitative aspects of experimentation are a crucial 
theme for some recent authors like F. Steinle. 24
And fourth, a central aspect of experimental research, which was severely misrepresented 
by the inherited conceptions (here theoreticism was quite efficient in biasing and distorting): it 
is absolutely essential to take into account that data are not obtained automatically, instantly, or 
transparently. i believe one must speak about processes of data formation; one has to emphasize 
that experimental research must be analysed in terms of series of experiments. Examples can be 
multiplied at will, and although i shall continue focusing my discussion on the case of Newton, let 
me mention that of Pieter Zeeman and the celebrated effect he discovered in 1896 (the influence 
of magnetic fields on spectral lines, splitting them). A first successful experiment was far from 
convincing him, and he proceeded to make some others with the aim to control some variables 
(density, temperature, distribution of the substance emitting the radiation) that could conceivably 
affect the outcome. (Conceivably, that is, according to what theory suggested, or sometimes 
according to what analogies with other experiments suggested.) Zeeman wrote the following 
sentence, which clearly suggests the topic of series of experiments as the source of data:
“the different experiments … make it more and more probable that the absorption —and 
hence also the emission— lines of an incandescent vapour are widened by the action of 
magnetism.” 25
22 Nevertheless, sometimes one may be inclined to think that the search for the simple ultimate element (that holy 
grail of physicists) could be illusory, the product of an erroneous approach.
23 this question was raised already in kuhn, th. S., “the Function of Measurement in Modern Physics,” Isis, v. 52, 
n. 2, (1961), pp. 161-193. Reprinted in kuhn, th. S., The Essential Tension, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1977, ch. Viii, pp. 178-224. A very interesting paper that unfortunately founds no continuation in his work.
24 See, e.g., Steinle, F., “Challenging Established Concepts: Ampère and Exploratory Experimentation,” Theoria, 
v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 291-316.
25 Pieter Zeeman in October 1896, quoted by araBatziS, t., Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to 
Theoretical Entities, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006, p. 176. On this topic see also BuchWald, J. z. and 
WarWick, a. (eds.), Histories of the Electron: The Birth of Microphysics, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
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incidentally, Zeeman’s early experiments were rather exploratory, guided by vague 
considerations about the possibility of an interrelation, but later his research was guided by 
lorentz’s theory that spectral lines are caused by the vibration of atoms, and at the same time 
his experiments brought important modifications and refinements into this theory. 26
to come back to Newton, the point i want to make is that his practice of argumentation 
differed from the practice of his experimental researches. As we saw above, his publication of 
1672 was a clear bet for “decisive” experiments, carefully selected to support central elements 
of the theory; in this case, the experimentum crucis. in the midst of polemics, in 1776, he 
wrote: “For it is not the number of Exp[erimen]ts, but their weight that has to be considered; 
and when one may serve, what need is there of many?” 27 
With such rhetoric he was trying to stop his opponents from trying new designs of their 
own invention, and restrict their attention exclusively to the experimentum crucis with two 
prisms. but his own practice in the 1660s had tended to multiply trials, exploring different 
designs and possible influences, trying to control alternatives and variables. 28 it had been a 
long series of experiments, widely varied, which in my view reinforces the idea that it is never 
the single isolated experiment, but a whole experimental series, in its complexity, what counts 
when it comes to establishing experimental results. 
Newton himself seems to have learnt the lesson well through the polemics of the 1670s, 
which he experienced as such an unpleasant thing. this may well be why the Opticks of 1704 
is actually more similar to the university lectures of 1670-72 than to the famous paper, as 
far as the number and variety of experiments goes. While in the paper (Newton’s letter to 
Oldenbourg, 1672) there was an attempt to base the key proposition —that sunlight consists 
in a mixture of rays of different refrangibilities— upon just one experiment, in the Opticks 
this is presented as a conclusion after 10 different experiments. 29 it was not only Newton 
in the 1660s, but the whole scientific community of his time, that needed a wide variety 
of experiments before the “data” concerning refrangibilities of the different rays could be 
accepted. this is no exception, but rather the rule, and that is why i have been talking about 
series of experiments and processes of data formation.
Newton’s liking for simple and “crucial” experiments (which was truly mathematical 
and very little baconian) had its repercussion in later times, a long history. there emerged a 
tradition that counted some inheritors well into the 19th century, for instance, A. M. Ampère 
and W. Weber. but the tradition subsequently vanished. here it is relevant that the 19th century 
was the time when experimental protocols were standardized and refined. 
26 the intriguing predictions of lorentz’s theory of “ions” turned out to be correct, but the measurements of the ratio 
e/m showed that the intervening particles were much smaller than those in electrolysis, they had to be sub-atomical 
—and thus the “ions” became “electrons.” See araBatziS, t., Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to 
Theoretical Entities, ch. 4: “the birth and infancy of the Representation of the Electron,” pp. 70-111.
27 Cited in Guerlac, h., Newton on the Continent, p. 94.
28 the available information is broad and of high quality, because both Newton’s notebooks and his university 
lectures of 1670-1672 are available. A brief and precise summary can be found in the excellent work of WeStFall, R., 
Never at Rest: A biography of Isaac Newton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 156-175, 211-222, 
and 237-252.
29 Compare the exposition in neWton, i., “A letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, … Containing his New theory about Light 
and Colors,” with that found in his Opticks, S. Smith and b. Walford, london, 1704, Prop. ii, theor. ii, pp. 18-44.
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5. frOm the “CIrCle” tO the helIx Of exPerImental researCh 
to the question whether there existed elements that could break the vicious circle of Collins 
and Schaffer, i have answered yes. let me make it even more explicit.
the circle is broken, and turned into a helix, mainly in two ways. First, strengthening the 
reliability of the experimental results according to criteria that are properly experimental, i.e., 
characteristic of experimental activity (and not of the theoretical ‘phase’). And second, by 
Newton’s insistence on the idea that one had to be careful with the notion of a “simple” ray. 
let us consider both aspects in some detail.
here is a concrete example of the characteristic criteria of experimental practice at work. in 
order to show that the prisms did not modify visible light, but merely decomposed or analysed 
it, Newton performed a diversity of experiments: One employing two prisms juxtaposed in 
opposite senses; another with three prisms that projected their spectra against the same screen, 
in such a combination as to recover white light; a third with a prism followed by a lens that 
made the rays converge. 
in the series formed by all these experiments performed by Newton around 1670 or earlier, 
we find at work two of the key elements that hacking and Franklin have isolated as properly 
experimental criteria. (For this question of properly experimental criteria, one should see 
the pioneering work of hacking and also Franklin’s discussion of experimental strategies.) 30 
Above all, there is a convergence of results obtained in three different ways, by distinct 
material procedures. And there is also a good measure of control over the interventions, 
which is obtained through planning based on the phenomenic and instrumental models that 
are employed. Such interventions can be guided by theories as in this case (guided ultimately 
by the clever use and application of principles of geometrical optics) but in other cases they can 
be much more exploratory in character, or they can even be suggested by mere analogy.
Notice also that the results of those three experiments, being qualitative and not quantitative, 
can be reproduced without the problems created by the different dispersive powers of the prisms 
(due to the kind of glass employed), and so many of the difficulties derived from lack of technical 
knowledge disappear. Newton employed also prisms filled with water in an attempt to reduce the 
doubts caused by difficulties in the precise replication of his quantitative results.
the second element that Newton employed in order to break the circle was his insistence 
on the idea that one had to be careful with the notion of a “simple” ray. he repeated it time 
and again, but the point was not (as Schaffer wants to picture it) 31 that only Cambridge prisms 
produced simple rays —it was that neither those nor the ones in Paris or liège produced them. 
the point is merely to insist upon the difference between the simple ray of the mathematical 
model, a geometric line, and the experiment’s beam, something that can only be more or less 
coarse. if Mariotte did not understand or want to concede the point, it was because he rejected 
the use of mathematical models of the phenomena, in favour of crude empiricism. And there 
is, of course, evidence that other scientists accepted Newton’s proposal of geometrical models, 
30 Cf. hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, and Franklin, A., 
“Experiment in Physics,” passim. in my view, Franklin does not insist sufficiently on distinguishing what belongs 
to verbal argument from what constitutes cognitive factors that are characteristic of experimental research. See the 
comments in FerreiróS, J. and ordóñez, J., “hacia una Filosofía de la experimentación,” pp. 47-86.
31 Cf. SchaFFer, S., “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” pp. 67-104.
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if only tentatively in view of their predictive success, and that the scientific community at 
large ended up favouring such models wholeheartedly. 32
in that way, the circle did not come back onto itself, but rather —to exploit the geometric 
metaphor— it “regressed” on a slightly higher plane, forming a helix. A helicoid can seem a 
circle to us, when we look upon it from a certain biased angle, as our sociologists often do. but 
while circles are fundamentally retrograde, bringing us back to the same point time and again, 
helices progress by ascending from plane to plane. (Concerning the progressive connotations 
of this “helical” metaphor of scientific research, let me just say that my discussion concerns 
only local behaviour, and does not predetermine what may happen more globally in the 
development of a scientific discipline.)
6. COnCludInG remarks 
Despite all that has been said in the past, experimentation enjoys relative autonomy with 
respect to theory formation. i have been emphasizing that both are interacting ‘phases’ within 
the cognitive activity of scientists, and no one reigns above the other. Experiment brings into 
play epistemic or cognitive factors that are distinctive and characteristic. these are features 
that cannot be reduced to formal criteria, except of course in the way in which the flight of 
a bird can be captured by a mathematical model. (Notice that “reduced” is not the adequate 
word, just like a “logicistic” insistence on basing everything upon explicit formal criteria 
can only impoverish the account and make it unable to deal with the richness of scientific 
activity.) One has to underscore that the “measures” of experimental validity or reliability are 
(in part) intrinsic to this kind of practice, and in this sense autonomous. the dynamics of the 
experimental phase is (partially) determined by its own peculiar restrictions. 
i hasten to add that the dynamics of the theoretical phase is, in my opinion, also (in part) 
determined by its own peculiar restrictions. here and at this crude level of analysis, there 
is no asymmetry between them. but if that analysis is correct, one has to conclude that 
experimental and theoretical practices complement and enrich each other. As emphasized 
at the start of this paper, there is not scientific practice in the singular, but a plurality of 
coexisting practices, and the crux of the analysis has to do with their heterogeneous cognitive 
roots and their complex interactions. 33
the aforementioned complementarity is likely to be the main source of the epistemic 
strength showed by scientific knowledge, and a clear reason why science is different from 
philosophy or religion. One has to conclude, furthermore, that a conception of the philosophy 
of science which self-imposes limitations on its methods, such that it can only analyse correctly 
scientific theories (such was the effect, e.g., of the linguistic turn), makes it ipso facto unable 
to account for the epistemic richness of scientific knowledge. here lies the source of that 
solidarity between “logicism” and sociologism which was mentioned at the start (footnote 4). 
From what has been said above, it is easy to extract examples of intrinsic characteristics of 
the experimental phase: such are the above-mentioned criterion of convergence between results 
or representations with diverse procedural and instrumental origins, or the heavy dependence of 
32 None of my remarks is meant to deny that the process was long, winded, and far from straightforward.
33 Some interesting proposals concerning the role of models as “mediators” between theories and data can be found 
in the compilation MorGan, M. S. and MorriSon, M. (eds.), Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social 
Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 
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experimentation upon instruments and technical practices (from Gilbert and Galilei until today, 
there is scarcely one experimental or observational datum of interest that does not depend on 
instrumentation). A third example, not mentioned before, is what might be called in somewhat 
naïve language “objective features” of some data or results, like regularities in observed 
movements (such as in Galilei’s observations of Jupiter’s moons), or evidence for entities with 
constant properties (as in the work of thomson and Zeeman on the electron). 
At the beginning i stated that calling for a philosophy of science that is able to analyse the 
experimental phase complicates matters for the philosopher, since it forces her to broaden the 
panoply of tools. Fine analysis of the factors that enter into experimental activity should include 
questions belonging to the cognitive sciences, with a strong basis on biology and physics, and 
it should also include the analysis of instrumental or technical practices. Experimentation is 
not a simple matter of observation, for it sets into play many diverse processes of manipulation 
and perception. (Notice that perception, a high-level cognitive process, must be neatly 
distinguished from the mere sensorial stimulation that was so dear to Quine.) it involves 
mechanisms of motor control, attention, perception, memory, language, etcetera, in short: the 
whole gamut of cognitive processes studied by psychology and neuroscience, and more.
this viewpoint does not seem to be accepted by many partisans of social studies, such as 
Pickering, who regards the three main structural ingredients of experiment —material procedure, 
instrumental model, phenomenic model; see sect. 2 above— as comparable elements, which can 
be treated as if they had very similar levels of material and cognitive complexity. 34 Pickering 
defends that, starting from a situation of disparity and disunion, the scientist modifies those 
ingredients in search of compatibility and stability, and that such a process can be adequately 
understood from the assumption that all of them are eminently plastic resources. Among the 
factors that condition the process of interactive stabilisation of these resources, there are according 
to Pickering “material resistances,” but also all kinds of limitations to which theoretical work can 
be subject, many of them arbitrary, and also, quite naturally, all kinds of sociological factors.
Once again we find the old temptation to which philosophy has yielded so often, the 
wish to solve everything too quickly, simplifying too much, relying on an impoverishing 
analysis, as if that should not put the main goal in jeopardy. Pickering’s resulting scheme is too 
“philosophical,” to use this adjective in its negative connotations. he esteems too highly our 
creative, modifying abilities, the margin of freedom that is open to our elaboration of artificial 
universes. in my opinion, the point is simply that the three ingredients mentioned above are 
not homogeneous —not by far. the material procedures and their operations are of far greater 
complexity than the models, and their complexity keeps defying our analytical abilities.
it is quite easy to say “material procedure,” but think of some particular case, such as the 
prism experiments that we have mentioned repeatedly, or even more the experiments with tubes 
of cathode rays, electromagnetic plates, and substances like sodium or lithium, performed 
by Zeeman and thomson. to analyse all the cognitive and biological, technical and physical 
processes that took place in any of these cases (both what concerns the apparatus and samples, 
and what relates to the experimenters) is a task of enormous, indeed forbidding complexity. to 
hide this high complexity, which calls for analyses of both technics and cognitive processes, is a 
way of falling into simplifications as abusive as those of old theoreticism. 
34 Cf. pickerinG, A. “living in the Material World,” pp. 275-298, and pickerinG, A., The Mangle of Practice, 
pp. 21-26, and 144-147.
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the above comments may suffice to underscore once again what is specific and 
characteristic of a philosophy of experimentation. but i would not like to finish without 
making a new effort to eliminate one possible misunderstanding, and so i add a word about the 
intervention of theories in experiment. the thesis of a relative autonomy of experimentation 
is not a thesis against all forms of determination of experiment by theory: Certainly the 
celebrated thesis of “theory-ladenness,” as usually presented, is very biased and incomplete, 
but the point is no to deny it outright. theories and research frames do play an important role 
as guides of experimental research. As so many authors have emphasized, the elaboration 
of experimental results is too complex to be possible without the aid of maps and drafts that 
help to organize and simplify the work, as unilaterally as it may be. Which, however, does not 
turn theory into the queen of scientific activity. it is, therefore, fitting to conclude bringing to 
mind the general principle (which i have proposed as an elaboration on the old description of 
science as “experimental philosophy”) that science is both philosophy and technics, a hybrid 
of theorisation and experimentation, which could not survive without the richness conferred 
upon it by the mestizo interaction of both dimensions.
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dImensIOns Of ClInICal OBserVatIOn In the OrIGIns  
Of sCIentIfIC medICIne  
José a. lópez cerezo
the history of medicine constitutes a documental source of great interest to the philosophy of 
science, one which, regrettably, has not received the attention comparably shown to that of other 
fields of science. One of the most exciting periods of this history was the anatomical-pathological 
revolution at the beginning of the 19th century, which many authors have generally established 
as the origin of both clinical and scientific medicine. Numerous historians have classified this 
period involving conceptual, organizational and technical innovations as a Kuhnian revolution; 
whatever the case may be, it warrants philosophical study in order to gain a better understanding 
of the historical episode and of the analytical instruments of philosophy itself.
Specifically, this contribution essays some of the main contextual, instrumental and 
conceptual determinants in the production and interpretation of clinical observation during 
the first decades of the anatomical-pathological revolution, focusing on the work of René 
laennec and his invention of the first of the major medical instruments: the stethoscope. the 
theoretical framework adopted corresponds to the naturalistic conception of the philosophy of 
science, as found in the approaches of authors such as h. longino, i. hacking, M. Solomon or 
P. thagard. it is from this approach that some interesting theses of contemporary philosophy 
of science are tested, such as the theoretical character of observation and experimenter’s 
regress, and the main dimensions of the aforementioned revolution in medicine are analysed. 
to conclude, it is argued that a close interdependence existed between epistemic and non-
epistemic elements throughout the development of a new nosological foundation for modern 
medicine at the beginning of the 19th century, that is to say, in the ways of producing and 
interpreting clinical information in the origins of present-day medicine.
1. InVentIOn and uses Of the stethOsCOPe
One of the most representative authors in medicine at the start of the 19th century was 
the French physician, René laennec (1781-1826). trained as a surgeon, this fervent Catholic 
counterrevolutionary acquired extensive knowledge of pathological anatomy in the hôpital 
Necker and hôpital de la Charité, both in Paris. During the second decade of the 19th century, 
laennec was especially interested in practical clinical diagnostics. he had three objectives in 
this respect: (a) to locate the pathological physical traits in the corpse which characterize the 
affected organ; (b) to recognize said traits in living patients from positive signs, separating the 
1  Project FFi2008-06054 (Ministry of Science and innovation of Spain) provided support for the development of this 
study. i also wish to express my gratitude to R. Mallet and the Direction des Services et des Réseaux of the National 
library of France, as well as to Paul barnes for the English version.
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accompanying symptoms; and (c) to fight disease by using the experience which had proven 
to be effective. 2
the main contribution for which laennec is known in the history of medicine is the second 
of these objectives and, particularly, for the invention of the stethoscope in 1816. the history 
of this scientific instrument and its uses will be useful to understand the way in which disease 
was conceptualised at the outset of scientific medicine, 3 as well as the value of instrumentation 
and disciplinary standards in clinical observation during the period in question.
it is interesting to recall the circumstances of his invention. laennec found himself at the time 
examining a young woman with general symptoms of heart disease at hôpital Necker in Paris, 
where he had been named clinical chief that same year. 4 he tried using the usual techniques of 
the time: he started by applying his hand and using percussion, but with little result due to the 
patient’s obesity; he then considered auscultation (placing an ear on the patient’s chest to listen 
to the heartbeats), but the patient’s age and sex made him desist. 5 then, remembering a common 
acoustic phenomenon, he rolled up a quire of paper into a tube and placed one end on the patient’s 
chest and the other to his ear. What he heard were clear, distinct sounds coming from inside the 
body. “it occurred to me,” he later wrote about his invention, “that that circumstance could be 
a useful, applicable method not only for the study of sounds made by the heart, but also for all 
the movements which can produce sound within the chest.” 6 laennec subsequently improved 
his invention, testing different types of apparatus, with diverse lengths, widths and thicknesses. 
Finally, he decided on a hollow wooden cylinder about 30 cm. long, with two adjustable parts 
on either end. he called this instrument simply “cylinder” (cylindre), later using the name of 
“stethoscope” (stéthoscope), from the Greek for “chest” and “examine.”
laennec made his results public in his De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique 
des poumons et du coeur, published in 1819, in which, as in other parts of his works, he attempted 
to make clinical practice more rigorous by basing it on the natural sciences. 7 the book, which 
was sold together with the new instrument, was well-received from the moment it was published. 8 
besides the actual mediate, or indirect, auscultation technique, 9 laennec accurately described 
2  See laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, brosson et 
Chaudé, Paris, 1819, especially the Préface, pp. xViii-xxVi.
3  See SchaFFner, k. F., Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1993, especially ch. 3, pp. 64-99 and 119-128, for an extensive discussion of the habitual nature of scientific theories in 
biology and medicine.
4  in the times of laennec, this hospital was one of the smallest in Paris, with only some 100 beds. it was situated in 
the Sèvres neighbourhood, in the outskirts of the city. Patients in this hospital suffered predominantly from pulmonary 
ailments, which were precisely laennec’s primary object of study. the centralized hospital administration of Paris 
made this concentration possible. Cf. ForBeS, J., “translator’s Preface,” in laennec, r. t. h., A Treatise on the Diseases 
of the Chest, ed. by John Forbes, Underwood, london, 1821, pp. viii-ix.
5  these were the usual techniques, although, as one physician of the age admitted, they then lacked any rules or 
principles —portal, A., Mémoires sur la nature et le traitement de plusieurs maladies, bertrand, Paris, 1800, p. 178. 
Quoted in Birtalan, G., “laennec and Skoda, Classics of internal Diagnostics,” Communicationes de Historia Artis 
Medicinae, n. 97-99, (1982), pp. 33-34.
6  laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, p. 8.
7  See Birtalan, G., “laennec and Skoda, Classics of internal Diagnostics,” pp. 33-41.
8  See kervran, r., Laennec: His Life and Times, Pergamon, New york, 1960, p. 153.
9  laennec took the term “auscultation” from Régis buisson, who, in 1802, introduced the distinction between 
two methods of listening: a passive way called “audition” and an active way called “auscultation.” Cf. lachMund, J., 
“Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century French and German 
Medicine,” Science, Technology and Human Values, v. 24, n. 4, (1999), p. 443. the technique of auscultation was an 
invention of leopold Avenbrugger, a Viennese physician who published his technique in a 1760 book which received 
no acclaim at the time. Cf. kervran, r., Laennec: His Life and Times, p. 133.
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diverse thoracic affections and offered new clinical-pathological analyses of bronchial ailments 
such as emphysema, pulmonary oedema and pneumonia. likewise, he applied the stethoscope to 
the diagnosis of fractures, hepatic abscesses and ear affections, although his greatest contribution 
was in the area of thoracic diseases, most especially, his study of pulmonary tuberculosis.
tuberculosis was responsible for a high percentage of deaths in 19th-century Europe, as 
in the preceeding centuries. today it is known to be caused by the bacillus Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis, which is airborne-transmitted, usually attacking the lungs first. in the days of 
laennec, pulmonary tuberculosis was known as phthisis or consumption, as the disease 
consumed its victims little by little until they finally died. As opposed to his contemporaries, 
laennec defended the specificity of tuberculous lesions and the possibility of spontaneous cure 
in certain cases. Relying on auscultatory exploration, 10 he painstakingly described the different 
forms of tuberculosis and their corresponding lesions, while introducing order into the chaotic 
pulmonary pathology of the age, as well as hygiene and decorum in medical practice. 11 
2. dIsease thrOuGh the stethOsCOPe
in order to appreciate the theoretical potentiality of the new instrument with respect to the 
understanding of disease, it is worth briefly considering a line of work within the modern naturalist 
school of philosophy of science: the study of the practical dimension of science, in authors such 
as R. Ackermann, A. Franklin, i. hacking and A. Pickering. For example, in the terminology 
of Ackermann, 12 diverse components in science can be characterised when approached as an 
activity: (i) the material resources of the apparatus and the experimental configuration in which 
the phenomenon to be studied is registered through data (data and instruments); (ii) the conceptual 
resources which explain the functioning of the material resources (the theory of the apparatus 
which justifies its reliability); and (iii) the theoretical model or set of models which account for 
the phenomenon (the theory of the phenomena). As hacking in turn states, in accord with other 
authors who adopt this position, 13 the maturation of a scientific theory consists precisely in the 
mutual adjustment of these types of elements (data, equipment, theories) until stabilizing in a 
10 i am following common trends in philosophical literature by differentiating “observation” from “experimentation,” 
and both of these from “exploration,” as basic data production procedures in science. to start, the general term, 
“observation,” as, for example, auscultation reveals, may refer to perception of a non-visual nature. As opposed 
to “observation,” “exploration” implies a certain intervention in the phenomenon under study (as a physician does 
when performing an autopsy or a geologist, when obtaining a sample of the ground). “Experimentation,” in turn, 
implies a systematic manipulation of the phenomenon to study a certain relation among variables and to test the 
null hypothesis. See, e.g., harré, r., Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty Experiments that Changed Our View of 
the World, Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1981. Spanish translation by luis bou: Grandes experimentos científicos, labor, 
barcelona, 1986, pp. 14-16.
11 in his Laennec: His Life and Times, p. 138, R. Kervran describes the state of chaos in which pulmonary pathology 
was then immersed. For example, in 1817, lung cancer, lung abscesses and bronchial emphysema were commonly 
confused with varieties of tuberculosis. this same book (e.g., pp. 134, 148) also emphasizes the importance which the 
considerations regarding hygiene, convenience and decency had in the invention and diffusion of the instrument.
12 ackerMann, r. J., “Allan Franklin, Right or Wrong,” in A. Fine, A., ForBeS, M. and WeSSelS, l. (eds.), PSA 1990, 
vol. 2. Proceedings of the 1990 Biennial Meeting of the PSA, Philosophy of Science Association, East lansing, Mi, 
1991, pp. 455-457.
13 See, e.g., hackinG, i., “the Self-Vindication of the laboratory Studies,” in pickerinG, a. (ed.), Science as Practice 
and Culture, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp. 29-64. Andrew Pickering, for example, likewise 
explains to this effect in his particular historicist elaboration of the actor-network theory. For this author, scientific 
practice consists in the reciprocal “tuning” of human agency (scientists) and material agency (apparatus and phenomena). 
this process constitutes a “dialectic of resistance and accommodation,” guided by interests and objectives which are 
continually being revised and modified parallel to interaction with material agency. See pickerinG, a., The Mangle of 
Practice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.
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“symbiotic system” of mutual interdependence, in this case, a symbiotic system which, as will 
later be seen, was also to require in the case in hand a receptive social and professional context 
to achieve its consolidation.
As to our own case study, the data logically corresponds to the results of clinical observation, 
aided by the exploratory use of autopsy, as the basic technique, and the stethoscope, as the 
instrument. the theory of the apparatus is the theory of physics regarding the production, 
transmission and reception of sound waves, that is to say, acoustics. the theory of the phenomena 
consists of the explanation for said phenomenon from the perspective of pathological anatomy; 
for example, when explaining tuberculosis in terms of the presence of tubercles in the lungs (the 
anatomical lesion) and associating these with a temporally-ordered set of characteristic symptoms 
(fever, etc.) and, especially, with certain sonorous signs detectable by mediate auscultation. 14
thus, the stethoscope became a useful clinical instrument due to the possibility of relating 
two series of phenomena: on the one hand, the characteristic anatomical lesions of the different 
cardiac and pulmonary diseases and, on the other hand, the corresponding auscultory sounds. 
in fact, laennec’s work was guided by the heuristic principle of “one sign-one lesion.” in 
order to link both sets of phenomena, he devoted himself to the painstaking empirical task 
of compiling and clarifying the extraordinary number of sounds which may be heard when 
auscultating the human thorax, reducing multiform sounds to their sonorous elements and 
relating these to elemental anatomical lesions. the proper use of the apparatus thus made 
linking lesions and signs possible, giving it a diagnostic and prognostic value, and guaranteeing 
its good performance through autopsies —“convincing us through our eyes of the accuracy of 
the signs which our hearing gives us.” 15
in short, for laennec, alterations in the organs which appear as anatomical lesions are the 
physical expression of disease understood as function disorder, and auscultatory sounds are 
the manifestation of these alterations. the result of this sign-lesion correlation was, in the 
words of lópez Piñero,
 “the set of auscultatory sounds which, with practically no modification, continues to form 
part of current semiology: the vesicular, bronchial, cavernous and metallic breath sounds, 
bronchophony, pectoriloquy and egophony, the different crackles and wheezes (crackling, 
bubbling, sibilant, ronchus, etc.), amphoric buzzing, metallic tinkling, friction rub, cardiac click, 
diastolic and systolic sounds, diverse heart murmurs, crackles, thrills, etc.” 16
After laennec’s contribution, tuberculosis was “unified” so that phthisis or consumption, 
on the one hand, and the anatomical presence of tubercles, on the other, were associated as two 
aspects of one and the same disease. 17
For laennec, the reliability of auscultatory signs depended on two independent qualities: 
specificity and sensitivity. A sign is specific if it is invariably associated with one, and only 
one, type of lesion, in such a way that one cannot be present without the other. A hardly-
specific sign produces false-positives (incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis), 18 which 
14 See the difference between “symptoms” and “signs” discussed later.
15 laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, p. 14.
16 lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, Nexos, barcelona, 1985, pp. 37-38.
17 See duFFin, J., To See with a Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
1998, pp. 156-157.
18 A false-positive is a type-i error, which consists in incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesis which 
states that there is no relation between two variables. A false-negative is a type-ii error, which consists in incorrectly 
accepting the null hypothesis.
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laennec personally abhorred. A sign is sensitive if it is always present and is detectable when 
a lesion is produced, no matter how weak this may be. lack of sensitivity produces false-
negatives, which laennec considered more tolerable than false-positives. 19 As Jacalyn Duffin 
states, laennec’s signs were little theories about the condition of his patients; they were more 
than sounds, “they incorporated visualization, imagination, calculation, and theory.” 20
A close association thus seems to emerge among the observational base, data from the 
auscultatory exploration, and the theoretical framework characteristic of pathological 
anatomy, generating what, in more classical philosophical terms (e.g., Feyerabend), could be 
called a bi-directional flow of meaning. it is a result which contradicts the traditional uses of 
the philosophical argument of the theoretical burden of observation, where said “burden” is 
conceived as an obstacle to evaluation and objectivity. 21 
in contrast to this approach, and more in congruence with the case under study, a new 
understanding of the active role of scientific observation, as well as a restating of the theoretical 
character of observation (and, in general, perception), tends to be favoured by the study of 
science-as-practice. More than limiting and relativizing, this theoretical character tends to be 
emphasized as a possibilizing element, as a guarentee of legitimate experimental evidence 
with respect to real-world structures. 22 in fact, the theoricity of observational data ceases to 
suppose an undermining of scientific objectivity when the base of science is no longer identified 
with elusive autonomous facts or neutral data, but rather, to the contrary, with exploratory 
or experimental constructs (mediatized by equipment or instruments and, in that sense, by 
anatomical, electromagnetic, optical, etc., theories) produced in laboratories or dissection halls, 
whether these constructs be populations of Drosophila or lung tissue from corpses. 23 
Furthermore, if the possibility of testing the reliability of these instruments through techniques 
such as calibration (for example, via immediate auscultation) is taken into account, then both 
“theoretical burden” of perception and robust and sound empirical evidence may be achieved. 24 
laennec himself insisted on the need to compare the data from stethoscopic exploration with that 
obtained by other exploratory techniques, such as immediate auscultation or percussion, in order 
to lend robustness to the results. 25
19 laennec was, however, aware of the fact that a serious disease might lack an evident or symptomatically-manifested 
organic lesion. Moreover, although he was reticent in the beginning, due to his “one sign-one lesion” principle, he 
finally accepted the possibility that a given abnormal sound might be caused by more than one type of organic lesion 
(although within a limited range). See duFFin, J., To See with a Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, pp. 173 and 202.
20 duFFin, J., To See with a Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, pp. 201-202.
21 i am referring to the well-known philosophical argument which states that all perception is filtered through some 
theoretical framework: what we see or perceive depends as much on impressions of the senses as on previous knowledge, 
expectations, prejudices and the general internal state of the observer. thus, in this interpretation of the argument, 
characteristic of the so-called “anti-positivist reaction” of the 1960s, there is no neutral observational base which allows 
comparing incompatible rival theories or speaking of an accumulative growth in science.
22 in the French tradition of G. bachelard, taken up again, for example, by M. Callon, closer to the spirit of Kant than 
is the English-speaking tradition of N. R. hanson. See rothBart, d. and Slayden, S. W., “the Epistemology of a 
Spectometer,” Philosophy of Science, v. 61, n. 1 (1994), pp. 25-38.
23 One of the pioneers of laboratory medicine and continuator of the anatomical-pathological tradition, Rudolph 
Virchow expresses an analogous idea in few words: “bare facts are doubtful weapons.” See virchoW, r., Disease, Life, 
and Man: Selected Essays by Rudolf Virchow, edition and translation by lelland J. Rather, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1958 (the original texts are from 1847-1898). 
24 Cf. WiMSatt, W. c., “Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination,” in BreWer, M. B. and collinS, B. e. (eds.), 
Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences: A Volume in Honor of Donald T. Campbell, Jossey-bass, San Francisco, 1981, 
pp. 124-163.
25 Cf. laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, p. 13.
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Contrary to audition (passive perception, listening) and immediate auscultation (active 
perception), stethoscopic auscultation is an active, instrumentally mediatized way of 
producing clinical data. Even with the simplest percussion, as laín Entralgo points out, “the 
clinician intervenes in the semiological description and, to a certain extent, shapes it with his 
intervention.” 26 in the case at hand, auscultatory data proceeding from exploration is the basis 
of the theory of the phenomenon, and is supported by the corresponding theory of the apparatus 
—a theory independent of the theory of the phenomenon. in this regard, this case does not 
appear to exemplify the well-known argument of experimenter’s regress either. According to 
the argument by harry Collins, in order to evaluate the correct functioning of an innovative 
instrument, a hypothesis concerning the existence or inexistence of the phenomenon that is 
to be detected (or the attributes of the magnitude that is trying to be measured) must be taken 
into account; however, in order to put said hypothesis to the test, data must be produced by 
applying the instrument in question. 27 the case at hand does not give rise to a situation of 
epistemic indetermination because, although estimating the correction of the theory of the 
phenomenon implies presupposing the correctness of the theory of the apparatus, it is not 
necessary to presuppose the correctness of the former theory in order to judge the correctness 
of the latter. the theory of the apparatus (acoustics) constitutes a firmly consolidated body of 
knowledge in physics, entirely independent of medical theories and traditions. 
to this effect, A. Franklin and S. Culp argue that theoretical and instrumental mechanisms 
are normally available in science for evaluating the correct functioning of innovative or 
controversial techniques and instruments. 28 When these mechanisms of comparison are based 
on principles of physics independent of the object in dispute, then, if the results are coincident, 
good reasons exist to affirm the reality of a given phenomenon or to trust the robustness of a 
result (in this case, auscultation taxonomy). 29
3. COnsOlIdatIOn Of the stethOsCOPe
Returning now to laennec’s story and the consolidation of his invention, it is interesting to 
examine other dimensions of the observational base of medicine at that time. After being named 
clinical chief of hôpital Necker, laennec’s conservative ideology worked to his favour during the 
Restauration in France. During the five years prior to his death, he received the legion of honour 
and was named Professor of Clinical Medicine at hôpital de la Charité, Professor of Medicine 
at the Collège de France and, finally, Royal Physician to the royal family. 30 laennec died of 
26 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, CSiC, Madrid, 1950, p. 280.
27 in an example by Collins, in order to check whether the gravitational wave detector functions correctly, it must 
be previously known if these waves exist, if they are detectable and the causal process by which supposedly they are 
detectable; however, deciding on the existence or inexistence of such waves requires previous successful application of 
the detector. thus, a situation of epistemic indetermination results. See collinS, h. M., Changing Order: Replication 
and Induction in Scientific Practice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992 (first ed. 1985).
28 See, e.g., Franklin, a., “how to Avoid the Experimenters’ Regress,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 
v. 25, n. 3 (1994), pp. 463-491, and culp, S., “Objectivity in Experimental inquiry: breaking Data-technique Circles,” 
Philosophy of Science, v. 3, (1995), pp. 438-458.
29 For limitations to this approach, see raSMuSSen, n., “Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology 
with the Electron Microscope,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, v. 2, (1993), p. 233.
30 this same ideology also served to gain him countless enemies, especially his colleague, François broussais, who 
reduced pathologies to inflammations and ferociously attacked the particular anatomical-pathological approach of 
Gaspart bayle and laennec himself (cf. lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, pp. 34-35). his 
ideological evolution is described by kervran, r., Laennec: His Life and Times, p. 115.
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tuberculosis on 13th August, 1826, a few months after making the terrible discovery himself by 
means of the stethoscope and the appearance of the second edition of his book (April, 1826, in 
both cases). An autopsy was not performed.
the instrument, and its accompanying technique, was finally consolidated with the work of 
Joseph Skoda (1805-1881), an important author in the evolution of clinical diagnostics, to which 
he attempted to infer a scientific base. Skoda, an internist at the General hospital of Vienna since 
1832 (where he coincided and maintained close ties with ignaz Semmelweis), published his work 
20 years after laennec’s treatise: Abhandlung über Perkussion und Auskultation (Treatise on 
Percussion and Auscultation, 1839). 31 Skoda remained faithful to the anatomical-pathological 
tendency which was the basis of his work on mediate auscultation, attempting to offer a new 
classification of the sounds subordinate to a scientific explanation of their anatomical origin.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that there exist discrepancies between the approaches 
of laennec and Skoda concerning the classification of auscultatory sounds; even while both 
formed part of the same anatomical-pathological school, they gave rise to two different 
traditions in the French and German medical milieus. 32 For Skoda, as opposed to laennec, 
auscultatory signs should be based on acoustic principles and supported by a program of 
experimental research. this involved discovering in each case the mediating physical 
mechanism between, on the one hand, what had been observed in the body during the process 
of the disease and, on the other, findings in the body after death. As a result of requiring this 
physical explicability, the “one sign-one lesion” methodological principle was abandoned and 
a lesser degree of taxonomic refinement was acheived. 33 these methodological differences, 
as Jens lachmund points out, 34 led to different codification systems; in one case (laennec), 
the description of clinical cases and postmortems took priority, while, in the other (Skoda), the 
description of acoustic experiments and reasoning in physical theory were most important. in 
other words, theoretical principles took priority in Skoda over perceptive discrimination and 
its possibilities for associating visual (anatomical) and auditory (auscultatory) elements. in 
literary terms, sensibility was subordinated to sense, to reason.
these differences also reveal the “interpretative plasticity” (of the auditory experiences) which 
is found in the origin of the use of the stethoscope, as well as the importance of standardization 
as a universalising mechanism for knowledge and regulation of the practice. the history of the 
stethoscope, to this effect, is also a process of standardization of perceptions 35 which, according 
to lachmund, led not only to the reconfiguration of the objects of medical knowledge, but to 
perceptive competency in medical professionals as well.
31 later, head of the Department of thoracic Diseases from 1840 and Professor of Medicine from 1846 to 1871 at the 
University of Vienna.
32 See lachMund, J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century 
French and German Medicine,” pp. 427-436.
33 For example, where laennec differentiated between three varieties of voice amplification (bronchophony, 
pectoriloquy and egophony), Skoda only identified one (bronchophony, weak or strong), attributing it to voice 
resonance in the lungs. likewise, Skoda introduced a new notion, unbestimmte Geräusche (undetermined noise), as 
a residual category for those sounds for which sufficient physical explanation could not be offered. Cf. lachMund, 
J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century French and German 
Medicine,” p. 431.
34 “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century French and German 
Medicine,” p. 430. 
35 this is what, shortly before the invention of the stethoscope, J. Corvisart called l’éducation médicale des sens, 
with regard to the need to foment and standardize the semiological value of percussion. Cf. laín entralGo, p., La 
historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 281.
New Methodological Perspectives on observation and experimentation in science124
After its invention in 1816, and especially on account of the contributions made over 
the following decades by authors like Skoda, the stethoscope was quickly consolidated as 
a key instrument in medical practice and research. it proved to be tremendously useful due 
to the precision with which it aided in diagnosing pulmonary and cardiac diseases, as well 
as to its application in veterinary medicine or with deaf-mute patients (possibilities which 
laennec had already recognised). 36 With the aid of the stethoscope, physicians were able to 
gain direct access to information inside the body; they were able, in a manner of speaking, 
to perform an autopsy while the patient was still alive. it was able to extraordinarily increase 
the possibilities of the anatomical-clinical method of anatomical-pathological correlation, 
allowing not only for diagnosis and prognosis, as Rusell Maulitz states, 37 but also for a certain 
degree of therapeutic intervention.
4. the anatOmICal-PathOlOGICal reVOlutIOn
in fact, the stethoscope was also the best testimony to the prevailing medical paradigm 
during the first half of the 19th century, in which laennec was of fundamental importance. 
laennec (as well as Skoda) formed part of the anatomical-pathological revolution which, 
according to common understanding, placed medicine on the map of the sciences. 38 At the core 
of this revolution was the transition from clinical symptomatology to pathological anatomy in 
the conceptualisation and classification of disease. 
Until the 19th century, diseases were classified on the basis of the changes they produced 
in the human body, that is to say, on clinical symptomatology, which in turn had displaced the 
humoural theory of the hippocratic-Galenic tradition. 39 One of the main driving forces behind 
symptomatological nosology was the English physician, thomas Sydenham (1624-1689):
“Nature,” says Sydenham, “in the production of disease, is uniform and consistent; so 
much so, that for the same disease in different persons the symptoms are for the most part the 
same; and the selfsame phenomena that you would be observe in the sickness of a Socrates you 
would observe in the sickness of a simpleton.” 40
Sydenham lent great importance to observation and experience, shunning theory and 
causal conjectures, and considered each patient to be a unique, dynamic entity in which 
disease manifested itself individually. Fighting against disease was akin to combating 
dysfunctional symptoms and the task of the medical scholar was to identify diseases through 
their characteristic clinical histories in order to later associate them with specific therapies. 
the observation involved in medical research is that characteristic of baconian botanical 
36 See laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, pp. xxxii ff.
37 Maulitz, r. c., Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp, 100-101.
38 laín entralGo, p., Historia de la medicina, Masson, barcelona, 1978, p. 464.
39 According to this last tradition, health depends upon the correct balance among the four organic fluids or 
humours: black bile, yellow bile, blood and phlegm. the predominance of one or another also gives rise to different 
types of temperament.
40 Observationes medicae circa morborum acutorum historiam et curationem (Medical Observations on the history 
and Cure of Serious Diseases) quoted in reiSer, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 9. For Sydenham, contrary to the Galenic tradition, symptoms are not mere accidents of the 
disturbance of vital functions in which consists the “essence” of the disease; symptoms are the defining operations of 
the disease and are endowed with biological meaning, cf. laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del 
relato patográfico, p. 141.
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observation: careful observation of numerous cases, exclusion of odd cases (“tricks of Nature”), 
description of similarities (identification of “constant symptoms” in a certain temporal order) 
and classification by type or “morbific species.” 41
Michel Foucault says of the symptomological approach: “Disease is perceived in a space 
of projection without depth, of coincidence without development… a space where analogies 
define essences.” 42 Diseases are understood as “morbific species,” as regularities of Nature 
with characteristic clinical histories which are repeated from one patient to another. 43
in opposition to this tradition, at the start of the 19th century diseases began to be 
characterised in terms of the internal structural lesions that they produced, which were revealed 
through autopsy. the anatomical lesion came to constitute the basis for pathology and clinical 
practice, overcoming the traditional subordination of these with respect to the symptom. 
“Open up some cadavers: you will immediately dissipate the darkness that simple observation 
could not make disappear,” said xavier bichat, one of the leaders of this revolution, in 1802. 44 
From that point on, disease started to be understood as local lesions within the human body 
and to be classified according to the pathological alterations evidenced in the autopsy. 45 it was 
the beginning of what is known as “scientific medicine,” as bichat claims in the prologue to 
his Anatomie Générale (1801):
“Medicine has long been rejected from the bosom of the exact sciences. it will have the 
right to be associated with them when rigorous observation (of the patient) has coupled with 
examination of the alterations which the organs present…” 46
Methodologically speaking, it was a question of moving from a traditional approach based 
on generalizing inductive practice to one founded on the introduction of causal hypotheses 
about the seat of disease, thus subordinating the symptom to the lesion. in the suggestive 
words of Foucault:
“… medical experience is going to substitute the recording of frequencies with the fixed-point 
signal. the symptomatic course of pulmonary phthisis presents cough, respiratory difficulty, 
marasmus, hectic fever and, at times, purulent expectoration: however, none of these visible 
modifications is absolutely indispensable (there are tuberculosis patients who do not cough) and 
their order of entrance on the scene is not rigorous (fever may appear early on or not break out 
until the end of the evolution of the disease). Only one phenomenon is constant, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for phthisis to exist: lesion in the lung parenchyma … the symptoms slide 
41 See, La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 144. One of the most influential classifications in 
symptomological nosology was precisely that of the physician and botanist, François boissier de Sauvages, who, in his 
Nosologia methodica (1763), differentiated 10 classes, 40 orders, 295 genuses and 2,400 species of disease, cf. reiSer, 
S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, pp. 9-10.
42 Foucault, M., Naissance de la clinique, Quadrige/PUF, Paris, 1963, pp. 4-5 (Spanish translation by Francisca 
Perujo: El nacimiento de la clínica, Siglo xxi, Madrid, 1999).
43 See riera, J., Historia, Medicina y Sociedad, Pirámide, Madrid, 1985.
44 Quoted in lindeMann, M., Medicina y sociedad en la Europa moderna: 1500-1800, Siglo xxi, Madrid, 2001 (orig. 
ed. 1999). Spanish translation by Ángela Pérez, p. 69. besides xavier bichat (1771-1802) in France, other precursors of 
pathological anatomy are the italian, Giovanni Morgagni (1682-1771), a professor at the University of Padua to whom 
the foundation of pathological anatomy is usually attributed, and the Scot, Matthew baillie (1761-1823).
45 Cf. lachMund, J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century 
French and German Medicine,” p. 423.
46 Quoted in lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, p. 27.
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and disappear over this fixed point, … ‘it is necessary,’ he continues, quoting bayle, ‘to consider 
individuals who do not have fever, or thinness, or purulent expectoration as consumptives: it is 
sufficient for the lungs to be affected by a lesion that tends to disorganize and ulcerate them; 
phthisis is this same lesion.’” 47
laennec himself defended the new approach in an analogous way: “Pathological anatomy is 
a much more reliable science and presents more distinct objects of study than symptomological 
nosology. it is, for example, much easier to describe tubercles and relate their signs in detail 
than to define the disease solely on the basis of its external symptoms, to then order its varieties 
according to their causes.” 48
in this same regard, he continues: “the alteration of the organs is without doubt the most 
positive and least variable phenomenon of local disease; the danger and the possibility of cure 
always depend on the nature and extension of these alterations, and [this phenomenon] is therefore 
what should characterize diseases. in contrast, the functional disorder which accompanies these 
alterations is extremely variable, being the same under the influence of totally distinct causes 
and, subsequently, it can hardly serve to discriminate different diseases.” 49
Due to the relevancy of the subject, it is worth pausing briefly to discuss a question of 
terminology, which nonetheless summarizes the rivalry between these two medical traditions. 
laennec called any disturbance in biological functions a “symptom” and understood such 
disturbances to be the consequence of a fundamental organic lesion. he distinguished 
between two classes of symptoms: the “moral” or psychic (such as anxiety or moaning 
in pain), which would be the psychological correlate of the disease, and the “physical” or 
corporal (such as fever, vomiting or coughing), which would be the somatic manifestation of 
the disease. As far as “sign” is concerned, he considered it to be all the sensorial data which 
allowed the existence or the properties of this anatomical lesion to be inferred. All things 
considered, from the point of view of laennec and the anatomical-pathological tradition, the 
fundamental difference between symptoms and signs lay in their semantic value as evidence 
for the observer of disease. 50 For laennec, the intentionally triggered sign, that is to say, the 
empirical evidence proceeding from exploration, constituted “the most positive and least 
variable phenomenon” of the disease. in contrast, symptoms were variable for each disease, 
too general (they could be common to several diseases) and misleading in their reading. 51 
by means of the physical sign, the physician could diagnose the disease and anticipate its 
development, that is, the course of the disease could be “seen”: oedema zones, formation of 
effusions, cardiac dynamics, etc. 52 
the above reasoning resulted in his disdain for the symptom and regard for the sign, which 
established the link between the anatomical lesion and exploration. laennec criticized the 
variability of the simple covariation on which the traditional approach was based and defended 
47 Foucault, M., Naissance de la clinique, pp. 140-141. Spanish translation: El nacimiento de la clínica, pp. 196-197, 
his italics. the quote corresponds to Bayle, G. l., Recherches sur la phthsie pulmonaire, Gabon, Paris, 1810, pp. 8-9.
48 laennec, r. t. h., A Treatise on the Diseases of the Chest, p. xxxi, his italics. See also laennec, r. t. h., De 
l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, p. xix.
49 laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, p. xx.
50 Foucault, M., Naissance de la clinique, pp. 89-90. 
51 De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, Préface, pp. xix-xxi, xxxi-xxxii.
52 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 307.
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the need to introduce those causal hypotheses where reference was made, not to the origin or 
ultimate causes of the disease, but to anatomical or physiological determinants on which the 
latter depended (the sedes morborum or seat of disease). 53
5. PhysICIans and surGeOns
this involves what laín Entralgo termed “the Copernican turn of the anatomical-
pathological lesion.” 54 this was a change in worldview, produced when medicine was shaken 
by the most famous of political revolutions: the French Revolution of 1789. in the words of 
lópez Piñero:
“it is not by chance that the original stage for anatomical-clinical medicine was precisely 
that of post-revolutionary France. For obvious reasons, the new economic, social and 
political structures offered the appropriate conditions for producing a decisive rupture with 
medical tradition… in order to eliminate the dead weight of the ancien regime, the [medical] 
profession and teaching, scientific institutions and hospitals were organized on completely 
different bases. there was a desire to create a new medicine and this reorganization 
managed to put an end to the separation between physicians and surgeons, imposing 
instruction of a fundamentally practical nature and making hospitals the centres of medical 
life. All these were factors that weighed decisively on the appearance of the anatomical-
pathological school, which would make the program of radical renovation a reality, at least 
as regards pathology.” 55
Neither was it by chance that the pioneers of the “Copernican turn” were surgeons or 
physicians with surgical training in the France of the time: xavier bichat, Jean Corvisart, 
Gaspard bayle, René laennec, etc. For these authors, disease should be conceptualised in 
terms of pathological lesions in tissues and organs, and medicine itself should focalise on the 
structural alterations or anatomical lesions which autopsy reveals after death, to later relate 
this knowledge to data from clinical observation. 56
the effective leading force behind this medical reorganization in France was Antoine 
Fourcrouy, a physician and delegate to the Convention. in November of 1794, inspired by Vicq 
53 Caution must be exercised with the causal subject in this tradition. For example, Russell Maulitz states in this 
regard, referring to the approach by G. bayle: “the anatomical lesion … establishes the class and possibly the 
specific type of a disease entity, but not its origin. Final causes must remain obscure. So, too, must immediate causes. 
it is often impossible to state the nature of the terminal event; only the organic lesions that (presumably) preexisted 
are discernible, and it is assumed they become causes of death only through some sort of mediating mechanism. 
Only rarely are the organic and inciting (that is, inciting to death) lesions one and the same …” (Maulitz, r. c., 
Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, pp. 81-82, italics in the original). 
See also laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du coeur, pp. xx 
ff. and laennec, r. t. h., A Treatise on the Diseases of the Chest, p. 55, who assumed a position analogous to that 
of bayle. thus it appears that, in this tradition, the most common understanding of “cause,” when referring to the 
anatomical lesion as seat of disease, was that of “contributing necessary condition.” See duFFin, J., To See with a 
Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, pp. 205-206, and lachMund, J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and 
lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century French and German Medicine,” p. 424.
54 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 274. See, in general, Faure, o., 
Histoire sociale de la médecine (XVIIIe-XXe siècles), Anthropos, Paris, 1994, chs. 4 and 5.
55 lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, p. 13.
56 See Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, pp. 11 ff. See also Maulitz, r. c., Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy 
of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, ch. 1.
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d’Azyr, the former Secretary General of the Royal Society of Medicine, Fourcrouy submitted 
a project to the Convention concerning the unification of medicine and surgery, which would 
allow for improvement in both the theoretical and practical aspects of teaching:
 “Medicine and surgery are two branches of the same science; to study them separately is 
to abandon theory to the ravings of the imagination, and practice, to blind routine; to join and 
fuse them is to mutually clarify them and favour their progress.” 57
the Assembly approved the proposal to start up a clinical medicine, in which practice and 
theory would be united in the hospital bed and laboratory, in the training of physicians as well as 
midwives. thus it may be said that the birth of the clinic, the launching of “hospital medicine” 
and the decisive move towards modern medical science all took place in the Parisian hospital 
wards of mid-1790. 58 in this move towards modern medical science, as Olivier Faure notes, 59 it is 
not easy to differentiate the scientific aspects from the professional and socio-political ones.
As Rusell Maulitz indicates, 60 the physicians and surgeons of late 18th century Europe 
were different subcultures, each with their own codes and symbols and each speaking distinct 
dialects as regards the human body. For surgeons, with an approach based more on craft and 
lacking the social prestige of physicians, the body was a mosaic of individual parts. Most of 
the diseases subject to their attention, such as inflammations and gangrene, were targeted 
for one of the two standard surgical interventions: excision or amputation. For physicians, 
the body code was another: interdependent regions linked by fluids which transported 
substances responsible for the well-being or weakening of the body’s economy, an economy 
which was expressed symptomatically. the convergence of these two cultures, with distinct 
visions regarding disease, involved institutional and professional changes as well as changes 
that were conceptual in nature and generally relative to intellectual resources. this is what 
Maulitz terms the creation of a new “body grammar”: something towards which bichat took 
the decisive step and which triumphed with the work of laennec. 61
hence lies the importance of the invention of the stethoscope for a trained surgeon and 
anatomist like laennec. Stethoscopic auscultation made it possible to perform a virtual 
autopsy, thus extending the study of pathological lesions to patients who were still living, 
allowing physicians “to make the invisible visible.” 62 by means of the stethoscope and the 
virtual autopsy which the former had enabled, the anatomical lesion was able to fully assume 
the explanatory role which it had lacked until then. Until the 19th century, the anatomical 
lesion had been limited to being a “confirmatory or rectifying finding,” in the words of laín 
Entralgo, 63 but always a posteriori or post mortem. Since the invention of the stethoscope, the 
anatomical lesion was to acquire diagnostic and prognostic value, and was to become the basis 
for nosology and medical knowledge. As lachmund states, “seeing pathological objects in the 
57 Fourcrouy, A., “Rapport à la Convention du 27 novembre 1794,” quoted in Beauvalet-Boutouyrie, S., Naître à 
l’hôpital au XIXe siècle, belin, Paris, 1999, p. 67.
58 See lindeMann, M., Medicina y sociedad en la Europa moderna: 1500-1800, pp. 106 ff., as well as Foucault, M., 
Naissance de la clinique, chs. 3 and 5. 
59 Faure, o., Histoire sociale de la médecine (XVIIIe-XXe siècles), pp. 43-44.
60 Maulitz, R. C., Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, p. 227.
61 Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, p. 228.
62 Foucault, M., Naissance de la clinique, ch. ix: “l’invisible visible”, pp. 168-174.
63 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 198.
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dissection room and hearing sounds and murmurs at the sickbed thus became complementary 
modes of ordering medical reality.” 64
6. the sIGnIfICanCe Of the reVOlutIOn
All things considered, what is the nature and scope of the so-called “anatomical-pathological 
revolution”? Was it really a revolution in the Kuhnian sense? in what sense is it fitting to 
speak of a link between the revolution in medicine and the political revolution? Following 
Kuhn, 65 scientific revolutions basically constitute scientific developments with no epistemic 
continuity. they are episodes in which a normal scientific tradition is interrupted; an 
extraordinary scientific context then arises in which theoretical references and common 
epistemic values are substituted by controversy and persuasion; and finally these episodes are 
closed by the conversion of the community to a new paradigm or tradition of normal science, 
with a “change in the world” in which scientists work taking place during the transition. At 
least one change which supposes an epistemic break, and a professional context which 
propitiates this change, must therefore occur. let us examine these two elements in order.
According to hoyningen-huene, 66 there are several ways in which a scientific revolution 
may produce a change in Gestalt, that is, a change in that region of the phenomenal world in 
which scientists carry out their work. 67 in the first place, the post-revolutionary phenomenal 
world may contain previously absent phenomena and entities, provided that these discoveries 
(to differentiate them from analogous discoveries in normal science) lead to certain revisions 
of significant portions of previous theoretical knowledge, experimental techniques or the use 
of instruments and models of data interpretation. Secondly, even when new discoveries do not 
occur, the world of phenomena of scientists may change due to familiar phenomena and entities 
being seen in a different light, as instances of different laws or with different attributes. this 
latter case is precisely the one that basically occurred with the substitution of the classificatory 
tree in the move from symptomological to anatomical-pathological nosology.
the classification of diseases in terms of anatomical lesions rather than symptoms 
or balances of fluids certainly involved a profound conceptual change in the evolution of 
medicine. it instances the greatest of the types of conceptual change identified by P. thagard 
in How Scientists Explain Disease: 68 tree switching, that is, changing the organizing principle 
64 lachMund, J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in Nineteenth-Century French 
and German Medicine,” p. 423.
65 Cf. kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., the Chicago University Press, Chicago, 
1970 (1st ed. 1962).
66 Cf. hoyninGen-huene, p., Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, the 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. English translation by Alexander levine, pp. 201-206.
67 According to i. hacking, we may now understand “world-change” in Kuhn nominalistically. the world in which 
we, including scientists, live and work is a world of classes of things, as every action takes place under description. in 
other words, all the choices we make, all our doings in and interactions with the world, the explanation of its phenomena 
or prediction of its events, is action under description: this means choices under descriptions in use in the social or 
scientific community in which we work and act. Descriptions require classification, the grouping of individuals into 
classes. therefore, with a revolution, our world changes, that world of understandings and explanations (the world 
of classes of things), but not so the world (in the sense of the ontological inventory of what exists). See hackinG, i., 
“Working in a New World: the taxonomic Solution,” in horWich, p. (ed.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the 
Nature of Science, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, pp. 275-310. Other interpretations of “world-change” may be 
found, e.g., in Bird, A., Thomas Kuhn, Acumen, Chesham, 2000, ch. 4. 
68 Cf. thaGard, p., How Scientists Explain Disease, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p. 150.
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of a hierarchical conceptual tree. the anatomical-pathological approach clearly implies 
what Kuhnian terminology would describe as a Gestalt shift, categorizing the available 
empirical evidence, data from clinical observation, in a new way, as well as broadening (and 
correcting) that traditional empirical base through exploration via autopsy and stethoscopic 
auscultation. Nosology is the cornerstone of both medical knowledge and professional activity, 
in which a very important change occurs in the way or ways of producing data and in their 
interpretation: these are substantial changes which imply a transformation in medical theory 
and practices (in physiology, in clinical medicine, in therapy, etc.). 69
What were seen from the extreme empiricism of symptomological nosology as collections 
of specific symptoms, pertaining to the “nature” of each morbific species, 70 from the 
hypothetical-causal view of the anatomical-pathological approach were considered simple 
external manifestations of organic lesions defining the disease. these distinct Gestaltsehen 71 
are revealed even in Sydenham’s need to propose new names for the same phenomena: although 
a disease and its symptoms were closely associated, a disease could be distinguished from its 
symptoms in the Galenic tradition (as later in the anatomical-pathological tradition). 72Smallpox, 
for example, produces fever. For Sydenham, on the contrary, the fever from smallpox is 
variolous fever: it is (part of) the disease itself. 73
in this understanding of the shift from the symptomological view of disease to the 
anatomical-pathological view, contextual elements should also be taken into consideration 
and the kind of influence these might have exercised on said revolution should be examined. 
As already pointed out, according to Kuhn, 74 scientific revolutions constitute scientific 
developments with epistemic discontinuity. Nonetheless, this epistemic break requires a 
propitious context in order to spread and consolidate. it is important to bear in mind that 
the agent of a revolution is always a scientific community, 75 for one reason especially: 
researching the factors that foster or hinder the revolution, a new research tradition and a 
world-change, implies researching the motives that make up the dynamics of decision-making 
69 however, this does not imply a total substitution. Changes in the architecture of medical knowledge (the 
conceptual tree) do not have to substantially affect some elements of the structure (such as the clinical), which go 
on to fulfil other functions in said structure. Concerning the diversity of formats which, in principle, revolutionary 
change may adopt, see in general Bird, a., Thomas Kuhn, ch. 2.
70 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 145.
71 ludwig Fleck defined Gestaltsehen as a “formative way of seeing” from a particular conceptual framework or 
thought-style. Fleck understood a “thought-style” (Denkstil) as a set of beliefs and mindsets shared by a “thought-colle
ctive”(Denkcollectiv), which, in turn, he understood as a group of people who exchange ideas and maintain intellectual 
interaction, which, as is obvious, requires sharing the same scientific lexus, accepting the same basic theories and 
fundamental facts, etc. See Fleck, l., Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung 
in die Lehre von Denkstill und Denkkollektiv, Schwabe, basilea, 1935, and Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1980. English 
translation: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, edited by t. J. trenn and R. K. Merton, the University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, ch. 4.
72 in a certain sense, the anatomical-pathological revolution supposes a regression to the Galenic tradion, with new 
instruments and approaches. “Regression” solely in the sense that the types of disease are defined by the organic 
dysfunction subjacent to the symptoms.
73 See laín entralGo, p., La Historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 151. With respect to the extreme 
empiricism of Sydenham, it may be interesting to note the friendship he had with the british philosopher, John locke, and 
the fact that he was a contemporary of John Ray, who propounded an anti-essentialist empiricist foundation for the new 
botany of his time. they all appear to have shared one and the same idea: genera and species are only useful abstractions 
for ordering experience; however, reality is an attribute of the phenomena which are revealed to our senses.
74 See kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, passim.
75 See hoyninGen-huene, p., Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, 
pp. 200-201.
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in a human community, which, in this case, include a network of hospital institutions and 
health care systems.
the political antecedents created the circumstances which made the anatomical-
pathological revolution possible, but its consolidation was to depend upon the effective 
transformation of the socio-professional context of medicine at the time in keeping with 
the disciplinary standards of the new approach. As to the said socio-professional context 
one should understand the organisation of healthcare in European hospitals in the early 
19th century, an organisation that came to reflect the principles of pathological anatomy. 
it included such aspects as the division of medical work, the structure of clinical histories, 
instrumental support in hospital research, the favoured lines of research, epidemiological 
planning, the routines of medical care and even the physical distribution of hospital wards. 
in fact, this health reorganisation in hospital care and the anatomical-pathological approach 
itself jointly evolved from the association of surgery and medicine and the conversion of the 
hospital from a place where patients with no other recourse were admitted for observation and 
care to a teaching and testing centre —the birth of the clinic. As bowker and Star point out, 
the way in which classificatory systems (and, in general, disciplinary standards) are reflected 
in infrastructures is something that only becomes visible at times of rupture and change. 76
to this effect, in his classic Morbid Appearances, 77 Russell Maulitz describes the expansion 
of pathological anatomy in Napoleonic Europe as a process not only of the spreading of 
ideas, but also as dependent on professional and socio-political contexts, and, to a certain 
degree, on other contingent factors. Specifically, the persistence of the separation between 
surgery and medicine in England hindered the assimilation of the anatomical-pathological 
approach there, in contrast with the other side of the Channel, where this approach was 
shown to be “… particularly consonant with the new professional realities of Napoleonic 
France.” 78 british students, as well as those from other nations, converged on Paris in the 
early decades of the 19th century to assimilate the new approach and then later to contribute 
to its international implantation.
by the mid-19th century, in such important hospitals as those of Paris and Vienna (and, 
by this time, britain), the anatomical-pathological approach, outstandingly represented by 
such professors and researchers as Karl Rokitansky and Rudolph Virchow, was not only the 
dominant paradigm in the medicine of that time, but it also constituted a progressive research 
program, in the sense of lakatos. With no serious anomalies to face, its positive heuristic 
clearly anticipated the pathway for the development of research: the reductionist line that it 
had followed in the characterisation of disease from the symptomatological manifestations to 
the body organ (Morgagni), from the complex body organ to the organic tissue (bichat) and 
from the tissue to the cell (Virchow) as sedibus et causis morborum, to paraphrase the title of 
the pioneering work of Giovanni Morgagni dated 1761. 79
76 See BoWker, G. c. and Star, S. l., Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, the Mit Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1999, ch. 1. All considered, the socio-political context must be maintained as an independent variable 
as regards disciplinary standards, since it also responds to other macro variables such as health policy design, business 
strategies in pharmaceutical development and the bureaucratic organisation of healthcare personnel.
77 Maulitz, r. c., Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, pp. 134-157 
and 224-229.
78 Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth Century, p. 226.
79 the 1850s constituted, in fact, the emerging years of cellular pathology led by Rudolf Virchow. See hudSon, r. p., 
Disease and its Control: The Shaping of Modern Thought, Greenwood Press, New york, 1983, ch. 6.
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the parallel development of laboratory medicine during the 19th century likewise offered 
soundness to this program through the appearance of new techniques for the detection of 
physical signs and the anatomical-pathological redefinition of old diseases. For example, in 
Richard bright’s redefinition of “renal dropsy” as “albuminous nephritis,” the possibility 
of detecting albumin in the patient’s urine by means of a chemical test allowed the lesion of 
an internal viscera, inaccessible to direct exploration, to be clearly evidenced, thus being 
able to dispense with the symptomatological charaterisation of the disease. 80 Only the later 
development of the etiological approach and microbiology, in the work of l. Pasteur and R. 
Koch in the 1880’s, would create the conditions for the substitution of pathological anatomy as 
the dominant paradigm in medical theory and practice. 81
the predominant clinical-nosological paradigm thus constituted a methodological 
framework which afforded visibility to a certain class of phenomena, highlighting them 
as significant. it emphasized a certain kind of practice, anticipated anomalies and offered 
indications as to the way of developing theory. the anatomical lesion, the autopsy, the 
association between lesions and signs, as well as the physical explanation of these associations 
(in the tradition of Skoda) were especially the main principles or disciplinary standards of 
the anatomical-pathological approach in medicine, all within the framework of a hospital 
organisation appropriate to the “body grammar” of the new medicine.
7. the InstrumentalIsatIOn Of health
Finally, two interesting consequences of this anatomical-pathological revolution should be 
examined, consequences which may be termed the “depersonalisation” of disease and the “de-
subjectivisation” of medical information. the creation of modern medicine also supposed, or 
at least contributed decisively to, a redefining of health care through hospital reorganisation, 
the reconceptualisation of disease and an instrumentalisation of medical practice which led to 
rather significant changes in the physician-patient relationship.
the development of the anatomical-pathological view of disease and the instrumentalisation 
of medicine signified, in the first place, the consolidation of an “ontological” notion of disease, 
as opposed to the traditional “functionalist” notion. 82 this actually involved a process which 
began with the symptomological definition of disease favoured by 17th century physicians 
like thomas Sydenham; it was given a boost by medical instrumentalisation and culminated 
with the later etiological view of disease, the development of microbiology and the spectacular 
improvement in public health care at the start of the 20th century. Since the so-called ontological 
approach, diseases have become “depersonalised” and “reified”: every disease is considered 
as a real entity existing independently of the identity of the affected subject.
On the contrary, from the functionalist (or holistic) viewpoint, disease was understood as 
a dysfunction resulting from personal habits or from the particular action of the environment 
on the individual. the functionalist notion represents the classical conception, linked to the 
80 As P. laín Entralgo points out in La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 324, this line of 
medical research permits raising laboratory data to the category of physical sign, in the sense of laennec.
81 the definitive triumph of the etiological explanation, eventually favoured by laboratory medicine (and particularly 
by medical microbiology), did not occur until the last decade of the 19th century. Robert Koch, for example, did 
not publish his classic work on bacteriology (in which he establishes the rule that a specific microorganism must be 
considered as the specific agent of a given disease) until 1890. See lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el 
siglo XIX, pp. 139-140.
82 See lindeMann, M., Medicina y sociedad en la Europa moderna: 1500-1800, pp. 2-3.
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hippocratic-Galenic tradition, which maintained significant influence over Western academic 
medicine until well into the 18th century. 83 According to this tradition, diseases were specific 
to individuals, affections resulting from the actions of environmental agents which caused the 
humoural imbalance of an organism with its own constitutional idiosyncracy. Consequently, 
treatments were also highly individualised, acting allopathically on the symptoms, 84 as the 
idea was to restore that particular balance of humours in each individual human being. Disease 
did not exist as a specific pathological entity in the way it has been understood ever since the 
consolidation of the ontological conception.
A second interesting consequence, related to the previous one, deals with what may be called 
the “de-subjectivisation” of medical information promoted by the diffusion of the stethoscope, as 
the spearhead to a later process of growing instrumentalisation and technological development 
in medical practice. As Jacalyn Duffin states in her excellent biography of laennec:
“in laennec’s lifetime, disease concepts changed from constructs based on patient’s subjective 
symptoms and feelings, described in the patient’s history, to concepts based on specific changes 
in the patient’s body, detected objectively through physical examination.” 85
the effects of the stethoscope are documented by Stanley Reiser in his classic Medicine and 
the Reign of Technology: “… [mediate] auscultation helped to create the objective physician, 
who could move away from involvement in the patient’s experiences and sensations, to a 
more detached relation, less with the patient but more with the sounds from within the body. 
Undistracted by the motives and beliefs of the patient, the auscultator could make a diagnosis 
from sounds that he alone heard emanating from the body organs, sounds that he believed to 
be objective, bias-free representations of the disease process.” 86
this growing differentiation between subjective symptoms and objective signs in fact 
constitutes a tendency associated with the implementation of the anatomical-pathological 
approach at the beginning of the 19th century, of which laennec formed a fundamental link, 
but which has important precursors in other French physicians who accompanied him in this 
revolution. For example, laennec’s mentor, Jean Corvisart, used percussion profusely as a 
source of reliable medical information, differentiating between the homme physique and the 
homme morale. Dividing patients in this manner allowed him to group clinical information 
into three categories:
“… the ‘sure and constant signs’, univocal with respect to their immediate cause; the 
‘moral man’s’ expressions regarding disease, essentially ambiguous, variable and suspect; 
and, between the latter and the former, the organic symptoms which, like vomit and fever, lack 
a fixed and known semiological significance.” 87
83 there are, of course, important exceptions, beginning with the Swiss physician, Paracelso (c. 1493-1541), 
forefather of symptomological nosology. Parecelso understood disease as a real entity which existed independently, 
as the result of the organism having been invaded by an external entity (the arqueo —a kind of spiritualised poison). 
See lindeMann, M., Medicina y sociedad en la Europa moderna: 1500-1800, pp. 4, 69-82. As regards the timeframe 
for the validity of Galenism, some basic physiological principles (like the humoural theory) or related therapeutic 
practices (like bloodletting to eliminate bad humours) continued to be widely practiced until the very 19th century 
—see, for example, the Nuevo compendio médico, Editores de la biblioteca escojida de Medicina y Cirujía (sic), 
vol. i, imprenta de la viuda de Jordán e hijos, Madrid, 1843.
84 that is to say, carefully choosing medicines and remedies which produce effects contrary to those of the disease 
in the organism in question.
85 duFFin, J., To See with a Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, p. 25.
86 reiSer, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Techonology, p. 38.
87 laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, p. 281.
New Methodological Perspectives on observation and experimentation in science134
the triumph of the anatomical-pathological paradigm and the instrumentalisation of 
medical practice also brought about quite a significant change in physician-patient relations. 
in the symptomological approach during the 17th and 18th centuries, the centre for medical 
practice was the home, either the physician’s or the patient’s, but not the hospital. the patient 
was a patron, not a client. 88 the physician examined the patient’s external appearance and 
fluids, asked questions and listened carefully to the patient’s story about their ailment, to 
the personal narration of the symptoms. the change of paradigm and instrumentalisation 
would suppose, as, for example, S. Reiser or N. Postman observe, 89 that medicine dealt with 
disease, not with patients, and that what patients knew and felt was not very reliable, whereas 
the information obtained from technical exploration or laboratory analysis was very much so. 
these were ideas which would gradually become consolidated with each new apparatus and 
technology that has been added to the medical instrumentarium since then. 90
8. sOme COnClusIOns
in light of the previous discussion, one initial concluding reflection which may be made is 
the support that this case study lends to the new naturalist approaches in the study of science 
as a practice, which also has been called “philosophy of experimentation,” as well as the lack 
of support lent to both the antipositivist reading of the theoretical character of observation 
argument and the constructivist thesis on experimenter’s regress. in both cases, the close 
tie between theoretical models and empirical evidence (and the non-circular nature of this tie 
due to the possibility of triangularisation based on independent theories) made reciprocal 
theory-experience reinforcement possible, rather than its weakening, in the conformation of a 
symbiotic system of mutual interdepence, in hacking’s terms.
A clear interdependence may be specifically appreciated between the instrumental, 
conceptual and contextual determinants in the production and interpretation of clinical 
observation as involved in the anatomical-pathological revolution. As regards instrumental 
determinants, the invention of the stethoscope allowed for the broadening of the observational 
base in medical practice and research through the results of mediate auscultatory exploration, 
but the efficacious use of this instrument presupposed, besides the acoustic principles of 
the physical theory of the apparatus, a certain conceptual innovation with regards to the 
characterisation of disease: a reifying nosology built upon a certain type of causal hypotheses 
and autopsy technique. in turn, the conceptual change, and the reclassification of clinical data 
on the basis of said conceptual change, involved and presupposed contextual and organisational 
changes in the medical profession. these were changes related to the new line drawn for 
88 See lindeMann, M., Medicina y sociedad en la Europa moderna: 1500-1800, pp. 221-222.
89 See reiSer, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, passim, and poStMan, n., Technopoly. The Surrender 
of Culture to Techonology, Knopf, N. york, 1992. Spanish translation by Vicente Campos González: Tecnópolis. La 
rendición de la Cultura a la Tecnología, Círculo de lectores/Galaxia Gutenberg, barcelona, 1994. See also illich, 
i., Medical Nemesis: The Expropiation of Health, Pantheon, New york, 1976, pp. 155-173, as well as Foucault, M., 
Naissance de la clinique, ch. 9.
90 See reiSer, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, ch. 1, pp. 1-44. An antecedent of the stethoscope which 
provoked the same type of criticism in obstetrics were the forceps, which came into general use in 1723. in the 19th 
century, as ignaz Semmelweis then noted (The Etiology, Concept, and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever, ed. by K. Codell 
Carter, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983, p. 74, orig. ed. 1861), some obstetricians, such as lucas 
boër, the first Professor de Obstetrics at the General hospital of Vienna (from 1789 to 1822), complained of the excessive 
use of the instrument due to the simple fact that it was available (see likewise Beauvalet-Boutouyrie, S., Naître à 
l’hôpital au XIXe siècle, p. 178).
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disciplinary frontiers (the fusion of medicine and surgery) and the reorganisation of hospital 
care, which were to evolve jointly with the new disciplinary standards and to eventually place 
medicine on the scientific map.
9. referenCes
ackerMann, r. J., Data, Instruments, and Theory: A Dialectical Approach to Understanding 
Science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985.
ackerMann, r. J., “Allan Franklin, Right or Wrong,” in Fine, A., ForBeS, M. and WeSSelS, 
l. (eds.), PSA 1990, vol. 2. Proceedings of the 1990 Biennial Meeting of the PSA, Philosophy of 
Science Association, East lansing, Mi, 1991, pp. 451-457.
Bayle, G. l., Recherches sur la phthsie pulmonaire, Gabon, Paris, 1810. 
Beauvalet-Boutouyrie, S., Naître à l’hôpital au XIXe siècle, belin, Paris, 1999.
Bird, A., Thomas Kuhn, Acumen, Chesham, 2000. 
Birtalan, G., “laennec and Skoda, Classics of internal Diagnostics,” Communicationes de 
Historia Artis Medicinae (budapest), n. 97-99, (1982), pp. 33-41.
BoWker, G. c. and Star, S. l., Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, the 
Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
collinS, h. M., Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, the University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992 (first ed. 1985).
culp, S., “Objectivity in Experimental inquiry: breaking Data-technique Circles,” Philosophy of 
Science, v. 3, (1995), pp. 438-458.
duFFin, J., To See with a Better Eye: Life of R. T. H. Laennec, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
NJ, 1998.
Faure, o., Histoire sociale de la médecine (XVIIIe-XXe siècles), Anthropos, Paris, 1994.
FeyeraBend, p. k., Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, New left 
books, london, 1975.
Fleck, l., Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in die 
Lehre von Denkstill und Denkkollektiv, Schwabe, basilea, 1935, and Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1980. 
English translation: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, edited by t. J. trenn and R. K. 
Merton, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979.
ForBeS, J., “translator’s Preface,” in laennec, R. t. h., A Treatise on the Diseases of the Chest, 
ed. by John Forbes, Underwood, london, 1821, pp. vii-xxviii.
Franklin, a., “how to Avoid the Experimenters’ Regress,” Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science, v. 25, n. 3, (1994), pp. 463-491.
Foucault, M., Naissance de la clinique, Quadrige/PUF, Paris, 1963. Spanish translation by 
Francisca Perujo: El nacimiento de la clínica, Siglo xxi, Madrid, 1999.
GaliSon, p., How Experiments End, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987.
hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
hackinG, i., “the Self-Vindication of the laboratory Studies,” in pickerinG, a. (ed.), Science 
as Practice and Culture, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp. 29-64.
hackinG, i., “Working in a New World: the taxonomic Solution,” in horWich, p. (ed.), World 
Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, 
pp. 275-310.
New Methodological Perspectives on observation and experimentation in science136
harré, r., Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty Experiments that Changed Our View of the 
World, Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1981. Spanish translation by luis bou: Grandes experimentos 
científicos, labor, barcelona, 1986. 
hoyninGen-huene, P., Die Wissenschaftsphilosophie Thomas S. Kuhns. Rekonstruktion und 
Grundlagenprobleme, F. Vieweg, braunschweig, 1989. English translation by Alexander t. levine: 
Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Th. S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1993.
hudSon, r. p., Disease and its Control: The Shaping of Modern Thought, Greenwood Press, 
New york, 1983.
illich, i., Medical Nemesis: The Expropiation of Health, Pantheon, New york, 1976.
kervran, r., Laennec: His Life and Times, Pergamon, New york, 1960.
kuhn, th. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., the University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1970 (1st ed. 1962). 
lachMund, J., “Making Sense of Sound: Auscultation and lung Sound Codification in 
Nineteenth-Century French and German Medicine,” Science, Technology and Human Values, 
v. 24, n. 4 (1999), pp. 419-450.
laennec, r. t. h., De l’auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostique des poumons et du 
coeur, brosson et Chaudé, Paris, 1819.
laennec, r. t. h., A Treatise on the Diseases of the Chest, edited and translated by John 
Forbes, Underwood, london, 1821. 
laín entralGo, p., La historia clínica: historia y teoría del relato patográfico, CSiC, 
Madrid, 1950.
laín entralGo, p., Historia de la Medicina, Masson, barcelona, 1978.
lakatoS, i., “Fasification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in lakatos, 
i. and MuSGrave, a. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1970, pp. 91-196. 
leSky, e., The Vienna Medical School of the 19th Century, Johns hopkins University Press, 
baltimore, MD, 1976.
lindeMann, M., Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1999. Spanish translation by Ángela Pérez: Medicina y sociedad en la Europa 
moderna: 1500-1800, Siglo xxi, Madrid, 2001.
lonGino, h. e., The Fate of Knowledge, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2002.
lópez piñero, J. M., Ciencia y enfermedad en el siglo XIX, Nexos, barcelona, 1985.
Maulitz, r. c., Morbid Appearances: The Anatomy of Pathology in the Early Nineteenth 
Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Nuevo compendio médico, Editores de la biblioteca escojida de Medicina y Cirujía (sic), vol. i, 
imprenta de la viuda de Jordán e hijos, Madrid, 1843.
pickerinG, a., The Mangle of Practice, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.
portal, A., Mémoires sur la nature et le traitement de plusieurs maladies, bertrand, Paris, 1800.
poStMan, n., Technopoly. The Surrender of Culture to Techonology, Knopf, N. york, 1992. 
Spanish translation by Vicente Campos González: Tecnópolis. La rendición de la Cultura a la 
Tecnología, Círculo de lectores/Galaxia Gutenberg, barcelona, 1994.
137changes in the framework on observation and experimentation
raSMuSSen, n., “Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology with the Electron 
Microscope,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, v. 2 (1993), pp. 227-265.
reiSer, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
riera, J., Historia, Medicina y Sociedad, Pirámide, Madrid, 1985.
rothBart, d. and Slayden, S. W., “the Epistemology of a Spectometer,” Philosophy of Science, 
v. 61, n. 1 (1994), pp. 25-38.
SchaFFner, k. F., Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine, the University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993.
SeMMelWeiS, i., The Etiology, Concept, and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever, ed. by K. Codell 
Carter, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983 (orig. ed. 1861). English translation by K. 
Codell Carter.
SoloMon, M., Social Empiricism, the Mit Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
thaGard, p., How Scientists Explain Disease, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999.
thaGard, p., “Pathways to biomedical Discovery,” Philosophy of Science, v. 70, n. 2 (2003), 
pp. 235-254.
virchoW, r., Disease, Life, and Man: Selected Essays by Rudolf Virchow, edition and 
translation by lelland J. Rather, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958 (the original texts 
are from 1847-1898). 
WiMSatt, W. c., “Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination,” in BreWer, M. B. and 
collinS, B. e. (eds.), Scientific Inquiry and the Social Sciences: A Volume in Honor of Donald T. 
Campbell, Jossey-bass, San Francisco, 1981, pp. 124-163.

139
PrOBaBIlIstIC CausalIty,  
OBserVatIOn and exPerImentatIOn 
Maria carla galavotti
1. PreamBle
in the last fifty years, increasing attention has focused on the probabilistic notion of causality, 
and it is currently at the core of a vast debate. the issue of observation and experimentation 
bears on probabilistic causality in many ways. Observation and experimentation are 
assigned pivotal importance within the theories of causation developed by econometricians 
and statisticians, who typically take a model-based pluralistic approach, parallelled in the 
philosophical literature by the work of Patrick Suppes. Furthermore, experimentation acquires 
a special meaning within the manipulative views of causality. in particular James Woodward, 
who embraces this kind of approach, makes experimentation the main ingredient of the 
definition of causality. More generally, it is widely recognised that experimentation has a role 
to play in the process of detecting causal relations. 
this paper addresses the problematic link between probabilistic causality, observation and 
experimentation, through a sketchy overview of the literature on the topic, with no pretension 
to being complete. its purpose is to give an idea of the breath of the ongoing debate, and 
suggest possible connections between the viewpoints developed by philosophers of science, 
statisticians and econometricians. 
2. the twOfOld nature Of the deBate On PrOBaBIlIstIC CausalIty
An early attempt to define causality in probabilistic terms is to be found in hans 
Reichenbach’s book The Direction of Time, published posthumously in 1956. A few years 
later, in 1961-62, the statistician irving John Good published two articles under the title “A 
Causal Calculus.” Reichenbach and Good embrace utterly different standpoints. Reichenbach 
develops probabilistic causality as part of a causal theory of time, on the assumption that “time 
order is reducible to causal order.” 1 A central role in his theory is played by the principle of 
common cause, based on the idea that “if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must 
exist a common cause.” 2this principle guides the search for genuine causes, by “screening 
off” from their effects those properties which become irrelevant in the presence of other 
more relevant properties. in other words, a spurious correlation —for instance, the correlation 
between the barometer’s fall and the storm that follows— is “absorbed” by the dependence 
of each of these effects on the common cause, identified as a drop in air pressure in the 
area. Reichenbach frames the principle of common cause in a mechanical view of the world, 
1  reichenBach, h., The Direction of Time, University of California Press, berkeley, 1956, p. 24.
2  reichenBach, h., The Direction of Time, p. 157.
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subsequently expanded by Wesley Salmon, who developed a mechanical theory of causation 
and explanation revolving around the principle in question. 
Good’s approach starts from a distinction between two kinds of probabilistic causality: the 
tendency of an event of a certain kind to cause another event, and the degree to which one 
particular event caused another event. While the tendency to cause concerns types of events 
(type, or general, causation), the degree of causation concerns single events, considered after 
they have occurred (token, or singular, causation). Good regards them as different types of causal 
analysis, to be defined and measured by means of different conceptual tools. 3 
Good’s viewpoint is quite distant from Reichenbach’s mechanical perspective, and from the 
frequency notion of probability underlying it. by contrast, Good’s approach brings causality 
within the domain of the subject’s evaluation and makes the establishment of causal links depend 
on the researcher’s judgment regarding the possible alternatives to the events which are taken as 
cause and effect. this gives causal analysis a contextual flavour. Good handles the problem of 
distinguishing genuine from spurious causes by taking causal speech relative to “the state of the 
Universe” just before the occurrence of the cause and “all true laws of nature” it holds.
Remarkably, Good does not establish a strong link between causation and explanation 
and defines a notion of “explicativity” taken as “the extent to which one proposition or event 
explains why another one should be believed.” 4 According to his perspective, causality and 
explanation are related, but not identical. 
this sketchy outline of Reichenbach’s and Good’s theories discloses the twofold nature of 
the debate on probabilistic causality. On the one hand, we have a philosophical theory which 
associates causality with the old mechanical ideal revisited in a probabilistic fashion. On 
the other we have a statistical theory which points to the contextual character of causation 
and assigns it a role quite independent of explanation. Subsequent literature on probabilistic 
causality has proceeded along these two lines, with sporadical interactions. 
A number of problematic issues were raised in subsequent literature and a wide array of 
solutions offered. the first problem that arises as soon as causality is taken as probable rather 
than constant conjunction is that of identifying causal as opposed to spurious relations, without 
getting muddled with problems of the Simpson’s paradox kind. A further problem is that of 
defining the asymmetry of the causal nexus, which some authors associate with the temporal 
priority of the cause with respect to the effect, while others define quite independently of time. 
Moreover, the virtuous circle linking causality, explanation and prediction within classical 
determinism (of the laplacean kind) breaks down in the case of probabilistic causality. in its 
probabilistic version, causality is not necessarily associated with explanation, but can be related 
to prediction and/or manipulation. Equally problematic is the distinction between those causal 
ascriptions referred to populations, or type causality, and those referred to single occurrences, or 
token causality. the proportions reached by the debate on these problems testify to the fact that 
they admit of no univocal solutions. 
3  Good’s theory of causality was first developed in Good, i. J., “A Causal Calculus,” i British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, v. 11, (1961), pp. 305-318; Good, i. J., “A Causal Calculus,” ii, British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, v. 12, (1962), pp. 43-51; and Good, i. J., “Errata” and “Corrigenda,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science,v. 13, (1963), p. 88.
A modified version was published, together with other articles on causation, in Good, i. J., Good Thinking, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983, Part V. Se also Good, i. J., “Causal tendency: A Review,” in 
SkyrMS, B. and harper, W. (eds.), Causation, Chance and Credence, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 73-78.
4  Good, i. J., Good Thinking, p. 219. 
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3. the PhIlOsOPhICal deBate
the philosophical debate on probabilistic causality is inspired by two different intuitions. 
According to the first, causality is understood in mechanical terms, while the second 
associates it with manipulability, namely with the idea that a causal factor is one on which we 
can intervene to achieve a certain goal. these intuitions inspire two major trends, which find 
their most radical expression in Wesley Salmon’s probabilistic mechanicism, on the one hand, 
and huw Price’s perspectivalism, on the other. 
3.1. Mechanicism
building on Reichenbach’s work, Salmon’s theory of probabilistic causality revives the 
old mechanical ideal of explanation, coached in probabilistic terms. Salmon’s task is “to 
put the ‘cause’ back into ‘because’”: 5 for him the “because” of explanation derives from 
that of causation. 6
Salmon’s theory includes two levels of explanation. At the first level we find the Statistical 
Relevance model, according to which events are explained by locating them in a network of 
statistical relations holding between the properties relevant to their occurrence. this is obtained 
by restricting the reference class to which the explanandum event belongs by progressive 
inclusion of relevant properties and exclusion (“screening off”) of irrelevant ones, to the point 
where all and only relevant properties are taken into account. the canon yielding the proper 
(homogeneous) reference class is statistical relevance. 
On the second level we have causal explanation in terms of causal processes, defined 
as spatio-temporal continuous entities able to transmit marks, or conserved quantities. 
Causal processes form the causal mechanisms of which the causal structure of the world is 
compounded. 7 these two levels of explanation correspond to type causality, called by Salmon 
statistical causality because it can be defined in statistical terms, and token causality, called 
by him aleatory causality, defined in terms of processes. Given that causal processes are 
theoretical entities endowed with ontic import, aleatory causality exceeds a purely statistical 
formulation. For a long time Salmon thought that only aleatory causality carried explanatory 
power, but he revised his position in the late 90s, coming to the conclusion that statistical and 
aleatory causality are both necessary, and complement each other. in his words: “statistical 
relevance relations, in the absence of connecting causal processes, lack explanatory import 
and … connecting causal processes, in the absence of statistical relevance relations, also lack 
explanatory import. … both are indispensable.” 8
According to Salmon one can move in a relatively unproblematic way from types to tokens. 
One should keep in mind that Salmon’s theory is devised for application in physics, and in 
5  SalMon, W. c., “A third Dogma of Empiricism,” in ButtS, r. and hintikka, J. (eds.), Basic Problems in 
Methodology and Linguistics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977, p. 160. Reprinted in SalMon, W. c., Causality and Explanation, 
Oxford University Press, New york, 1998, p. 103. 
6  in this sense Salmon’s perspective stands opposite to that of other authors, like Philip Kitcher, as pointed out in 
SalMon, W. c., “Causality without Counterfactuals,” Philosophy of Science, v. 61, (1994), pp. 297-312. 
7  the most detailed and perspicuous version of Salmon’s theory of explanation is contained in SalMon, W. c., 
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984. this 
book was followed by many articles containing important developments, a number of which are collected in his book 
Causality and Explanation, published in 1998. For an outline of Salmon’s theory see Galavotti, M. c., “Wesley 
Salmon on Explanation, Probability and Rationality,” in Galavotti, M. C. and paGnini, a. (eds.), Experience, Reality, 
and Scientific Explanation. Essays in Honor of Merrilee and Wesley Salmon, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1999, pp. 39-54.
8  SalMon, W. c., “A Reply to two Critiques,” Philosophy of Science, v. 64, (1997), p. 476. 
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fact his mechanical picture of causality suits fields like statistical mechanics, characterized 
by a sound theoretical apparatus and by the use of general laws to describe the phenomena. 
in that realm, provided that the available information will identify causal mechanisms, 
statistical causality will match token causality. by contrast, in disciplines characterized by 
a weaker theoretical apparatus the description of phenomena rests on models, and the link 
between statistical and token causality becomes looser, as does that between explanation 
and prediction. One can say that Salmon’s attempt to develop a theory of causality meant to 
combine property and token causality within a unified theory of explanation results in very 
restricted applicability. this is the price he pays for making the asymmetry of causation depend 
ultimately on spatio-temporal continuous processes, a notion that faces severe difficulties in 
fields like economics, psychology, medicine, and more generally the social sciences, which 
happen to offer the most extensive ground for the application of causal concepts.
Experimentation enters into Salmon’s theory in a somewhat tangential way. Following a 
long standing-tradition dating back at least to John Stuart Mill, Salmon acknowledges the 
importance of controlled experimentation “to investigate cause-effect relations.” 9 in addition, 
he grounds the notion of counterfactual on experimentation, in an attempt to avoid getting 
muddled with lewis’s possible worlds interpretation. After having tried for a long time to 
dispense with counterfactuals, Salmon accepted the suggestion put forward by a number of 
authors including James Woodward and Christopher hitchcock that counterfactuals should 
be assigned an explanatory role. 10 he then turned to counterfactuals rooted in correlations 
expressing frequencies, supported by experimentation: “counterfactuals, like statistical 
relevance relations, are often effectively tested by controlled experiments.” 11 Again, this is 
bound to raise problems of applicability in a number of fields, where extensive information of 
that kind is not available. 
Alternative forms of mechanicism have been proposed by a number of authors. Among 
them Phil Dowe, who develops a notion of physical causation based on a conserved quantity 
theory of processes. 12 this is intended to be a refinement of Salmon’s theory of causation, 
especially because it does not require the use of counterfactuals, and in his last writings 
Salmon adopted it with minor changes. 
Other mechanical theories are due to Stuart Glennan, 13 Peter Machamer, lindley Darden and 
Carl Craver, 14 who are primarily concerned with applications to complex systems, especially 
those occurring in biology. With respect to Salmon’s perspective, the theories advanced by 
these authors are more flexible, as they admit of incomplete descriptions of mechanisms and 
stress the importance of contextual elements. 
having in mind applications to neurobiology, Machamer, Darden and Craver define 
mechanisms in terms of both the entities that compose them and the activities they perform. 
9  SalMon, W. c., “A Realistic Account of Causation,” in MarSonet, M. (ed.), The Problem of Realism, Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2002, p. 129. 
10 See especially hitchcock, c., “Discussion: Salmon on Explanatory Relevance,” Philosophy of Science, v. 62, 
(1995), pp. 304-320, to which Salmon replied in his paper “A Reply to two Critiques.”
11 SalMon, W. c., “A Reply to two Critiques,” p. 476.
12 Cf. doWe, p., Physical Causation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
13 Cf. Glennan, S., “Rethinking Mechanical Explanation,” in PSA 2000. Part II. Supplement to Philosophy of 
Science, v. 69, (2002), pp. S342-S353.
14 Cf. MachaMer, p., darden, l. and craver, c., “thinking about Mechanisms,” Philosophy of Science, v. 67, 
(2000), pp. 1-25. 
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Mechanisms are complex systems organised into a multi-level hierarchical structure, whose 
distinctive feature is the productive continuity between the various stages characterizing 
their activity. the components of mechanisms exhibit specific spatio-temporal features, 
and their productive stages are characterized by certain phases, a given duration, and so 
on. Phenomena are explained by describing which mechanism produces them and how. 
Mechanisms that are described only in part, or mechanism schemata to be formulated at 
different levels of abstraction, are also admitted. 
Experimentation is assigned an important role in order to detect mechanisms. this role 
is pointed out by Craver, who describes various experimental strategies aimed at telling us 
“what the relevant entities and activities are, how they are nested in component/sub-component 
relations, and how the activities of the component entities fit into their mechanistic context.” 15 
Darden also calls attention to the need for an experimental phase in the complex process of 
“discovering” mechanisms. he draws an analogy with the procedures adopted by engineers 
when designing mechanisms: “the engineering process of designing a mechanism goes through 
cycles of construction, evaluation and revision as components are proposed, evaluated, and 
possibly redesigned. the goal is to construct a smoothly working mechanism. there is a strong 
analogy between an engineer designing a mechanism and a scientist discovering one that 
already works in nature.” 16 the “evaluation” phase involves experimentation, which therefore 
becomes a crucial ingredient of these versions of mechanicism. 17 
3.2. Manipulability
the other mainstream in the philosophical debate combines causality with manipulability. 
A radical version of this tendency is represented by the agency account of causality developed 
by huw Price, partly in collaboration with Peter Menzies. here causality is related to the agent’s 
perspective, in the sense that to think of A as a cause of B is to regard A as a potential means 
for achieving the end B. Causal asymmetry is grounded in our experience as agents —an idea 
borrowed from the philosophy of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. this view of causality is openly 
anthropocentric, because causality is taken as “a manifestation of the fact that causal concepts 
originate in our experience as agents.” 18 Embracing a similar account involves regarding 
human beings as deliberating agents, rather than pure observers. this is reflected by the 
label perspectivalism attached by Price to his own viewpoint, that extends beyond causation, 
to laws, theories and probability, which are all made to depend ultimately on the agent’s 
knowledge and beliefs. Obviously, this theory has a strong pragmatic flavour and regards 
causality as intrinsically context dependent. As Price puts it: “causation has a conceptual tie 
to intervention, and hence to deliberation. but the possibility of deliberation is epistemically 
constrained in several ways —it depends on both knowledge and ignorance, and these 
epistemic factors are contingencies, whose limits may well vary from agent to agent. hence 
15 craver, c., “interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory,” in PSA 2000. 
Part II. Supplement to Philosophy of Science, v. 69, (2002), p. S91.
16 darden, l., “Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms: Schema instantiation, Modular Subassembly, Forward/
backward Chaining,” in PSA 2000. Part II. Supplement to Philosophy of Science, v. 69, (2002), p. S364.
17 the role of experimentation within these mechanical theories is explored in some detail in caMpaner, r., 
“Mechanisms and Counterfactuals: a Different Glimpse of the (Secret?) Connexion,” Philosophica, v. 77, (2006), 
pp. 15-44.
18 price, h., “Agency and Causal Asymmetry,” Mind, v. 101, (1992), p. 501.
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causal judgments are correspondingly perspectival: they are necessarily ‘situated’, relative to 
some implicit boundaries to the knowledge and ignorance of the agent concerned.” 19
the agency theory of causation is couched in probabilistic terms. in other words, the means-end 
relation on which the theory is grounded is characterized in terms of “agent probabilities,” 
to be construed as conditional probabilities, “assessed from an agent’s perspective under the 
supposition that the antecedent condition is realized ab initio, as a free act of the agent concerned. 
thus the agent probability that one should ascribe to b conditional on A … is the probability 
that b would hold were one to choose to realize A.” 20 According to its proponents this approach 
has several advantages, like that of representing a good substitute for the counterfactual theory, 
and offering a natural solution to the problem of spurious causation. in this connection, Price 
holds that statistical correlations are assigned an asymmetrical interpretation in the light of 
an agent’s judgment in terms of the means-end relation, rooted in his own experience. Such a 
judgment drives deliberation towards asymmetrical correlations rather than to mere statistical 
correlations, which are usually symmetrical, and “correlations due to common causes don’t 
translate into probabilistic dependencies from the agent’s point of view.” 21
Salmon’s and Price’s theories stand opposed in various respects: Salmon’s is ontic, Price’s 
anthropocentric; Salmon’s conjugates causality with explanation, Price’s does not; Salmon relies 
on an objective notion of probability, namely the frequency interpretation, Price is not explicit 
on this point, but his reliance on Ramsey’s ideas calls for the subjective notion of probability. 
Furthermore, Salmon gives a detailed account of causality meant to cover token causation, but 
his theory has restricted applicability; instead Price’s view is very general and widely applicable, 
but it needs to be supplemented with more detailed accounts in order to fit specific contexts.
Although Price does not pay much attention to experimentation, he assigns a pivotal role to 
intervention. the fact that the asymmetry between cause and effect is captured in a natural way 
by the analogous asymmetry between interventions and the changes they produce in certain 
phenomena and/or variables, leads naturally to experimentation. this idea is clearly stated by 
the economist Daniel hausman in his article “Causation and Experimentation,” where he writes: 
“the fact that causes can be used to manipulate their effects, but not vice versa seems to capture a 
good deal of the notion that causes are ‘effective’ and that they necessitate their effects.” 22
A similar idea underlies James Woodward’s version of the manipulative view of causation 
that focusses on the link between causation and experimentation. Woodward feels the need to 
distance himself from the anthropocentrism characterizing Price’s perspective and, borrowing 
some results from econometrics, defines causation in terms of invariance under a set of 
interventions. laws are accounted for in a similar fashion, being taken as generalizations that 
are invariant, or stable across a broad range of varying conditions and circumstances. Relying 
on such a notion of law, Woodward develops a view of explanation reflecting the claim that 
“to explain an explanandum is to show how changes in it counterfactually depend on changes 
in the factors cited in the explanans … the relevant notion of counterfactual dependence 
19 price, h., “Causal Perspectivalism,” in price, h. and corry, R. (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of 
Reality. Russell’s Republicanism Revisited, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 282.
20 MenzieS, p. and price, h., “Causation as a Secondary Quality,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 44, 
(1993), p. 190.
21 price, h., “Causal Perspectivalism,” p. 281. See also price, h., “Agency and Probabilistic Causality,” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 42, (1991), pp. 157-176.
22 hauSMan, d., “Causation and Experimentation,” American Philosophical Quarterly, v. 23, (1986), 150.
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(or of answering a what-if-things-had-been-different question) is captured by counterfactuals 
the antecedents of which have to do with interventions. … When a generalization relating 
x and y is invariant in this way, we may think of it as telling us how to manipulate y if 
(perhaps contrary to actual fact) it were possible to intervene to change x. in this sense the 
theory … embodies a ‘manipulationist’ conception of explanation.” 23 An important feature of 
Woodward’s position is that manipulation is not taken relative to experiments that are actually 
performed, but rather to hypothetical experiments, i.e., to potential “appropriately designed 
experimental manipulation.” 24 the transposition of causation from agency to manipulability in 
terms of hypothetical experiments is designed to contrast the halo of subjectivism surrounding 
Price’s agency theory of causation, to embrace a form of “instrumental realism.” 
Woodward complains that “most philosophical treatments of causation leave the connection 
between the content of causal claims and the role of experimentation completely opaque.” 25 in 
an attempt to counteract this tendency, he brings experimentation to the foreground and assigns 
it a twofold role. First and foremost, experimentation is the essential ingredient of Woodward’s 
definition of causation. As he puts it: “causal claims should be interpretable as claims about 
the outcomes of hypothetical experiments.” 26 Secondly, experimentation is the tool that will 
distinguish causal relations from observable correlations (that might be spurious). 
the vast debate provoked by Woodward’s theory cannot be described here. 27 however, 
it is significant that Woodward’s approach requires that invariance is assumed across 
observational and experimental situations. in his words: “using experiments to learn about 
causes requires that some relationships remain stable or invariant across the manipulated and 
unmanipulated systems.” 28 One may wonder to what extent invariance assumptions of this 
kind can be taken to hold. As we shall see in Section 5, one lesson that can be learned from the 
work of econometricians and statisticians is that invariance assumptions need to be justified 
with reference to the context in which they occur.
4. suPPes’ PluralIsm 
in his monograph A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, published in 1970, Patrick Suppes 
takes a pluralistic approach to causality that does not resemble any of the views considered 
so far. Suppes does not attempt to work out a univocal definition of probabilistic causality, 
but gives a flexible, context-dependent account. he does not impose requirements on causal 
chains, and claims that causality can be defined both in terms of random variables and events, 
23 WoodWard, J., “law and Explanation in biology: invariance is the Kind of Stability that Matters,” Philosophy 
of Science, v. 68 (2001), p. 5. See also WoodWard, J., Making Things Happen, Oxford University Press, New york, 
2003, and the articles by hitchcock, c. and WoodWard J., “Explanatory Generalizations: Part i: A Counterfactual 
Account,” Nous, v. 37, n. 1, (2003), pp. 1-24, and hitchcock, c. and WoodWard J., “Explanatory Generalizations: Part 
ii: Plumbing Explanatory Depth,” Nous, v. 37, n. 2, (2003), pp. 181-199.
24 WoodWard, J., “Experimentation, Causal inference, and instrumental Realism,” in radder, h. (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2003, p. 90.
25 WoodWard, J., “Experimentation, Causal inference, and instrumental Realism,” p. 87.
26 “Experimentation, Causal inference, and instrumental Realism,” p. 105.
27 Among others, Paul humphreys criticises Woodward for allowing manipulations to alter the structure (or 
mechanism) characterizing the situation in which a certain causal attribution is made, and Elliott Sober challenges 
Woodward’s way of handling the type/token distinction. See the review symposium “invariance, Explanation and 
Understanding,” Metascience, v. 15 (2006), pp. 39-66, with papers by Paul humphreys and Elliott Sober, and the 
“Author’s Response” by James Woodward.
28 WoodWard, J., “Experimentation, Causal inference, and instrumental Realism,” p. 102.
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without specifying once and for all what counts as an “event.” the notion of event, like that 
of cause, is linked to the specification of the set of concepts characterizing a given context. 
Coherently with his pluralistic epistemology, centred on models, Suppes adopts a model-based 
approach to causality. 29 
Experimentation plays an important role in this perspective. Suppes observes that “there are 
at least three kinds of conceptual frameworks within which it seems appropriate to make causal 
claims … One conceptual framework is that provided by a particular scientific theory; the second 
is of the sort that arises in connection with a particular experiment or class of experiments; and 
the third is the most general framework expressing our beliefs with respect to all information 
available to us.” 30 After pointing out the relevance of the notion of causation to the sphere of 
experimentation, extensively dealt with by statisticians, Suppes calls attention to an important 
distinction, namely that between contexts characterised by extensive experimentation and 
contexts that are not. he does so in the course of a discussion of the problem of passing from 
causal relations regarding types to conclusions regarding tokens, and points out that, in spite 
of the fact that this passage is clearly unwarranted, predictions of individual events based on 
relations of the type kind are made every day, for instance by meteorologists. Undoubtedly, such 
inferential procedures can only depend ultimately on “judgment as to how the knowledge one has 
is used and assessed,” 31 but if such knowledge includes widely accepted generalizations backed 
by extensive experimentation, the shift from type to tokens is more warranted, though there will 
always be additional elements to be evaluated case by case. if the information available does not 
stand on a strong experimental basis, additional care will be required. therefore experimentation 
—actual or potential— provides solid grounds for causal inferences from types to tokens. 
Suppes’ pluralism holds that any attempt at working out a notion of causality applicable to 
every situation in which causal speech occurs is deemed to failure, because different contexts 
call for a different characterization of causality. Grounded on this conviction, his theory of 
causality is conceived as a starting point from which to move on to more detailed accounts to 
be given within specific contexts. 
5. mOdel-Based aPPrOaChes In statIstICs and eCOnOmetrICs 
Statisticians and econometricians by and large share a model-based approach to probabilistic 
causality, which devotes great attention to observation and experimentation. Manipulability is 
a crucial ingredient of the notion of causation developed within econometrics and statistics, 
where it is associated with a functionalist notion of mechanism, taken to represent the structure 
of a model rather than a description of the world. 
5.1. Econometrics
Causality has always been a major issue for econometrics, where it is conceived as a 
combination of functionalism and manipulability. One can distinguish two approaches 
to econometric model building. One is the “classical” approach started by the founders of 
29 See SuppeS, p., Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993, and 
SuppeS, p., Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures, CSli Publications, Stanford, 2002.
30 SuppeS, p., A Probabilistic Theory of Causality, North-holland, Amsterdam, 1970, p. 13.
31 SuppeS, p., “Conflicting intuitions about Causality,” in French, p., yuehlinG, t. and WettStein, h. (eds.), Causation 
and Causal Theories. Midwestern Studies in Philosophy IX, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984; 
reprinted in SuppeS, p., Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, p. 130.
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econometrics like Ragnar Frisch, Jan tinbergen and trygve haavelmo. Such an approach 
is often associated with the names of herbert Simon and herman Wold and is characterized 
by the following steps: (1) building a simplified model (in general a linear model) of a 
deterministic economic theory; (2) adding an error term (also called residual or disturbance) 
to each relationship provided by the theory; (3) estimating the unknown parameters of the 
model on the basis of observable data; (4) applying a set of statistical tests to assess the fit of 
the econometric model to the given data; (5) using the accepted model to forecast and evaluate 
economic policy interventions. 32 Causality is a feature of the model, which can be identified 
with the possibility of manipulating the relations it fixes. Manipulability is what distinguishes 
a causal model from purely predictive models. Within the Simon-Wold’s approach causality is 
associated with exogeneity, which in turn depends on a priori assumptions, usually imposing 
some restrictions on the parameters of the model. When the conditions imposed on a model 
are justified by an appeal to economic theory, the model is called structural and interpreted as 
describing the behaviour of an economic system, according to some theory.
the second approach to econometric model building is characterised by the adoption of 
statistical models specified in terms of observable random variables. this approach strongly 
emphasizes observed data, and makes the validity of an econometric model depend more on 
the probabilistic structure of observed data than on theoretical assumptions. Statistical and 
theoretical models stand side by side, and both play an important role. A theoretical model 
represents a mathematically formulated construct making use of theoretical variables (such 
as for example demand and supply in relation to intentions and plans of economic agents). A 
statistical model supplies probability distributions for the observed variables and specifies a 
sampling model. 
the probabilistic approach covers a number of different viewpoints. A well known theory 
is due to Clive W. J. Granger, 33 whose notion of causality is based on data arranged in time 
series. Accordingly, a variable y can be said to cause another variable x if the information 
provided by the knowledge of y at time t is relevant to the value taken by x at time t + 1 
(assuming that all considered variables are measured at pre-specified time points at constant 
intervals t = 1, 2, …). to give an operative import to his notion of causality, and to connect 
it with predictability, Granger works out the complementary notion of non-causality, based 
on conditional independence. Non-causality can be subjected to various testing procedures, 
which specify its operational meaning. 
Granger’s causality rests on the idea that causality is to be based in the first place on 
observed data, not on theory. As a matter of fact, Granger claims that theoretical knowledge 
has no role at all in his theory. however, to justify this claim he requires causal assertions 
to be conditional on knowledge of the history of the universe, which should also include 
information on which variables are to be taken as exogenous and which as endogenous. this 
is obviously an ideal requirement never to be fulfilled; for this reason Granger puts forward 
a weaker notion of causality in mean, which is easier to test and therefore more suitable for 
operative purposes. 
32 For a more detailed account of the Simon-Wold approach see Galavotti, M. c. and GaMBetta, G., “Causality and 
Exogeneity in Econometric Models,” in cooke, r. and coStantini, d. (eds.), Statistics in Science. The Foundations of 
Statistical Methods in Biology, Physics and Economics, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 27-40.
33 See GranGer, c. W. J., “testing for Causality: a Personal Viewpoint,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
v. 2, (1980), pp. 329-352.
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in a recent paper addressed to philosophical readers, Granger illustrates the advantages of 
his own theory as follows “it is easily understood, is pragmatic, and can be used in testing and 
is also not clearly incorrect.” 34 For Granger, the suitability of a definition of causality can only 
be asserted on pragmatical grounds: “the effect of a causal definition on the decisions taken by 
a decision maker in a realistic setting is the only way that its usefulness can be discussed.” 35 
Causality is strictly linked with manipulation because it provides solid grounds for decisions 
regarding economic policy. Nevertheless, Granger maintains that causality should not be 
identified with control over economic variables, because control “is a much deeper concept 
than causality. … many writers seem to want to find causality so that the relationship obtained 
can be used to control or manipulate the effect. however, for this to succeed one needs the 
assumption that the relation does not change when control is attempted.” 36 We are warned that 
such an assumption cannot be taken to hold in all situations, and needs justification. Granger’s 
recommendation that the assumptions underlying causal attributions, as well as prediction and 
decisions on policy making, be made explicit and justified is a distinctive trait of the approach 
taken by econometricians and statisticians.
A generalization of Granger’s theory has been proposed by Robert F. Engle, David F. hendry 
and Jean-Francois Richard, 37 according to whom exogeneity, instead of being a distinctive 
characteristic of a variable as in the classical view (for example policy variables under direct 
intervention of the authorities), is a property that depends on the chosen parametrization of the 
model and on the use for which the model has been constructed. in this perspective endogenous 
and exogenous variables cannot be distinguished before the probability distribution of 
observable variables is considered. in other words, the distinction is not fully definable on a 
priori grounds, but is to some extent testable inside a specific model. incidentally, this marks 
a difference with Granger’s theory, which is model independent because it does not include 
restrictions on parameters. 
A somewhat similar view is that of Christopher Sims, who defines as structural a model 
which is invariant under a certain set of hypothetical interventions. here “whether a model 
is structural depends on the use to which it is to be put —on what class of interventions is 
being considered.” 38 One cannot decide whether a model is structural (whether it describes a 
structure) by examining the form of the system of equations, as in the classic view of Simon 
and Wold. by contrast, the property of being structural is related to the application of the 
system to the world. Such a property can be tested by comparing the predictions as to the 
effects of an intervention, made on the basis of a certain system, with the observed results 
of such intervention. Woodward’s theory shares some traits with Sim’s, but it should not pass 
unnoticed that Sim’s definition of causality remains within the scope of econometrics and 
does not share the claim to generality that Woodward attaches to his own approach. 
in general, the view of causality worked out by econometricians has a pragmatic flavour and 
qualifies as pluralistic and context-dependent. this tendency has been strengthened by the need 
to handle the problem of bridging the gap between macro and micro models (the so-called problem 
34 GranGer, c. W. J., “Causality in Economics,” in MachaMer, p. and WolterS, G. (eds.), Thinking about Causes. 
From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2007, p. 294.
35 GranGer, c. W. J., “Causality in Economics,” p. 295.
36 “Causality in Economics,” p. 294.
37 See enGle, r. F., hendry, d. F. and richard, J.-F., “Exogeneity,” Econometrica, v. 51, (1983), pp. 277-304.
38 SiMS, c. a., “Scientific Standards in Econometric Modelling,” in hazeWinkel, M. and rinnooy kan, a. h. G. (eds.), 
Current Developments in the Interface: Economics, Econometrics, Mathematics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1982, p. 332.
149changes in the framework on observation and experimentation
of aggregation). Put briefly, the problem arises from the fact that while variables taken to be 
manipulable (instrument variables) are assumed to be strictly causal with respect to single 
agents, in the sense that single agents cannot influence their value, at the aggregate level the 
behaviour of all agents can have feedback effects on the instruments of the policy maker, 
thereby altering the causal structure of the effect. in view of this, it is necessary to introduce 
a conditional concept of manipulability, according to which the efficacy of the intervention of 
the policy maker is subordinate to the body of information available to economic agents. the 
conclusion attained by the econometric literature is that the relationship between causality 
referred to statistical variables and causality referred to individuals can be handled only at 
the price of introducing a conditional notion of manipulability and a dynamical specification 
of causal structure, dependent on the expectations and the information available to economic 
agents, as well as on the purpose for which models are used. 39
Econometrics exhibits a complex interplay between observable data and/or variables and 
theoretical assumptions (or variables) that calls for a systematic separation between them. 
in economics it is often the case that observable phenomena are measured by means of 
non-experimental data, namely only one sample can be generated for each situation. Given 
that proper randomization procedures cannot be applied, tests are extensively used in such 
situations, to guarantee the correct specification of models. here manipulation plays a 
crucial role by comparing predictions with the results of intervention. Another peculiarity of 
econometrics lies in the fact that data are sometimes referred to the population (for instance, 
mean or marginal data on income, consumption, etc.) and sometimes to individuals (for 
instance, data expressed in terms of expectations). in this connection the issue of observation 
and experimentation intersects that of type and token causation. 
5.2. Statistics
Statisticians have devoted great attention to causality, traditionally associated with the 
design and interpretation of experiments. like econometricians, statisticians refer causality 
to models and associate it with manipulability. An influential theory of causality has been put 
forward by Judea Pearl. building on the techniques of representing statistical associations by 
means of graphs, Pearl defines causal relationships on the basis of directed acyclic graphs 
(DAG), also called Bayesian networks. the causal interpretation attached to such networks 
combines the functionalist notion of mechanism with manipulability. Put briefly, causal 
bayesian networks are taken to represent ordered structures of variables exhibiting certain 
stability conditions which can lead to manipulations. Such a “mechanism-based conception 
of interventions” 40 is the cornerstone of a theory of causality that regards causality as a useful 
tool for prediction and intervention. A clear-cut distinction between seeing and doing underlies 
Pearl’s treatment of causality, where the quantities determined through observation are 
systematically distinguished from those obtained through experiment. this distinction plays 
a crucial role in predicting the results of controlled experiments from observed probabilities, 
which from this perspective is the main task of causality.
39 For more details see Galavotti, M. c. and GaMBetta, G., “theory and Observation in Econometric Models: a 
Constructivist Approach,” in roSSini Favretti r., Sandri, G. and Scazzieri, r. (eds.), Incommensurability and 
Translation, Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton, 1999, pp. 339-349.
40 pearl, J., Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 24.
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Pearl also considers the explanatory use of causal models “to provide an ‘explanation’ or 
‘understanding’ of how data are generated,” or to convey information on “how things work.” 41 
A crucial role is assigned to the stability of causal structures, which should be durable over 
time and invariant across a variety of situations. Models characterized by such features of 
robustness allow for predictions and manipulations that are bound to hold for a wide range 
of circumstances. So conceived, “the explanatory account of causation is merely a variant 
of the manipulative account, albeit one where interventions are dormant.” 42 Remarkably, 
Pearl’s recent work on “actual causes” and explanation, done in collaboration with Joseph 
halpern, reaches the conclusion that when taken in the explanatory sense causality is context 
dependent. this simply follows from the fact that the whole edifice of causation is made to rest 
on modelling, which in turn requires various assumptions so strictly linked with the context as 
to justify the claim that “the choice of model is a subjective one” and “depends to some extent 
on what the model is being used for.” 43 
Although well received, especially among computer scientists and psychologists, 44 Pearl’s 
theory of causation has provoked much debate. its most controversial aspect lies in the Markov 
condition required by DAGs, whose assumption is considered by many authors problematic in 
a number of situations. We will not go into the details of this highly debated topic, nor shall we 
deal with the related issue of randomization, which is also a matter of endless controversy. 45 
Another important theory developed within the statistical literature is the so-called 
potential response (PR) approach of Donald Rubin, Paul holland and others. 46 this is a model 
for inferring the effects of causes (type causation) that makes use of counterfactual reasoning 
couched in statistical terms. As described by its most resolute opponent, namely Philip Dawid, 
the “special feature of the PR approach is that it represents a response (‘effect’) variable Y by 
two or more random variables, one for each of the possible values of the ‘cause variable’ X.” 47 
the idea is to compare the (assumed) values of potential responses with the effects observed in 
experimental units, under appropriate assumptions. these are usually invariance assumptions, 
like “unit homogeneity” (for instance, experimental units of people who are treated for 
headache with a certain drug); “temporal stability” (constancy of response to treatment over 
time); “causal transience” (the effect of causes and measurement processes in control groups 
is transient and does not affect the response to treatment measured later); and “constant effect” 
(the effect of treatment on each and every experimental unit is the same). Potential responses 
are defined counterfactually, namely the model assumes that even though a certain response 
is observed (say a certain subject u has given a certain response to drug treatment) “there is 
still a fact of the matter about what the subject’s u response would have been, had she been 
41 pearl, J., Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference, pp. 25-26.
42 Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Inference, p. 26.
43 halpern, J. and pearl, J., “Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part i: Causes,” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 56, (2005), p. 878.
44 See for instance SloMan, S., Causal Models, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
45 See for instance the discussion of randomization in Worrall, J., “Why Randomize? Evidence and Ethics in 
Clinical trials,” in Gonzalez, W. J. and alcolea, J. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology 
of Science, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2006, pp. 65-82.
46 See for instance holland, p., “the Causal interpretation of Regression Coefficients,” in Galavotti, M. c., SuppeS, 
p. and coStantini, d. (eds.), Stochastic Causality, Stanford, CSli, 2001, pp. 173-187, and the bibliography included.
47 daWid, p., “Counterfactuals, hypotheticals and Potential Responses: A Philosophical Examination of Statistical 
Causality,” in ruSSo, F. and WilliaMSon, J. (eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences, College Publications, 
london, 2007, p. 510.
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given [a different] treatment.” 48 Such a counterfactual assumption is really the gist of the 
PR method, which derives from it the capability of treating causes of effects. Stathis Psillos, 
who has called the attention of philosophers of science to this method, quite popular among 
statisticians, deems it “a big step forward” 49 and argues in favour of a pluralistic approach to 
causality combining counterfactuals and mechanisms. 
by contrast, the counterfactual assumption underlying the PR approach is judged 
metaphysical by Philip Dawid, who opposes to it a decision-theoretic approach (Dt), which 
is entirely in terms of conditional probabilities and expectations based on information, known 
or knowable. the Dt approach avoids counterfactuals, to use only “models and quantities 
that are empirically testable and discoverable.” 50 According to Dawid, type causality, or the 
analysis of effects of causes, can be done entirely with the Dt machinery. however, the same 
cannot be said of token causality, or the analysis of causes of effects, which is more strictly 
related to counterfactuals. in that connection the Dt approach leaves some problems open. 
An important aspect of Dawid’s work amounts to his insistence on the need to make explicit 
the assumptions (usually invariance assumptions) that are made, and systematically separate 
observational regime from interventional regime. the task of type causation analysis, he 
claims, is to use past data to make choices about future interventions, and “… this requires that 
we understand very clearly the real-world meaning of terms such as ‘observational regime’ or 
‘interventional regime’, since there are many possible varieties of such regimes.” 51 this can only 
be accomplished with reference to the context in which one operates, and the same holds for the 
justification of assumptions. in Dawid’s words: “… appropriate specification of context, relevant 
to the specific purposes at hand, is vital to render causal questions and answers meaningful.” 52 
this passage contains a major lesson to be drawn from the statistical literature on causality. 
6. ClOsInG remarks
the preceding overview addressed a variety of theories of causality. First we examined a 
number of viewpoints developed by philosophers of science, ranging from Salmon’s monolithic 
account embodying a fully fledged definition of causality, to Suppes’ pluralistic perspective, 
which leaves the specification of what counts as causal to the context. While Salmon’s view 
is centred on physics and relies on theories and laws, Suppes has in mind a broad range of 
applications, including the social sciences, where heavy use of statistical models is made. 
like Reichenbach, Salmon assigns a marginal role to experimentation, which is by and large 
regarded as belonging to the “context of discovery.”
by contrast, Woodward makes experimentation an essential ingredient of his manipulative 
approach, where it enters in the definition of causality as well as laws. Salmon’s and 
Woodward’s theories embody different intuitions of causality and diverge in a number of 
important respects. Nevertheless, they seem to share the tendency to define causality in a 
48 pSilloS, S., “A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: harmonizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals,” Perspectives 
on Science, v. 12, (2004), p. 303.
49 pSilloS, S., “A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: harmonizing Mechanisms with Counterfactuals,” p. 307.
50 daWid, p., “Causal inference Without Counterfactuals,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, v. 95, 
(2000), p. 408.
51 daWid, p., “Counterfactuals, hypotheticals and Potential Responses: A Philosophical Examination of Statistical 
Causality,” p. 529.
52 daWid, p., “Causal inference Without Counterfactuals,” p. 422.
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univocal fashion, to establish a strong connection between causality and explanation, and to 
regard type and token causation as readily combinable. 
Applied scientists like statisticians and econometricians take a different stand. their 
attitude towards experimentation is similar to Woodward’s, but they keep type and token 
causation separate, do not link causality with explanation and take a model-based and context-
dependent viewpoint.
Strong emphasis is put on context by Suppes, who holds that an investigation of causal 
attributions made in different fields shows that different causal notions can prove useful within 
different contexts. in tune with his attitude, it is here suggested that probabilistic causality is 
better conceived as context-dependent, and that local accounts of causality should be preferred 
to univocal definitions. in the first place this involves assumptions made case by case being 
fully specified. the need to support causal analysis by a careful consideration of context 
seems particularly compelling in the social sciences —including psychology, medicine, law, 
and so on— where various assumptions are made at every stage of causal analysis. the aims 
of enquiry, the nature of the “objects” (events, variables, time series, etc.) to which causal 
relations are referred and the predictive or explanatory use made of such relations are additional 
contextual elements to be taken into account. Also important is the distinction between type 
and token analysis, and the interplay between mechanical and manipulative causality. 53 
the same holds for the distinction between observational and interventional (experimental) 
regimes systematically made by statisticians. 
A pluralistic approach to probabilistic causality goes hand in hand with a model-based 
approach. One could say that when applied to probabilistic causality models play the role of 
mediators described by Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison. 54 Models play a mediating 
role between the various uses to which probabilistic causality can be put, namely prediction, 
manipulation and explanation. Moreover, they mediate between mechanical and manipulative 
causation, and between type and token analysis. last but not least, they mediate between 
theory, observation and experimentation.
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the rOle Of exPerIments  
In the theOrIes Of dIstrIButIVe JustICe 1
obdulia torres 
the traditional role that has been assigned to experiments from the standard conception is 
to test the theories. it implies, as has been sustained, that experimentation has no relevance in 
the context of the theories of distributive justice, given that these are normative theories based 
on principles or ethical judgements. in this paper i will try to show that experiments not only 
can fulfil the role that traditionally has been assigned to them, namely to test the theories, but 
also that they can be a fundamental tool in the conceptual clarification, the evaluation and the 
political implementation of these theories, and further that they can be a source of stimulation 
for new theoretical developments.
1. IntrOduCtIOn
the traditional role that has been assigned to experiments from the standard conception is to 
test the theories. this implies, as has been sustained, that experimentation has no relevance in 
the context of the theories of distributive justice, given that these are normative theories based on 
principles or ethical judgements. Since the famous dictum of hume, regarding the impossibility 
of inferring ought judgements from is, theoretical knowledge is generated by scholarly 
introspection and deduction from the general principles so founded. the general opinion is that 
popular beliefs about justice are one thing and a correct theory about it is quite another. Using 
the words of a theorist: “Evidently uninformed opinions of (a small and biased proportion of) the 
population do not have any authority over fundamental principles.” 2 the data obtained through 
empirical research are not relevant for the correction or validity of the theories. however in 
recent years there has been a growing interest in research in this area, which seems to indicate 
that this thought is not general and that experimentation does have a role to play in this field.
in the following pages i will try to show that with respect to the theories of distributive 
justice, first, experimentation can fulfil the role that traditionally has been assigned to it, 
namely to test the theories, and second, it can also be a fundamental tool in the conceptual 
clarification, the evaluation and the political implementation of these theories, and further that 
it can be a source of stimulation for new theoretical developments. this second approach is 
carried out according to the seminal work of i. hacking 3 and especially M. S. Morgan, 4 who 
develops an important comparative analysis between models and experiments emphasizing 
that both fulfil identical functions as conceptual clarification tools and demonstrating the 
major epistemic power of the experiment compared to the model.
1  this work has been possible thanks to a research grant from the Ministry of Education and Science, which financed 
my stay as a guest researcher in the project “Equality and Plurality” at Copenhagen University. i am very grateful for 
the invitation to participate from the director of the project K. l. Rasmussen. An additional support was given by the 
Spanish Ministry of Science and innovation, Research Project FFi2009-09483.
2  devooGht, k., “Measuring inequality by Counting Complaints: theory and Empirics,” Economics and Philosophy, 
v. 19, (2003), p. 242.
3  Cf. hackinG, i., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
4  Cf. MorGan, M. S., “Experiment versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” Journal of Economic 
Methodology, v. 12, n. 2, (2005), pp. 317-329.
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to show the above, i have selected a number of experiments performed by different 
authors which illustrate each of these functions. Even though it is not possible for reasons of 
space to describe such experiments in detail, each of them has been carried out by means of 
questionnaires in laboratory conditions. this methodology has been demonstrated to be very 
fruitful in other areas such as economy and psychology.
2. testInG the theOry
We will start by shortly characterizing the distributive theories. A distributive theory 
assigns to every individual a certain quantity of relevant resources according to some normative 
principle in a way that it can be said that the outcome is fair according to that principle. thus, 
we have a selection of principles, some distributive mechanisms related to the principles and 
a series of rules that govern the distribution. these rules can be characterized as properties of 
these mechanisms. With very broad strokes these principles can be grouped under the labels 
necessity, desert and equality. the question to be answered is: “who should get what?”
One of the distributive theories that has frequently been subject to experimental studies is the 
theory of justice by J. Rawls. 5 broadly speaking, Rawls starts from the following assumptions: 
individuals are rational and self-interested, and under very specific hypothetical conditions 
(“original position”) characterized by a restricted level of information (a “veil of ignorance”), 
the subjects will almost exclusively be concerned with the possibility of being placed in the 
worst-off class. From that he derives three fundamental hypotheses: 1) the individuals will 
come to a unanimous agreement, 2) the individuals will always select the same principle and 
3) as distributive principle the individuals will select the difference principle which maximizes 
the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society.
Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey subjected to empirical testing the three aforementioned 
hypotheses. “the experimental itself consisted of three parts. First, five subjects were each 
introduced to principles of distributive justice and given experience choosing a principle 
which governed their first earnings. Second, the subjects were given a chance to discuss 
and then to choose collectively a particular distributive principle that governed their next 
payments. Finally, the subjects answered a questionnaire about themselves. At four points in 
the experiment, subjects were asked to rank, according to their preferences, the principles of 
justice that were on the agenda and to indicate how sure they were of these rankings.” 6 the 
experimental results confirm 1 and 2, but deny 3: the individuals do not select the difference 
principle. Furthermore none of the 44 groups in the experiment selected that principle, not 
even in a modified experiment where theoretically the adoption of the difference principle was 
favoured. instead of that, they selected a compound principle which maximizes the average 
income with a constraint on the floor, or the income of the worst-off.
Rawls’ theory presents a series of characteristics that makes it especially suitable to 
be subjected to experimentation in which it has the same role as in any scientific theory. 
According to the authors of the experiment, this is due to the fact that Rawlsian theory is based 
on explicit assumptions of human behaviour: “Whenever an ethical theory implicitly contains 
a model of human psychology from which normative conclusions are derived, that model 
opens the possibility for testing.” 7
5  Cf. raWlS, J., A Theory of Justice, harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971. 
6  Frohlich, n., oppenheiMer, J. and eavey, ch., “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental 
Groups,” American Journal of Political Science, v. 31, n. 3, (1987), p. 611.
7  Frohlich, n., oppenheiMer, J. and eavey, ch., “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental 
Groups,” p. 634.
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it seems that Rawls’ theory is testable as it is based on explicit assumptions of human 
behaviour 8, which is in contrast to the rest of the distributive theories. it is the behaviour 
generated by these assumptions that gives normative strength to the conclusions. however, 
most of the distributive theories are not expressed in a way that they can be captured by an 
experimental design, 9 precisely because they do not provide a model of human psychology. 
this is especially important for consequentialist theories, where the strength of the ethical 
arguments derives from the consequences of their rules, 10 in the same way that the theoretical 
implications derived from any scientific theory receive their strength from the results of 
testing. in this sense, experimentation has an important role to play in this field: testing the 
behavioural hypothesis derived from the models of human psychology.
3. the eValuatIOn
the theoretical testing is not the only function that experimentation could have in this type 
of theories. in the following we will illustrate the way in which the experiment could evaluate 
the theory and the meaning of evaluation in this context. 
For this we will use the pioneer work by yari and bar-hillel, 11 who empirically researched 
the acceptance of different distributive mechanisms and suggested experimentation as a 
way to prove the sustainability of the theory. We will see the methodology developed in the 
theoretical work, illustrate it with an example coming from the egalitarian theory and finally 
analyse the role of experimentation as a mechanism to evaluate the theory. 
the question that guides the theoretical work of yari and bar-hillel is what properties 
a distributive mechanism should have. the research follows these stages: in first place 
it establishes a list of properties which this mechanism ought to have (Axioms). then a 
mechanism must be determined that fulfils these axioms. if such a mechanism does not exist 
then we should redo the list of axioms until a mechanism is found that fulfils them. Once a 
mechanism is available we can continue with its characterization. that is, what is the whole 
set of properties (desired and undesired) that characterize this mechanism? the reason is 
that, as it is well known, occasionally some undesired results are derived from the whole set 
of axioms. Next, we will continue to evaluate its tenability. if the properties are found to be 
perverse, the mechanism is unsustainable and the process should restart. 12 We will illustrate 
the first three steps by an example from an egalitarian theory.
in the definition of moderate egalitarianism, bertil tungodden establishes as desired 
axioms, the following: 13
— Anonymity: for all the alternatives x and y, if x is a permutation of the values of y, then x 
is equally as good as y.
8  the fundamental assumption is that individuals are rational and self-interested. these are the assumptions accepted 
by microeconomic theory. however Rawls’ theory differs from it when he puts forward that in the “original position”, 
the individuals are exclusively concerned with the possibility of being among the worst-off. 
9  i use the term replicate suggested by M. S. Morgan in the sense of reproducing or capturing the theory or the world. 
MorGan, M. S., “Experiment versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” p. 320.
10 For this argument, see Frohlich, n., oppenheiMer, J. and eavey, ch., “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice 
in Experimental Groups,” p. 634.
11 Cf. yari, M. and Bar-hillel, M., “On Dividing Justly,” Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1, (1984), pp. 1-24.
12 Cf. yari, M. and Bar-hillel, M., “On Dividing Justly,” pp. 2-3.
13 Cf. tunGodden, B., “the Value of Equality,” Economic and Philosophy, v. 19, (2003), pp. 1-44. 
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— Conditional Contracting Extremes: for all the alternatives x and y, if 1) all the better-off 
persons in x are better-off persons in y and their level of welfare is strictly lower in x 
than y, 2) all the worst-off in x are worse in y and their level of welfare is strictly higher 
in x than y; and 3) the welfare of every one else is the same in x as in y; then x is better 
than y.14
— Strict Priority to Equality Promotion: for all the alternatives x and y, if 1) there are 
persons with higher well-being in x than y, and there are persons with higher well being 
in y than x; and 2) x is more equal than y; then x is better than y.
— Principle of Personal Good: for all alternatives x and y, if everybody is as well off in x 
as in y, and someone is strictly better-off (in x), then x is better than y.15
Furthermore, the mechanism must provide a relation of order (reflexive and transitive).
We have established a list of axioms, but a simple example demonstrates that there is no 
mechanism that fulfils this ensemble. together they generate an impossibility result. let us 
suppose the following distributions: x = (2,10,100); y = (1,100,100); z = (2,10,10). Any measure of 
inequality would say that y is more equal than x. 16 therefore, according to the strict priority to 
equality promotion, y is better than x. if we compare x with z, x is better than z according to the 
principle of personal good, thus x is better than z. Due to transitivity, y is better than z, but this 
violates the condition of conditional contracting extremes that says that z is better than y.
therefore, we should turn back and redefine the axioms. One way to solve this impossibility 
is to impose the maximin condition.
— Maximin: for all the alternatives x and y, if the level of welfare of the worst-off is 
strictly higher in x than y, then x is better than y.
in this way, in the ordering of x and y, x is better than y according to the maximin, z is better 
than y according to the conditional contracting extremes, x is also better than z according to 
the principle of personal good and we have an ordering. thus, the moderate egalitarianism is 
axiomatically defined by the principle of maximin.
We shall now proceed with its characterization. it is well known that the principle of 
maximin can produce results that may be considered undesired. its absolute obsession for the 
worst-off, means that it orders situations like (2, 5, 5, 5, 100) above situations like (1, 40, 40, 
40, 100), where the loss of the worst-off seems insignificant compared to the improvement of 
those other members of the society who are moderately better-off, but still far away from the 
best-off. 17 however, it can be argued that a loss for the worst-off is unacceptable as he sees 
that the distance between his own situation and the second worst-off increases. 18 how can we 
decide if moderate egalitarianism is an acceptable distribution mechanism? this means, how do 
we evaluate its sustainability?
14 What the condition says is that: “Where perfect equality does not obtain … any benefit (no matter how small) to 
a worst-off person that leaves him/her still a worst-off person has priority (with respect to equality promotion) over 
any benefit (no matter how large) to a best-off person,” vallentyne, p., “Equality, Efficiency and the Priority of the 
Worse-Off,” Economics and Philosophy, v. 16, (2000), p. 1.
15 As can be seen this is a reformulation of the principle of Pareto in the field of welfare.
16 the different measures suggested to evaluate the inequality produce the following values: range gives x = 2,62; 
y = 1,4; the relative mean deviation gives x = 1,2 y = 0,6, the variance would give x = 52,90, y = 32,50; the coefficient 
of variation gives x = 0,19; y = 0,02. 
17 this is due to the fact that the maximin does not take into account the cardinality of benefits as it does not evaluate 
the losses compared to the benefits. in this way, the weight given to the worst-off is infinite.
18 b. tungodden argues in this way. tunGodden, B., “the Value of Equality,” p. 13.
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the suggestion from yari and bar-hillel can serve to rescue the theory from this impasse. 
the authors claim: “A theory of distributive justice, like any theory is tested by how well 
it does when confronted with evidence. And it is our view that, in this particular case, the 
evidence with which the theory must be confronted consists of observed ethical judgements or 
moral intuitions. thus, a distribution mechanism will be deemed untenable if its prescriptions 
are significantly at variance with observed ethical judgements.” 19
 let us return to our example: is the maximin principle tenable? that is, does it agree with the 
ethical judgements observed in the individuals in the different experiments carried out?
the maximin is an axiomatic formulation of the difference principle of Rawls. if we turn 
back to the previously mentioned experiments of Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey, we find 
that no individual selected the maximin principle. therefore, we should restart the process in 
agreement with the proposal of yari and bar-hillel, given that moderate egalitarianism is not 
a sustainable mechanism of distribution. but it is not so easy! Why accept the experimental 
results, but not the reasoning by tungodden who adds to the previous argument, that if the 
transitivity is accepted as a requisite for consistency then the maximin seems to be the only 
option? 20 if any, what is the advantage of experimentation? 
the proposal by tungodden can be characterized as a model of equality. For this we 
will use the proposal by D. hausman who considers models as definitions, 21 or definitions 
of predicates and they are constituted by a set of assumptions. Paraphrasing hausman: “but 
formulating the model not only provides a useful abbreviation, it makes possible conceptual, 
logical and mathematical explorations of the consequences of [equality] 22 so defined.” let us 
return to our question: does the experiment have any advantage over the model? According 
to M. Morgan the answer is yes. this is because the experiment contrary to the model is 
constituted by the same materials as the world. “the shared ontology has epistemological 
implications. We are more justified in claiming to learn something about the world from the 
experiment because the world and experiment share the same stuff. in contrast, inference 
from the model experiment is much more difficult as the materials are not the same —there is 
no shared ontology, and so the epistemological power is weaker.” 23 thus, tungodden’s model 
permits conceptual exploration and clarification of all the consequences of equality so defined, 
but does not give us the possibility, or at least not to the same degree, to make inferences back 
to the world, whereas the experiment does. 
it is obvious that one single disagreement with the data does not contest the sustainability 
of the theory. but if we have accepted the relevance of the experiment in this area, we have 
travelled part of the road. the rest of the road will not be easier. A great part of the rejections 
of experimental methods in justice theories seems to come from a poorly articulated prejudice 
about problems of external and internal validity of the experiment. the former refers to the 
generalization of laboratory results to the real world. the latter refers to the extent that the 
experimental design captures the assumptions of the theory exactly. this is not the subject 
19 yari, M. and Bar-hillel, M., “On Dividing Justly,” p. 3.
20 Cf. tunGodden, B., “the Value of Equality,” p. 14. 
21 Cf. hauSMan, d., The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992; 
chapter 5, pp. 70-73. 
22 in the original text it is “rationality.” hauSMan, d., The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, p. 77. 
23 MorGan, M. S., “Experiment versus Models: New Phenomena, inference and Surprise,” p. 323.
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of this paper, 24 but some issues about internal validity are worthy of mention. Even though 
the results of Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey seem robust, the authors themselves remark 
that some issues of the experimental design could be considered as lack of internal validity, 
principally the permeability of the “veil of ignorance” and the absolute value of the payments 
that, according to the authors “… would still fall far short of the “life chances” which Rawls 
posits for the original position.” 25 however, in a more general theoretical framework, the 
authors point out one condition of the experimental design that is relevant to certain distributive 
theories. Frohlich and Oppenheimer 26 refer to those experimental situations where the subjects 
are placed in a situation of “impartial reasoning.” As the authors show, this condition is often 
argued to be a precondition for introspection and moral knowledge. this impartial reasoning 
can be induced by means of restriction of information, just in the same way as the veil of 
ignorance in Rawls’ theory. this is one way, and possibly not the only way, in which the 
empirical evidence can be relevant for the theory.
3. COnCePtual ClarIfICatIOn 
A third aspect, in which experimentation can play an important role, is in the definition 
and clarification of concepts. here the suggestion is that experimentation fulfils the same 
function as hausman assigned to models, that is, to make possible a conceptual exploration of 
the consequences of the definitions of the concepts.
One of the most important fields of research in egalitarian theories is the definition of the 
measures of inequality. the concept is highly complex and a great variety of measures has been 
suggested which order the social states in different ways. Although everybody knows when 
a distribution is inegalitarian with respect to an egalitarian one, it is more difficult to agree 
upon when one distribution is more unequal than another. Despite their apparent neutrality, the 
axioms are value-laden and if we keep to the formal language in which they are formulated, their 
application is followed by a series of consequences that are not always appreciable. 
the research done by yoran Amiel and Frank Cowell in 1991, 27 tried to prove experimentally 
whether the suggested axioms as properties of the lorenz curve, 28 fitted to the definition of 
the concept of inequality that the individuals hold. they used a questionnaire which “…is 
designed with two, interrelated sections. the first section is numerical: it contains a set of simple 
choices between successive pairs of specific income distribution, A and b. the distributions 
are presented as vectors, without explicit currency units, and no hints were provided to the 
student as to what sort of living standards or welfare levels might correspond to those numbers. 
in each case the respondent is merely invited to state which of A and b appears to be the more 
unequally distributed. the second section is mainly verbal: respondents are confronted with 
24 For a useful review of the threats to the internal and external validity, see McderMott, r., “Experimental Methods 
in Political Science,”Annual Review of Political Science, v. 5, (2002), pp. 31-61. For a short analysis of the ways to solve 
the problems of external validity in economics, see Guala, F., “On the Scope of Experiment in Economics: Comment 
on Siakantaris,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, v. 26, (2002), pp. 261-267.
25 Frohlich, n., oppenheiMer, J. and eavey, ch., “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental 
Groups,” p. 616.
26 Frohlich, n. and oppenheiMer, J., “Preferences for income Distribution and Distributive Justice: A Window on 
the Problems of Using Experimental Data in Economics and Ethics,” Eastern Economic Journal, v. 20, n. 2, (1994), 
pp. 147-155.
27 aMiel, y. and coWell, F., “Measurement on income inequality, Experimental test by Questionnaire,” Journal of 
Public Economics, v. 47, (1992), pp. 3-26. the questionnaire is reprinted in full in the appendix of the article.
28 the lorenz’s curve is one of the most popular measures of inequality among economists.
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various general propositions about income distribution; they have to choose with which view 
among several about income inequality in hypothetical changes of income distribution they 
agree. the issues raised in the second section are closely linked to the numerical questions of 
the first.” 29 both the numerical and the verbal section reflected the participants’ agreement 
with the axioms that constitutes the lorenz curve.
the lorenz curve is defined by the following axioms:
— Anonymity: for all the alternatives x and y, if x is a permutation of the values of y, then 
x is equally as good as y. 30
— the principle of population. Replication of the population and its income should not 
affect the index of inequality.
— the principle of scale invariance: the only important thing is the relative benefit and 
not the absolute. this means that the index is not sensitive to proportional increments 
of the relevant benefit.
— the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer: the inequality always decreases when there are 
transfers from the better-off individuals to the worse-off individuals with the condition 
that the mean income does not decrease and that the order among the individuals 
involved remains the same. 
it has to be pointed out that accepting the lorenz curve means accepting every one of 
these axioms. the first three may be more or less questionable given that they involve a choice 
between absolute measures and relative measures of inequality. For example, the principle of 
scale invariance requires that A = (5, 8, 10) and b = (10, 16, 20) 31 should be evaluated as equal 
with respect to inequality. but it is possible to argue that b is more unequal than A given that the 
distance between the better-off and the worst-off has increased, or that A is more unequal than 
b given that the income of the worst-off has increased in b. 32 With regards to the population 
replication that requires A = (5, 8, 10) and b = (5, 5, 8, 8, 10, 10) to be considered equal with 
respect to inequality, it can be argued that equality has increased because now there are pairs of 
persons with the same income. On the other hand, it can be said that it has decreased because 
now there is one person more in the same situation as the worst-off. if there are more persons 
worse-off in b than in A then equality has decreased. 33 
the same does not occur with the Pigou-Dalton principle that has an almost unanimous 
acceptance among the theorists. by way of example: let us suppose that we have the following 
distributions: A = (1, 4, 7, 10, 13) y b = (2, 4, 7, 10, 12). According to the principle, the inequality 
decreases in the step from A to b given that, first, there has been a redistribution from better-
off to worst-off, second, the average income has not changed, and third, the order among the 
individuals involved remains the same. let us now take a look at the following distributions: 
A = (1, 4, 7, 10, 13), b = (1, 5, 6, 10, 13). 
29 aMiel, y. and coWell, F., “Measurement on income inequality,” p. 6.
30 Even though anonymity may seem trivial it is incompatible with the different rights that individuals may have.
31 All the numeric examples in this section come from aMiel, y. and coWell, F., “Measurement on income 
inequality,” pp. 23-26.
32 this latter argument would imply using the maximin principle where the fairness of the results is evaluated only 
as a function of the worst-off.
33 For a criticism of the axiom of the population replication, see teMkin, l., Inequality, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993: “After all, not only are b’s worse-off all the same level as A’s, and not only are the gaps between the 
better- and the worse-off just as great in b as in A, but there are twice as many in the position of being worse-off than 
others through no fault of their own, and there are twice as many that they are worse-off than.” p. 201.
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the same as in the previous case and in accordance with the transfer principle, the inequality 
has decreased in the step from A to b. however, not all the participants considered that as a 
decrease in inequality; 42% considered b more unequal than A and 22% considered them equal 
with respect to inequality. there are two explanations for this. First, the transfer did not take 
place between the best and the worst-off individuals, but in the mid-range of the vector. the 
experiments seem to show that agreement with the Pigou-Dalton condition depends on who 
transfers and who receives. When a better-off person transfers to a worse-off person, the principle 
counts with a high number of supporters, whereas when the transfer takes place in the extremes 
of the range, then the support of the principle decreases. 34 On the other hand, it is possible to 
claim that, after the transfer, even though person 2 increases his income, the distance between 
the third and the fourth has increased and this can be seen as a sign of increased inequality.
Accepting the lorenz curve as a measure of inequality implies accepting the four axioms. 
however, 85% of the participants rejected one or more of these axioms and thereby the lorenz 
curve. What relevance do these findings have regarding the concept of inequality? Should the 
economists take them into account in the definitions of inequality? Should the principle of transfer 
be modified so that only transfers between the better and worse-off are allowed and not transfers 
in the lower part of the vector? Or do the economists have a privileged situation from which they 
can evaluate inequality? the role that we grant to experimentation in this field will depend on 
the answers given to these questions. the fact that, within the complete group of experimental 
subjects, the subset that showed the highest agreement with the principle of transfer was that of 
the students at hebrew University who learn about the lorenz curve as part of their introductory 
economic course may be revealing. As the authors note: “Perhaps the received wisdom of the 
profession is making its mark on perceptions of inequality comparisons at an early stage in 
students’ intellectual development.” 35 in this case, the knowledge of the beliefs of the individuals 
about inequality is even more important and not only the belief of the economists.
Another example that elaborates on the role of experimentation in conceptual clarification 
is the studies made on the bases of desert. three bases have usually been proposed: 36 skill, 
contribution and effort. in this way, the rewards of the individuals depend on their skills in the 
actual task, the effort made, or their contribution to the final product. the majority view among 
the theorists is that the individuals can only deserve things based on factors like effort that are 
under their voluntary control. On the contrary, the experiments demonstrate that bases selected 
by the people depend on the context and the benefits being distributed. 37 What relevance do 
these findings have for the definition of the concept of desert? Should we maintain the principle 
of responsibility as a constituent element of the concept or should we modify the concept?
We can conclude from the above examples that experimentation helps in conceptual 
clarification by specifying the definition of general concepts like equality or desert. Furthermore, 
34 aMiel, y. and coWell, F., “Measurement on income inequality,” pp. 15-17.
35 “Measurement on income inequality,” p. 17. 
36 i think that the term was used for the first time in FeinBerG, J., “Justice and Personal Desert,” in Friedrich, C. J. 
and chapMan, J. W. (eds.), Nomos VI: Justice, Atherton, N. york, 1963, pp. 69-97; reprinted in FeinBerG, J., Doing 
and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970, pp. 55-94. 
“those conditions not specified in any regulatory or procedural rules whose satisfaction confers worthiness or desert,” 
FeinBerG, J., Doing and Deserving, p. 58.
37 See Miller, d., “Distributive Justice: What the People think,” Ethics, v. 102, n. 3, (1992), pp. 555-593. For a useful 
review of the literature.
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it isolates a new phenomenon, 38 namely, that the individuals hold more pluralistic opinions 
regarding justice than the various general theories of justice state, and that the evaluation of the 
distributive mechanisms depends on the context and the item to be distributed. 
5. POlItICal ImPlementatIOn
One aspect remains to be mentioned, where i think that empirical research is absolutely 
relevant, and that aspect is the political implementation of the redistributive systems. 
the distributive theories range over a great variety of questions. When we ask “who should 
get what?,” this “what” comprises things so different as income, taxes, social acknowledgement, 
the qualifications of students, legal punishments, the sharing of the children’s party cake, … 
questions that affect our daily life, but fundamentally imply the basic design of our social 
institutions. it seems inadmissible to claim that the beliefs held by the individuals do not have 
relevance for determining the principles that guide our institutional design. let us return to 
the experiments carried out by y. Amiel and F. Cowell about the transfer principle. if cognitive 
failures committed by the subjects are not adduced we could ask why some definitions about 
equality are considered valid when they were rejected by most of the subjects, especially 
when taking into account that this has consequences in our institutional design. For instance, 
a certain society yields certain inequality measurements, which may orient public policies in 
one direction or another, and indeed do so. it is not the same if the tax load that finances the 
redistribution falls to the high part of the range as to the mid-part. As we have seen, many 
individuals do not see this redistribution as a decrease in inequality and therefore they will 
have a negative perception about these policies. 
Despite the doubts we may have regarding the role of the beliefs and the preferences of 
the individuals about distributive theories, it is undeniable that the selection of alternative 
policies depends to a greater or lesser extent on the preferences of the individuals and their 
beliefs about welfare and justice. Knowing these preferences is fundamental at the time of 
implementing one welfare policy or another.
A different related problem is: “how to make the empirical findings relevant for the real 
world?” that is, how to establish their external validity. i think that the road to follow has been 
well indicated by Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey in one of the texts that we have analysed. 
“how can we claim policy relevance for our results? One possibility is to consider the future. 
We may all know where we have been, but none of us can know with certainty where we are 
going. thus, voters can be thought of as sitting behind a (partial or ‘thin’) veil of ignorance: 
the future is not known to them. to the extent that the real world has a ‘thin veil’ similar to the 
one in our experiments, our results are relevant.” 39
A part of the criticism that denies the relevance of experimentation in the field of distributive 
theories, adduces problems of unrepresentative subject pool, others adduce cognitive defects 
that impede the subjects to make correct judgments. Finally, it is adduced that the subjects 
have selfish preferences and that their election of alternatives is guided exclusively by self-
interest, wherefore the results cannot be used to elucidate the justice principles that should 
38 this is in accordance with the position by ian hacking to whom “to experiment is to create, produce, refine and 
stabilize phenomena,” hackinG, i. Representing and Intervening, p. 230.
39 Frohlich, n., oppenheiMer, J. and eavey, ch., “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental 
Groups,” p. 635.
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govern the general interest. the first two criticisms can be answered by working with the 
representativeness of the subject pool; in any case it would not constitute a problem exclusively 
for the justice theories. the third criticism may be more problematic. Without entering into 
the discussion about whether human beings are purely egoist, uninterestedly altruistic or, 
the most likely, somewhere in between, the suggestion of the authors of incorporating the 
veil of ignorance could respond to this criticism. its incorporation allows us to tackle to the 
problem of internal validity, given that in a general theoretical framework the veil of ignorance 
is recognized as a fairness condition. it also allows us to approach the problem of external 
validity inasmuch as uncertainty about the future allows us to establish a parallelism between 
experimental design and the real world.
6. COnCludInG remarks 
the argumentation of the preceding pages can be divided into two levels. One set of 
epistemic questions and a set of questions that, just in order to make a distinction, we can call 
practical questions. 
On the one hand, it is argued that the role of experimentation is not limited exclusively 
to testing theories, but that it also has a role to play in the clarification and definition of the 
concepts and in the production of new phenomena, according to the arguments defended by i. 
hacking, among others.
the second set of questions, or practical questions, refers to the role of experimentation in the 
theories of distributive justice. Concerning this topic, it has been held that experimentation has 
no relevance, given that these are normative theories based on principles or ethical judgements.
A great part of the epistemic questions have been taken for granted, but even for those 
who think that the only role that experimentation has to play is testing theories, i believe i have 
demonstrated that first, there is no significant difference between the theories of distributive 
justice and the scientific theories with regard to the role of experimentation. Second, 
experimentation is of great importance, especially in consequentialist theories, given that the 
strength of the normative arguments is derived from the consequences of its rules. For the 
analysis of the consequences of these rules, it is fundamental to have an explicit model of 
human psychology. 
Many readers may find the differentiation between testing and evaluation in section two 
and three less clear, given that, moreover, the same set of experiments 40 is used to illustrate 
two different functions. i think that the difference is important. Regarding testing, we saw 
that individuals do not behave according to the “prediction” by the theory, that is, they do not 
select the difference principle. in this sense the theory is considered inadequate because its 
predictions do not correspond with the reality observed. Regarding the evaluation, the theory 
is deemed inadequate or unsustainable because when it is put into practice (in the process of 
experimentation), consequences are deduced which are judged (evaluated) “perverse” by the 
individuals. thus, testing and evaluation can be differentiated and experimentation plays a 
different role in each case. 
in this paper we have made some comparisons between the role of experimentation and 
the role of models in scientific research, following the work of M. Morgan. A great part of the 
40 those performed by Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey with respect to Rawls’ theory.
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theoretical advances in recent years in the field of distributive theories has been the development 
of formal models and has been done by economists. these models are very useful tools for 
conceptual exploration and clarification and allow us to detect the inconsistencies in each 
system and explore their consequences. but there is another fundamental difference between 
the models and experimentation which i think has been perfectly illustrated in the preceding 
pages, namely that “where mathematical modelling results may surprise, experimental results 
may not only surprise but also confound.” 41 that is, even though the model can have surprising 
implications, they can be traced back to and explained in terms of the model. Meanwhile 
the surprising implications of experiments, if they persist, constitute new phenomena that 
confound because they are not explicable within the theoretical framework. let us go 
over the experiments expounded again, most of them are characterized by this element of 
confoundment. Not only did the subjects behave and make choices in a completely different 
way to that expected, but to some extent a new phenomenon has been created, namely, that the 
individuals hold more pluralistic opinions regarding justice than the various general theories 
of justice state, and that the evaluation of the distributive mechanisms depends on the context 
and the item to be distributed. Perhaps the moment has come to include this new phenomenon 
in the models that define our distributive mechanisms. it is not about choosing between models 
and experiments. it is about complementing models with experiments, given that the latter 
may be more epistemically powerful for making inference back to the world.
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OBserVatIOn and exPerIment  
In eCOlOGICal researCh
rafael gonzález del solar *  
and luis Marone
the science of ecology studies the relations among living beings and their environment, both 
biotic and abiotic. Results of ecological research are descriptions, explanations, and predictions 
dealing with the temporal and spatial abundance and distribution of organisms, as well as with 
the movements of matter and energy through ecological systems. 1
Partly due to the breath of its subject matter, ecology is as diverse as it is complex. One 
consequence of this characteristic is that the discipline is not a homogeneous endeavor but a 
somewhat loose collection of sub-disciplines that exhibit a variety of goals and methodological 
approaches. think, for example, of the techniques used in studying interspecific relationships 
in community ecology, in contrast with those used in ecosystem ecology for the study of energy 
fluxes. Differences in styles of approach, however, are not restricted to differences among 
sub-disciplines, nor are they related only to matters of technique (e.g., the pros and cons of 
different sampling designs). General epistemological issues are also an arena for dissension 
in ecology. Among the latter, issues concerning the relevance of experiments and the role of 
explanation in ecological research, or the possibility of general ecological laws have elicited a 
number of articles in the ecological literature. Rather frequently, discussions on all three topics 
revolve around a more general debate between ecologists favoring so-called “mechanistic” or 
“reductionist” approaches and researchers who preconize the advantages of setting aside the 
“mind-boggling” details of ecological processes and concentrating in broad patterns in order to 
generate predictive, “useful” knowledge. 2 While the former tend to have experiments in high 
esteem, the latter speak usually for non-manipulative observation.
in the specific case of community ecology, however, some authors defend a 
methodological approach that starts with observation, proceeds to theory building and ends 
*  We are grateful to J. lopez de Casenave for insightful discussion. RGS thanks the support of Fundación Carolina 
(Spain). this is contribution no. 73 of the Desert Community Ecology Research team (Ecodes).
1  See likenS, G. e., Excellence in Ecology 3, the Ecosystem Approach: Its Use and Abuse, Ecology institute, 
Oldendorf-luhe, 1992.
2  E.g., laWton, J., “Are there General laws in Ecology?,” Oikos, v. 84, (1999), pp. 177-192; peterS, R. h., A Critique 
for Ecology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1991; Murray, b. G., “Universal laws and Predictive 
theory in Ecology and Evolution,” Oikos v. 82, (2000), pp. 403-408; turchin, p., “Does Population Ecology have 
General laws?,” Oikos, v. 94, (2001), pp. 17-26; and aGraWal, A. A. (ed.), “Forum. the Metabolic theory of Ecology,” 
Ecology, v. 85, (2004). 
Philosophers too have paid attention to these problems, especially that of ecological laws, see, e.g., Shrader-
Frechette, k. S. and Mccoy, e. d., Method in Ecology. Strategies for Conservation, Cambridge University Press, 
New york, 1993; WaterS, c. k., “Causal Regularities in the biological World of Contingent Distributions,” Biology 
and Philosophy, v. 13, (998), pp. 5-36; roSenBerG, a., “how is biological Explanation Possible?,” British Journal of 
Philosophy of Science, v. 52, (2001), pp. 735-760; colyvan, M. and GinzBurG l. r., “the Galilean turn in Population 
Ecology,” Biology and Philosophy, v. 18, n. 3, (2003), pp. 401-414; and lanGe, M., “Ecological laws: What Would 
they be and Why Would they Matter?,” Oikos, v. 110, (2005), pp. 394-403.
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with experiment (Fig. 1). 3 According to this traditional view, the observational stage serves 
the role of providing the ecologist with data, the raw material for empirical generalizations 
(i.e., propositions that describe patterns or trends or empirical regularities). Once a pattern 
is reliably established by means of observation, it would be related to other generalizations 
and conjectures in order to build “theory.” 4 After this modeling stage, a second empirical 
(ideally experimental) stage would follow, consisting of tests of the predictions deductively 
derived from theoretical constructs. 
Summing up, according to this view, ecological research would involve two empirical 
phases —one observational and the other mainly experimental—, each with a quite distinct 
role. Observation would provide descriptions of patterns and suggest “theory,” while 
experiment would be the means for accepting or rejecting the relevant hypotheses through the 
confirmation or refutation of the derived predictions. According to this model of knowledge 
production, the advancement of ecology would proceed by a helicoidal movement where the 
sequence observation-“theory”-experiment would successively iterate (Fig. 1).
figure 1. Schematic outline of the traditional methodological sequence in ecological research. the sequence 
in each loop of the helicoid is (a) observation, (b) theory building, and (c) experimentation. the arrow 
below the helicoid shows the general direction of advance of the inquiry. Arrows above the brace show 
the direction of the tactical procedure. Modified from peckarSky, B. l., “the Dual Role of Experiments 
in Complex and Dynamic Natural Systems,” in reSetaritS, W. J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental 
Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, p. 312.
3  See underWood, A. J., “Design, implementation, and Analysis of Ecological and Environmental Experiments. 
Pitfalls in the Maintenance of logical Structures,” in reSetaritS, W. J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental Ecology: 
Issues and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 325-349; and peckarSky, B. l., “the Dual Role of 
Experiments in Complex and Dynamic Natural Systems,” in reSetaritS, W. J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental 
Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, 1998, p. 312.
4  Ecologists usually use the term “theory” in a somewhat loose way, meaning hypotheses of different levels, models 
and traditional theories (i.e., hypothethico-deductive systems). here, we will maintain such ambiguity for the sake of 
the argument.
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this scheme is clearly based on a hypothethico-deductive view of scientific method. 
Subtleties apply, though, for observation here plays a major role in the generation of 
hypotheses and its importance in confirmation is greater than that assigned, for instance, 
by K. R. Popper. 5 As for the adequacy of the view represented in Fig. 1, we admit that it 
represents a possible methodological sequence and that it may even be frequent in some 
realms and stages of ecological research. yet, it has to be said that this is not the only 
possible methodological sequence, that it has proved inadequate as a research strategy in 
many cases, and that ecological research, like scientific research in general, is a much more 
complex process.
in this chapter, we shall try to illustrate three aspects: (i) observation itself is a rather 
complex procedure involving hypotheses about indicators (“theory”) and a modicum of 
intervention; (ii) both experiment and observation play important roles in the creation of 
ecological knowledge, and each of them may be used for different immediate epistemic ends; 
and (iii) the iterative integration of experiment and observation (and “theory,” of course, but 
we will not deal here with this interaction) within one and the same ecological research project 
allows one to solve complex problems unassailable by just one of these approaches or by the 
“traditional” methodological approach.
1. OBserVatIOn 
the point of making scientific observations is to provide a description of some of the 
properties of the entities under study. however, in contrast to the assumptions of the traditional 
research approach just described, such descriptions are not “basic” nor is their only role to 
provide raw data for generalizations. indeed, ecological observations are not always direct 
or straightforward. As is the case with other sciences, the great majority of ecological data 
are a result of indirect observation techniques and, to a certain degree, a fruit of human 
intervention. 6 Even though a large portion of ecological research deals with (in principle) 
observable entities, the processes in which they are involved are not, so indicators are a 
ubiquitous tool in ecological inquiry. in other words, most ecological data are constructions.
1.1. Ecological Data Are Constructions 
in this subsection we will provide some examples as to the sense in which ecological data 
are constructed. in the first place, we will start by saying that ecological observations are 
not always direct or straightforward. indeed, as in the case of any other science, the great 
majority of ecological data are a result of indirect observation techniques and, to a certain 
degree, a fruit of human intervention. 6 Even though a large portion of ecological research 
deals with (in principle) observable entities, the processes they are or were involved in are not, 
so indicators are a ubiquitous tool in ecological inquiry. in other words, most ecological data 
are constructed.
5  A classical representative of this methodological perspective is platt, J. r., “Strong inference,” Science, v. 46, 
(1964), pp. 347-353. For differences between the Popperian and the bayesian views on hypothetico-deductivism in 
ecology see, for example, okSanen, l., “logic of Experiments in Ecology: is Pseudoreplication a Pseudoissue?,” 
Oikos, v. 94, (2001), pp. 27-38.
6  For the role of intervention in the production of empirical knowledge, see hackinG, i. Representing and Intervening, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983.
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in the first place, there is always the sampling design. More often than not ecological 
observations are made systematically, according to a particular design, at particular places 
and during particular periods. Second, in some cases observations involve a modicum of 
intervention on the part of researchers. third, as we have said, observations do not always 
consist in the actual observation of the entity of interest, but rely on indicators supported by 
(ideally well-grounded and independently tested) indicator hypotheses.
the use of scent stations for assessing population tendencies of carnivores (and other 
animals as well) will illustrate this point. 7 Since many carnivores are too secretive or live in 
habitats too dense to measure their numbers by means of direct observation or binoculars, 
a way to do that is through the “capture” of their tracks. track samplings consist of “scent 
stations” (areas of soil of about 1 m2, with a standard plaster disc soaked in attractant) arranged 
in lines, whose role is to attract the target animals and make them leave their footprints on the 
soil. the latter must be previously cleared from any object that could hinder the “reading” of 
the tracks and, if necessary, covered with an ad hoc material (such as sand) for the tracks to 
print on its surface. Statistical requirements impose important characteristics on the design, 
such as total number of lines (the sampling unit), number of scent stations per line, number 
of nights they must remain active, etc. Materials involved in the sampling (plaster discs, 
attractant, etc.) are usually standard and used in standard quantities. 
the idea behind the scent station technique is that a series of yearly samplings, carried 
out at the same area and time of the year, can show whether the target population is stable, or 
decreasing or increasing its numbers. the raw data each yearly sampling yields consist of the 
average percentage of scent stations visited (out of the number of scent stations operable) in 
each sampling line. the final yearly data is a grand average of the averages for each line. Of 
course, there are more subtleties to the technique than meets the eye. yet, as an instance of 
how ecological data are constructed, it should suffice to add that yearly results are affected 
both by the size of the target carnivore population and by its activity level, and that the use of 
this technique requires calibration with other means of measuring population size. 8 in short, 
ecologists can measure the relative density of, say, grey foxes without ever actually seeing a 
grey fox, and only because researchers intervene by attracting them to scent stations. 
Since observations depend on sampling design and indicator hypotheses, they cannot be 
the proverbial bedrock upon which ecological knowledge would be built.
1.2. Observations and Experiments Can Play Different Roles in Ecology
As we saw in the introduction, the traditional methodological assumes that the research cycle 
starts from observation and ends with experimental testing of hypothesis. however, ecological 
studies do not always begin with observations, nor are experiments always a means to test 
hypotheses. in this subsection we will illustrate how both types of empirical tools can be used to 
assess the adequacy of ecological hypotheses.
7  For more details on the scent-station technique see rouGhton, R. D. and SWeeney M. W., “Refinements in Scent 
Station Methodology for Assessing trends in Carnivore Populations,” Journal of Wildlife Management, v. 46, (1982), 
pp. 217-229.
8  Reports on population tendencies based on the scent station technique presuppose that the proportion of scent 
stations visited is positively related to abundance and not affected by activity. See, e.g., SarGeant, A. b., JohnSon, D. 
h. and BerG, W. E., “interpreting Carnivores Scent Stations Surveys,” Journal of Wildlife Management, v. 62, (1998), 
pp. 1235-1245.
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1.2.1. Experiments Can Be Used as Exploration Tools
the traditional methodological approach notwithstanding, ecological studies do not always 
begin with observations and experiments are not always a means to test hypotheses. both 
types empirical of tools can be used to explore the phenomena of interest and both can be used 
to assess the adequacy of ecological hypotheses.
it is true that the first steps of an investigation usually involve some exploratory actions, 
but these need not be performed through observations, nor is the usefulness of observations 
confined to the early stages of research. For instance, observations alone sometimes fail to 
reveal a pattern in an unambiguous way, and researchers have to recur to different empirical 
tools, namely to experiments. A study on the spatial ecology of stoneflies, small flying insects 
belonging to the order Plecoptera, whose larvae (called nymphs or naiads) are aquatic, will 
help illustrate this point.
Ecologist barbara Peckarsky was looking for patterns in the use of habitat of the predatory 
nymphs of stoneflies. 9 An exploratory sampling carried on in a water stream in the Rocky 
Mountains showed that the spatial distribution of the naiads was random and that individuals 
were more abundant in stones whose upper surface area exceeded 200 cm2. Which of the 
features of the habitat governed the spatial distribution of naiads? 
Further observational studies failed to reveal any patterns that might help give an 
unambiguous answer to this question or give support to any hypothesis researchers might 
have had in mind. this was so even though they invested in an important sampling effort by 
registering a great number of factors that might affect the nymphs’ spatial distribution (i.e., 
densities of naiads, densities of preys and of other predators, surface and interstitial water 
speed, water depth and temperature, biomass of algae and detritus).
in cases like this, in which observation proves insufficient for pattern detection, experiments, 
particularly the so-called phenomenological experiments, provide a useful alternative. Also 
known as “mechanism-free experiments,” 10 manipulations of this kind are usually performed 
on a presence/absence basis of those factors suspect of being causally related to the variables 
of interest. their main characteristic is that they do not involve hypotheses about the processes 
plausibly linking the behavior of the variables of interest (i.e., about mechanisms). however, 
they do involve hypotheses on what is and what is not possible (or plausible) in any given 
circumstances, and on what may and may not be relevant to measure. 11 in other words, 
phenomenological experiments are tools for detecting or probing patterns.
9   See details in peckarSky, B. l., “Why Predaceous Stoneflies Do Not Aggregate With their Prey,” Verhandlungen 
der Internationale Vereinigung für theoretische und angewandte Limnologie, v. 23, (1988), pp. 2135-2140; peckarSky, 
B. l., “habitat Selection by Stream-Dwelling Predatory Stoneflies,” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Science, v. 48, (1991), pp. 1069-1076. the corresponding methodological reflections can be found in peckarSky, B. l., 
“the Dual Role of Experiments in Complex and Dynamic Natural Systems,” pp. 314-316.
10 Cf. dunhaM, a. e. and Beaupre, S. J., “Ecological Experiments. Scale, Phenomenology, Mechanisms, and the illusion 
of Generality,” in reSetaritS, W. J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, pp. 27-49.
11 this aspect, though rather obvious indeed, is relevant regarding the relationships among observation, experiment, 
and “theory,” especially regarding the debates on the thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation. As already identified 
by hacking in Representing and Intervening, a weak version of the thesis —i.e., that of the precedence of some conceptual 
constructions with respect to observation or experiment— is undeniable. the application of the methodological requisite 
of considering “all relevant factors” is simply not possible in the absence of some conceptual constructions that guide 
the selection of the relevant variables to be measured. besides, even if it were possible in principle, all kinds of logistic 
constraints (e.g., resources such as time, money, personnel, etc.) would make it unfeasible, or at least unwise, to perform 
observations or conduct experiments without the counsel of previous empirical and theoretical knowledge (i.e., constructs). 
What is reasonable (and more efficient) is to begin with those factors that are more plausible in the light of preliminary 
observations and according to the (not necessarily formal) model/s the researcher has in mind.
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Returning to stoneflies, in the face of the failure of the observational approach, Peckarsky 
and her colleagues carried out a series of phenomenological experiments taking advantage 
of a watercourse that had dried and would naturally get flooded in the near future. they 
marked stones with different upper surface areas and registered their after-flood stability. the 
experiment showed that predatory Plecoptera preferred stones with a higher probability of 
remaining stable when water came back. 12 these manipulations provided empirical support 
for the hypothesis that stoneflies prefer stones that provide them a more stable habitat. From 
further experiments involving manipulation of naiads in natural courses, another hypothesis 
arose that could explain their spatial distribution. those studies showed that the nymphs 
of stoneflies avoided microhabitats already occupied by other individuals, suggesting that 
competitive interference was the mechanism explaining the spatial pattern. Eventually, this 
hypothesis was tested —and confirmed— in artificial and semi-natural systems by means of 
“mechanismic” 13 experiments. in sum, the use of observations and two types of experiments 
was necessary to understand the spatial distribution of the naiads.
1.2.2. Observations Can Be Used to Decide Among Ecological Hypotheses 
the traditional methodological view schematized in Figure 1 also overlooks the fact that 
experiments, especially crucial experiments, are not always possible in ecology. therefore, 
observation may sometimes carry the weight of deciding among ecological hypotheses. this 
is the idea underlying the “smoking gun” methodology, which has already done good service 
in other historical sciences. this approach represents an attempt to overcome the impossibility 
of observing or manipulating past causes or other factors that are not repeatable in artificial 
environments due to physical (e.g., temporal or spatial scales) or ethical impossibilities. the 
smoking gun approach does not exclude experiments, but emphasizes the use of non-
experimental observations in order to provide solid grounds for a given hypothesis or model.
the study of the causes of dinosaur extinction, at the end of the Cretaceous period, 
provides an example of the smoking gun style of research. 14 According to the famous 
Alvarez hypothesis, the relatively rapid extinction of dinosaurs was a result of a dramatic 
environmental change, which in turn was a result of the collision of a large asteroid with 
Earth. 15 Of course, an experiment proper was not possible, and there were other competing 
ecological hypotheses invoking epidemics, global climatic change, and volcanism as potential 
factors leading to the extinction of the formidable reptiles. Only when researchers found large 
12 this is a nice example of how the underlying model influences the interpretation of the information provided by an 
experiment. Measurements of the stability of the stones were taken based on a plausible conjecture about the relation 
among stone area, stone stability, and habitat stability. in this case, the function of the phenomenological experiment 
was to enhance the plausibility of the hypothesis. 
13 the term “mechanismic” is a neologism coined some four decades ago by Mario bunge (“Phenomenological 
theories,”) in BunGe, M. (ed.), Critical Approaches to Science and Philosophy, transaction, New brunswick, NJ, 
1999 (originally published in 1964), pp. 234-254. the reason he gives for preferring “mechanismic” to “mechanistic” 
is avoiding some of the connotations of the latter term, an attempt we find particularly useful in ecology. bunge’s 
mechanismic view opposes the traditional mechanistic (physicalist) one in that the former is not radically reductionist, 
nor is causalist (though admits that most of the mechanisms revealed by the sciences are causal). in other words, in 
following bunge’s use of the term “mechanismic” we admit the possibility of mechanisms belonging in organization 
levels higher that that of the phenomenon to be explained, as well as the existence of random mechanisms.
14 Cf. cleland, c., “Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Experimental Science and historical 
Science,” Philosophy of Science, v. 69, (2002), pp. 474-496. 
15 Cf. alvarez, l. W., alvarez, W., aSaro, F., and Michel, h. v., “Extraterrestrial Cause for the Cretaceous-tertiary 
Extinction. Experimental Results and theoretical interpretation,” Science, v. 208, (1980), pp. 1095-1108.
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deposits of iridium at the C-t boundary (the limit between Cretaceous and tertiary layers 
of sediments) did the asteroid hypothesis begin to gain attention. Some time later, geologists 
found relatively large amounts of a rare mineral —shocked quartz— in the same layers, and 
this gave more support to the meteorite-impact hypothesis. the reason is that no volcanic 
mechanism was known that could produce so much shocked quartz. however, researchers 
would have not considered the latter as a smoking gun, they had not realized that dinosaurs 
disappeared in a relatively short period. 
Research on the processes leading to the assembly of any given ecological community 
is another case where observations serve a similar function. Evolutionary theory implies 
the progressive weakening of interspecific competition within a community by means of 
divergence in the use of resources. thus, long past competitive processes (as opposed, for 
example, to predation processes) that might explain the present state of a particular ecological 
community cannot be subject to observation or to experiment in present day communities. 
if the process structuring the community was competition, researchers will only find the 
so-called “ghost of competition past.” 16 Experiments can only tell us whether competition is a 
plausible candidate for explaining the present state of a natural community; observations can 
enhance that plausibility by adding further favorable empirical evidence.
Summing up, according to the smoking gun view, historical explanations can be tested 
through a procedure similar to that of a police investigation: Searching for clues that indicate 
which hypothesis is the one that best explains evidence up to the moment, a procedure in which 
non-experimental observation plays a central role.
2. exPerIment 
As we saw in the example of the research on stoneflies, experiments may be useful in order 
to find and/or probe patterns where observation has failed to do it. besides, as we saw in the 
example of the extinction of dinosaurs, observation can also be useful for discriminatin among 
different causal hypotheses.
One of the most utilized approaches in ecological research, particularly in community 
ecology, is that of perturbation experiments. these consist in manipulating diverse factors 
in order to determine whether some of them is/are associated to the variable of interest. 
As these manipulations typically do not involve mechanismic hypotheses, they are called 
phenomenological experiments. Now, experiments of this kind are useful for revealing or 
strengthening patterns, but are not adequate to reveal the causes of a phenomenon. 
2.1. Limitations of Phenomenological Experiments
Carrying out phenomenological experiments without taking account of their limitations 
implies the risk of attributing causal relations arbitrarily, as is shown in the following case. this 
example draws on a classical community ecology work carried out in the Sonora desert (Portal, 
Arizona, USA). A group of ecologists led by James h. brown wished to study the effects of 
interspecific competition on population size within a community of granivores (animals that 
feed on seeds). in order to do so, they built exclosures —i.e., areas enclosed by fences of different 
kinds to the effect of keeping outside individuals from particular species— that were treated in 
16 Cf. connell, J. h., “Diversity and the Coevolution of Competitors, or the Ghost of Competition Past,” Oikos, v. 35, 
(1980), pp. 131-138.
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different ways 17. All rodent species were removed from one third of these exclosures and the 
large kangaroo rats (Dipodomys sp.) were the only animals removed from the second third, while 
only ants were excluded from the last one. brown and collaborators then measured the changes 
undergone by certain populations of animals and plants within the exclosures.
After the removal of kangaroo rats from the selected exclosures, an increase in the number 
of smaller granivorous rodents was registered. Researchers interpreted these data as a result of 
competitive relaxation —i.e., as one competitor decreases in numbers or disappears the other 
one thrives. however, in the particular way in which the experiment was carried out, competitive 
relaxation was not the only plausible explanatory hypotheses. More precisely, the exclusion of 
kangaroo rats had been performed by means of a wire mesh fence. Small holes were made in the 
mesh to allow rodents other than Dypodomys to pass through it. the fences, however, also excluded 
from these plots some relatively large snakes that were the usual predators of the smaller rodents, 
and this should have prevented brown and his group from interpreting the data the way they did. 
the phenomenological experiment they conducted was not suited to answer unambiguously the 
question of why the number of smaller rodents had increased within the exclosure. there were at 
least two plausible (and not mutually exclusive) hypotheses: (a) competitive relaxation due to the 
removal of kangaroo rats and (b) the (unwitting) exclusion of a natural predator (snakes). 18 this 
is a usual situation in community ecology. Since the same pattern can be a result of different 
processes, at some time in research, it is necessary to perform mechanismic experiments in 
order to tell which of those mechanisms is effectively responsible. 19 
Mechanismic models and experiments have other properties, such as making it easier to 
understand how “transportable” (from the particular system under study to other similar systems 
or to the same system in the future) the knowledge obtained is. in other words, understanding 
on how particular systems work, derived from mechanismic experiments, provides more 
control on the possibility of generalizing that knowledge (even though mechanismic models 
are inherently less general than phenomenological ones). 20 Another property of such models 
within an ecological context, at least when performed within a reductionist framework, is 
(a) the possibility of obtaining quantitative predictions generated from the individual level, 
i.e., independently from those obtained at community level, and (b) the possibility of trying to 
reconstruct the processes by which communities assemble from models of processes related 
to individuals. both advantages contribute to enhancing control over the results obtained 
through other research tactics. 21
17 For details on the study see, e.g., broWn, J. h. and heSke, E. J., “Control of Desert-Grassland transition by a 
Keystone Rodent Guild,” Science, v. 250, (1990), pp. 1705-1707 and references therein. For further analysis on the 
methodological aspects of the study see broWn, J. h., “the Desert Granivory Experiments at Portal,” in reSetaritS, W. 
J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, pp. 71-95, and dunhaM, a. e. and Beaupre, 
S. J., “Ecological Experiments. Scale, Phenomenology, Mechanisms, and the illusion of Generality,” in reSetaritS, W. 
J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, pp. 27-49. 
18 Cf. dunhaM, a. e. and Beaupre, S. J., “Ecological Experiments. Scale, Phenomenology, Mechanisms, and the 
illusion of Generality,” pp. 27-49.
19 See Marone l., lopez de caSenave, J., MileSi, F. a. and cueto, v. r., “Can Seed-Eating birds Exert top-Down 
Effects on Grasses of the Monte Desert?,” Oikos, v. 117, (2008), pp. 611-619.
20 Cf. GonzÁlez del Solar, r. La explicación en ecología, treball de Recerca (Master’s thesis) submitted as a 
partial requisite for attaining the Diploma of Advanced Studies (Department of Philosophy, Universitat Autònoma de 
barcelona, 2006.)
21 See Werner, e. e., “Ecological Experiments and a Research Program in Community Ecology,” in reSetaritS, W. 
J. and Bernardo, J. (eds.), Experimental Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, pp. 3-26.
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2.2. Realism and Rigor in Ecological Experiments 
As we have shown in the preceding examples, ecological experiments offer interesting 
possibilities for advancing knowledge on natural systems. however, they also exhibit some 
constraints that need to be taken into account when planning their use in a given research 
project. in the previous section, we saw one limitation of mechanism-free experiments; 
now we will deal with a limitation that affects all kinds of experiments —whether 
phenomenological or mechanismic—, namely the need to compromise between “realism” 
and “rigor.” 
Ecological manipulations carried out in artificial environments (e.g., the laboratory) 
provide maximum control on the variables of interest, as well as maximum precision in 
their measurements (i.e., rigor). yet, laboratory experiments involve far less factors than 
those acting in natural systems, and may produce results so influenced by artifacts of the 
experimental technique that may end up representing little or not at all the natural facts 
under study. On the other hand, experiments conducted in natural settings provide maximum 
realism in the sense that they involve far more factors than laboratory experiments, and are 
less prone to be affected by artifacts. however, manipulations in natural environments are 
not without shortcomings, since the mere complexity of the experimental setting leaves 
many factors unattended, with the consequent decrease in control and/or precision (rigor). 
in sum, there are unavoidable trade-offs between realism and rigor in choosing the setting 
for an experiment. 22 the fact that experiments conducted in the laboratory can yield results 
completely opposed to those from experiments carried out in natural environments or from 
non-experimental observations is a good indication of the complexity of the situation. let 
us see an example.
in a study on the competitive mechanisms at play between the wood frog (Rana sylvatica) 
and the leopard frog (Rana pipiensis) experiments at different scales (i.e., at the lab and in 
progressively more natural environments) were performed. 23 the goal of the study was to 
analyze the effects of activity level and body size on the interactions between the two types 
of frogs, so researchers conducted an experiment in highly controlled (artificial) conditions. 
Eventually, the results of the trial unambiguously showed that leopard frogs were more active 
than —and dominant relative to— wood frogs. in contrast, all other studies carried out by 
the same research group —as well as those performed by other groups— either experimental 
or observational, clearly indicated that the relationship between these two frogs species was 
exactly the other way round: it was the wood frogs which were dominant.
because there is no way to know in advance whether —and to what extent— technical 
artifacts have biased the results of an experiment, it is advisable to perform several experiments 
with different degrees of naturalness and to include observational procedures as an attempt to 
answer the same question or similar versions of the question. Convergence of results coming 
from environments representing a gradient between complete naturalness and complete 
artificiality works as a control of the adequacy of its results.
22 Cf. Morin, p., “Realism, Precision and Generality in Experimental Ecology,” in reSetaritS, W. J. and Bernardo, J. 
(eds.), Experimental Ecology: Issues and Perspectives, pp. 50-70.
23 Cf. Werner, e. e., “Competitive interactions between Wood Frog and Northern leopard Frog larvae: the 
influence of Size and Activity,” Copeia, n. 1992, (1992), pp. 26-35; see also Werner, e. e., “Ecological Experiments 
and a Research Program in Community Ecology,” pp. 3-26.
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3. fInal remarks 
One of the consequences of ecological systems being complex and historically contingent is 
that, if we wish to understand present ecological phenomena, we will often need to undertake 
a reconstruction of the system’s past. 24 As historical trajectories —and complex processes in 
general— are not directly accessible to our senses, observation alone will not suffice. this 
situation calls for other research tactics, namely experimental and theoretical ones, which can be 
combined with observations in order to widen and/or deepen ecological knowledge.
Richard levins and Richard lewontin, respectively ecologist and evolutionary biologist, 
have already noted the convenience of considering that it is the entities under study —and 
not some methodological a priori— that should dictate which are the most adequate research 
tactics in each circumstance. 25 thus, it is possible to think that, as inquiry advances, iterative 
shifts from observation to experiment (to “theory”), and back, will probably be necessary in 
long-term research projects, depending on what the particular questions to be answered in each 
stage dictate. Furthermore, such iteration between different methodological tactics provides a 
source of mutual control.
the cases we have briefly discussed in this paper illustrate that where one empirical tactic 
fails, another one may be successful, and that ecological research needs observation and 
experiment (phenomenological as well as mechanismic, conducted both in artificial and in 
natural settings) in order to advance. Consequently, we believe that much of the fervor of the 
methodological debates between supporters of observation (or the comparative approach) and 
more or less radical experimentalists seems not to be justified. 
We have not provided examples on the advantages of the interaction between theoretical 
and empirical tactics, but we think that it is defensible in similar terms to those used here to 
defend the integration of observation and experiment. 26 Observing, conjecturing, modeling 
and manipulating natural systems iteratively and at different scales would provide ecologists 
with an opportunity to explore the present and the past of the system under study, and 
eventually show whether the hypotheses put forth to describe or explain its trajectory are 
plausible enough to be accepted. this is a rather different view from that of the traditional 
methodological approach described in the introduction of the present paper, which pictures 
ecological research as too rigid a procedure, not taking into account that observations and 
experiments can serve different purposes depending on the particular epistemic needs of the 
research project. Not all research projects start with observations, nor are these always the 
source of patterns, nor are experiments always used to put hypotheses to test.
Some ecologists have defended the need to integrate the diverse conceptual constructions 
that coexist in ecology, 27 and philosophers of different schools have preconized the unity of 
science at theoretical and methodological levels. 28 there is, however, another possibility. this 
24 Cf. Marone, l., “los alcances y límites de la investigación en ecología evolutiva,” in GotthelF, R. (ed.), La 
investigación desde sus protagonistas. Senderos y estrategias, EDiUNC, Mendoza, 2006, pp. 231-247.
25 Cf. levinS, r. and leWontin, r., “Dialectics and Reductionism in Ecology,” in Saarinen, E. (ed.), Conceptual 
Issues in Ecology, D. Reidel, boston, 1982, pp-107-138. the precedence of ontology with respect to methodology has 
also been preconized by philosophers, see, e.g., BunGe, M. A., Chasing Reality. Strife over Realism, University of 
toronto Press, toronto, 2006.
26 See Werner, e. e., “Ecological Experiments and a Research Program in Community Ecology,” for an example.
27 Cf. pickett, S. t. a., kolaSa, J. and JoneS, c. G., Ecological Understanding. The Nature of Theory and the Theory 
of Nature, Academic Press, San Diego, CA, 1994. 
28 Remarkably the logical empiricists and many realists, such as Karl Popper and Mario bunge.
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is still a kind of methodological integration, but one that stresses tactics, rather than strategies. 
More precisely, we believe that the combination of observational, experimental and theoretical 
approaches within one particular research project offers multiple advantages. One of them is 
that when any particular tactic fails to guide the next step of the inquiry, it is possible that a 
different tactic provides such guidance, as shown by the example of Plecoptera studies. yet, 
perhaps the most attractive feature of this proposal is that in the same way that consistency 
is one source of reliability of our knowledge, procedural integration provides a source of 
reliability for the results of the research project. this idea, of course, is not new. William 
Whewell defended the notion of “consilience of inductions” in the xix century and insisted 
on the importance of the convergence of results as a source of reliability of inductions. 29 We 
believe that ecology is a field where this notion of consilience or convergence is particularly 
useful and deserves further development.
Concluding, methodological pluralism within one research project in ecology is an interesting 
possibility. lack of constructive dialog between different forms of scientific experience and 
between these and theory hinders the advancement of ecological science. Each methodological 
approach has its possibilities and limitations, thus adherence to one of them, to be reasonable, has 
to be moderate. those that deserve our sternest criticism are not the approaches in themselves, 
but their abusive or unjustified utilization. 30
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